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ABSTRACT 
 
Essays on the Role and Influence of Top Managers on Firm Interactions With Secondary 
Stakeholders 
 
BY 
 
François Neville 
 
July 7th, 2016 
 
 
Committee Chair: Pamela Barr 
Major Academic Unit: Department of Managerial Sciences 
Firm behavior and performance has become increasingly susceptible to the influence of 
secondary stakeholders—namely community activists, advocacy groups, religious organizations, 
and other non-governmental organizations that often represent a broader social movement. 
Despite recent suggestions that secondary stakeholder demands trigger an important two-sided 
interactive process between secondary stakeholders and their targeted firms, little theoretical or 
empirical attention has been placed on firm-sided factors that influence the dynamics and 
outcomes of these interactions, especially the role and influence of the firm’s top managers 
during these interactions. In this three-essay dissertation, I theorize about and examine the 
influential role that the firm’s top managers expectedly occupy within the interactions that occur 
   
 
between secondary stakeholders and the firms that are the targets of their demands. My 
dissertation contributes to advancing strategic management and organization research by (1) 
examining influential managerial attributes that influence their firm’s responsiveness toward 
secondary stakeholder activism, and (2) examining certain important consequences of 
managerial responses for secondary stakeholder behavior and the targeted firm. 
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Chapter 1 
MOTIVATING AND POSITIONING THE DISSERTATION  
“You can please some of the people all of the time, and all of the people some of 
the time, but you can’t please all of the people all of the time…” —Abraham 
Lincoln 
 
 Firms have found themselves increasingly susceptible to being challenged by secondary 
stakeholders such as community activists, advocacy groups, religious organizations, and other 
non-governmental organizations (see: Barr, 2014; Eesley & Lenox, 2006; King, 2008; Soule, 
Swaminathan, & Tihanyi, 2014); noted for their usage of threatening performance tactics such as 
boycotts and protests (Downey & Rohlinger, 2008; Lipsky, 1968; Soule, 2009). Although the 
firm’s survival may not entirely depend on receiving continued support from these groups per se 
(Clarkson, 1995), secondary stakeholders have the capacity to disrupt firm routines and impose 
costs on the firm, create impediments for the firm in obtaining resources, and mobilize public 
opinion against the firm to potentially damage its reputation (den Hond & de Bakker, 2007; 
Eesley & Lenox, 2006; King, 2008; McDonnell & King, 2013). How a firm copes with—and 
responds to—secondary stakeholder demands therefore implies important strategic and 
performance-related consequences. Indeed, Greenpeace succeeding in forcing Shell Oil to 
terminate its Arctic drilling operations, and People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) 
successfully halting Abercrombie & Fitch’s usage of Australian merino wool serve as powerful 
examples of how firm responses to secondary stakeholders implicate broad reaching 
consequences for firm strategies, competitive behavior, and performance (Glaser, 2015; PETA, 
2004). 
 In this regard, academic research and popular media accounts demonstrate that 
considerable heterogeneity exists in firm responsiveness to secondary stakeholder demands. 
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While some firms concede entirely to secondary stakeholder demands, others appear to not 
respond at all (Eesley & Lenox, 2006; King, 2008). Some firms issue prosocial claims as a way 
to offset any potentially negative attention that a secondary stakeholder thrusts onto the firm 
(McDonnell & King, 2013), and others issue symbolic responses as a way to appease secondary 
stakeholder activists without committing to making any substantive strategic or policy-related 
changes (Bundy, Shropshire, & Buchholtz, 2013). By extension, because target firms may 
respond to secondary stakeholder demands in many different ways, this introduces very different 
consequences for the subsequent behaviors and actions of secondary stakeholders and for the 
outcomes of the interactions between these entities and their target firms.  
 To date, most of the work that contributes toward our understanding of the interactions 
between secondary stakeholders and their target firms has primarily focused on understanding 
the antecedents of secondary stakeholder group formation and mobilization (den Hond & de 
Bakker, 2007; Rowley & Moldoveanu, 2003), or which secondary stakeholder attributes and 
tactics yield concessions from target firms (Eesley & Lenox, 2006; King, 2008; Weber, Thomas, 
& Rao, 2009). However, despite a recent acknowledgement that secondary stakeholder group 
challenges ‘trigger’ an important two-sided interactive process in which both secondary 
stakeholders and their target firm “are engaged in public performances” (McDonnell & King, 
2013: 409), little theoretical or empirical attention has been placed on firm-sided factors, 
especially with regards to the role and influence of the firm’s top managers as the foremost 
actors that influence these interactions. This is an important omission, as logical and theoretical 
grounds both dictate that the targeted firm’s top managers occupy two important and related 
functions that ought to bear considerable influence over the interactions between secondary 
stakeholders and their target firms, as well as over the outcomes of these interactions. 
Chapter 1 – Motivating and Positioning the Dissertation   
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 First, a core insight in upper-echelons and strategic leadership research contends that the 
firm is a reflection of its top managers (Hambrick & Mason, 1984); the characteristics of the 
firm’s managers drive the interpretation of environmental stimuli and firm actions in response to 
these. Firm responsiveness toward secondary stakeholder demands can therefore can therefore be 
seen as contingent on how the target firm’s top managers interpret such an uncertain strategic 
issue, consider potential courses-of-action, and ultimately shape firm actions in accordance with 
these interpretations (Barr, 1998). Second, a key function of top managers lies in managing the 
firm’s external environment, through representing the firm to a range of external stakeholders 
(Fanelli & Misangyi, 2006; Pfeffer, 1981; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). In this regard, prior work 
demonstrates that the type of language managers utilize, in order to rally support from the 
external environment and obtain resources, has considerable influence on the behavior of 
external stakeholders (Fanelli, Misangyi, & Tosi, 2009). As such, whether a targeted firm’s top 
managers decide to respond to a secondary stakeholder’s demands and/or the manner in which 
they articulate a response (i.e. language used, tone of the response) would be expected to 
influence subsequent secondary stakeholder behavior and the outcomes of the ongoing 
interactions between this group and the target firm. 
1.1. Guiding Research Questions 
 In this dissertation, I build on the above considerations and focus on the influence of the 
role of top managers within the context of firm interactions with secondary stakeholders, in order 
to develop a more complete understanding of firm responsiveness to secondary stakeholders, and 
the consequences of interactions between these groups and their target firms more generally. To 
accomplish these objectives, I first focus on the socio-cognitive attributes of a targeted firm’s top 
managers and how these attributes influence these managers’ evaluations of secondary 
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stakeholder demands, which subsequently shape their responsiveness toward these demands. 
Secondly, I focus on the attributes of top managers’ responses to a secondary stakeholder 
demand to understand how responses may differently influence secondary stakeholders group 
behavior. As such, the dissertation is guided by two general research questions: 
1. What managerial attributes influence firm responsiveness to secondary stakeholders?  
2. What are the consequences of managers’ response rhetoric for secondary stakeholders 
and the target firm? 
1.2. Overarching Contributions 
 Although each chapter within the dissertation makes more pointed contributions in its 
own fashion, the findings of the dissertation make three noteworthy overarching theoretical 
contributions to strategic management and organization research. First, the dissertation 
contributes to stakeholder theory and to the literature on firm management of stakeholders by 
examining the cognitive challenges that secondary stakeholder demands present to the firm’s top 
managers. Although researchers have recently pointed to the importance of managerial cognition 
for understanding firm responsiveness toward stakeholder concerns (Bundy et al., 2013), 
theoretical development and empirical investigations related to the role of top managers 
cognition and cognitive attributes in such situations remain sparse. 
 Second, in focusing on the role of top managers within the context of secondary 
stakeholder demands, the dissertation contributes to research on upper echelons and strategic 
leadership. In particular, the dissertation emphasizes the role of executives’ personal values in 
evaluating secondary stakeholder demands and subsequently shaping their responses to these 
demands. Thus, the dissertation heeds a call for greater attention to understanding the causal 
linkages between managers’ personal values and cognition, and to examine how managers’ 
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values and specific situations interact to influence choice (see: Finkelstein, Hambrick, & 
Cannella, 2009). In addition, by also examining how secondary stakeholder group actions and 
behavior may change in light of differences in the responses that a targeted firm’s managers 
issue, the dissertation adds to the emergent area of research that focuses on the various ways in 
which top managers may manage the firm’s external environment and interact with its 
constituents through an array of substantive and symbolic actions (e.g. Barnard, 1938; Fanelli et 
al., 2009; Finkelstein et al., 2009; Westley & Mintzberg, 1989). 
 Finally, because secondary stakeholders often represent a broader social movement (den 
Hond & de Bakker, 2007), the dissertation also contributes to the literature on social movements. 
Specifically, interactions between social movements and firms have recently drawn an increased 
amount of interest from social movement scholars, but this stream of research remains in its early 
stages of development (see: King, 2008). Much of the work that seeks to understand interactions 
between social movements and firms is primarily concerned with explaining how a movement 
may challenge a targeted firm to influence its behavior. Consequently, much more is known 
about the movement-side aspects of the interaction than the firm-side of it (McDonnell & King, 
2013). The dissertation not only sheds additional light on firm-side explanations of the 
interaction between social movements and their targeted firms, it also places a focus on the 
targeted firm’s top managers as influential actors within this interaction. 
 The dissertation is organized into three distinct, yet related, essays. A summarized 
description of these essays is presented in Table 1. In the first essay (Chapter 2), I develop a 
theoretical model that advances top managers’ personal values and passion as concepts that can 
advance our understanding of firm responsiveness to secondary stakeholder demands. Building 
on previous developments in upper-echelons research and cognitive an social psychology, I 
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illustrate how top managers’ personal values trigger a cognitive process that are associated with 
the posture of a firm’s response to secondary stakeholders and how top managers’ passion 
influence the degree of commitment to the chosen response posture. In the second essay (Chapter 
3), I conducted an archival study to investigate whether and how top mangers’ political 
ideologies (a proxy for values) influence firm responsiveness to secondary stakeholder demands. 
Finally, in the third essay (Chapter 4), I conducted an experiment to investigate how variations in 
responses to secondary stakeholder demands influence subsequent secondary stakeholder group 
behavior. Table 1 summarizes these essays. 
TABLE 1 
Organization of the Dissertation 
Chapter Research Question(s) Description 
Chapter 2 
 
What top manager attributes influence firm 
responsiveness toward secondary 
stakeholders? 
 
Theoretical essay that focuses on 
managers’ values and passion as concepts 
to advance our understanding of firm 
responsiveness to secondary stakeholder 
demands. 
 
Chapter 3 To what extent do top managers’ values 
influence firm responsiveness to secondary 
stakeholders? 
 
Archival study to investigate how 
mangers’ political ideologies (a proxy for 
values) influence firm response strategies 
to secondary stakeholder activism. 
 
Chapter 4 
 
1. How and why do different responses to 
secondary stakeholder demands 
influence the subsequent behavior and 
actions of secondary stakeholders?  
2. To what extent can top managers 
strategically frame their responses to 
influence secondary stakeholder 
behavior and actions?  
Two-by-two experiment in which 
participants, assuming the role of 
secondary stakeholders report their 
intentions to execute additional 
threatening actions toward the firm, and 
form beliefs regarding the firm’s 
corporate opportunity structure. 
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Chapter 2 
A TOP MANAGER-DRIVEN PROCESS MODEL OF FIRM RESPONSIVENESS TO 
SECONDARY STAKEHOLDERS: THE ROLE OF PERSONAL VALUES AND 
PASSION 
“It's not hard to make decisions when you know what your values are.”—Roy 
Disney 
 
“Better pass boldly into that other world, in the full glory of some passion, than 
fade and wither dismally with age…”—James Joyce 
 
 As contemporary notions of firm effectiveness and performance have progressively 
implicated deeper considerations for how firms impact public welfare (see: Freeman, 1984; 
Lamin & Zaheer, 2012), many firms—namely, large publicly-traded corporations—have become 
increasingly susceptible targets of secondary stakeholder demands (den Hond & de Bakker, 
2007). Secondary stakeholders are those external constituents of the firm who are not engaged in 
transactions with it, and are not considered essential for its survival, but who may affect it in 
strategic and/or performance-related ways; for instance, community activists, advocacy groups, 
religious organizations, and other non-governmental organizations (Clarkson, 1995; Eesley & 
Lenox, 2006; Su & Tsang, 2015). A firm’s degree of responsiveness to a secondary stakeholder’s 
demands is, therefore, considered centrally important to its strategy because it entails substantial 
resource commitments and policy changes (Markman, Waldron, & Panagopoulos, 2016; 
McDonnell, King, & Soule, 2015; Pacheco & Dean, 2015; Waldron, Navis, & Fisher, 2013). 
 Recognizing that a firm’s degree of responsiveness is equivalent to that of its top 
managers, strategic management and organizational scholars have become increasingly 
interested in understanding the mechanisms that influence top managers’ interpretations of, and 
responses to, secondary stakeholder demands (e.g. Eesley & Lenox, 2006; Julian, Ofori-Dankwa, 
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& Justis, 2008; King, 2008; Waldron et al., 2013; Weber et al., 2009). Much of this research has 
leveraged Mitchell and colleagues’ (1997) stakeholder salience framework, which emphasizes 
key stakeholder attributes of power, legitimacy, and urgency, as primary drivers of stakeholder 
salience, and hence firm response (e.g. David, Bloom, & Hillman, 2007; Eesley & Lenox, 2006; 
Julian et al., 2008). More recently, others have placed theoretical attention more closely on the 
firm’s top managers by expanding upon the process(es) through which these individuals interpret 
secondary stakeholder demands, while still focusing on factors external to the firm’s top 
managers themselves that influence managerial interpretations (e.g. Waldron et al., 2013; see 
also: Bundy, Shropshire, & Buchholtz, 2013). As such, current research has little to offer in the 
way of a theoretical framework that focuses on the firm’s top managers themselves, or of one 
that attempts to link key top manager socio-cognitive attributes to their responsiveness to 
secondary stakeholder demands. 
I propose a top manager-driven perspective of firm responsiveness to secondary 
stakeholder demands, which I define as the degree to which the firm’s top managers are willing 
to accept secondary stakeholder demands and commit to continued work on the issues forming a 
basis for these demands (Bundy et al., 2013; IRRC, 1993; Waldron et al., 2013). Firms, per se, 
do not respond to secondary stakeholder demands. Rather, it is the firm’s top managers that have 
the ultimate decision-making authority over the degree to which they—and by extension, the 
firm—will be responsive to such demands (Agle, Mitchell, & Sonnenfeld, 1999; Mitchell et al., 
1997; Waldron et al., 2013). As Briscoe and colleagues note: “responses are not generated by 
amorphous ‘organizations,’ but instead emanate from debates and deliberations by living, 
breathing decision makers. In many cases, these decision makers will include, perhaps integrally, 
the company’s CEO.” (2014: 1802; emphasis in original).  
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Concretely, I develop a dual process model that positions top managers’ personal values 
and passion as central, yet hitherto unconsidered, drivers of firm responsiveness to secondary 
stakeholder demands. In developing my perspective, I build on prior research demonstrating that 
secondary stakeholders coalesce around values-laden, emotionally charged social issues, and 
adopt positions and tactics that are often times initially considered radical or illegitimate (Davis, 
McAdam, Scott, & Zald, 2005; den Hond & de Bakker, 2007; McDonnell & King, 2013; Rowley 
& Moldoveanu, 2003; Soule, 2009). For the firm’s top managers, such demands implicate 
potential courses-of-action that are far from obvious; they are weak situations relative to primary 
stakeholder demands (Mischel, 1968). Under such circumstances, top managers’ interpretations 
and eventual responses are perhaps better conceptualized as a boundedly rational process that 
inescapably reflects these individuals’ own cognitive limitations in some fashion (Daft & Weick, 
1984; Hambrick & Mason, 1984; March & Simon, 1958; Mischel & Shoda, 1995). In this regard, 
recent social psychological argumentation suggests, given the coalescence of secondary 
stakeholders around values-laden and emotional positions, top managers to be reliant on their 
own personal values as important cognitive reference points or filters, whereby they are “likely 
to be value-biased whether or not [they are] clearly aware of or overtly display such bias” (Stolte 
& Fender, 2007: 60; see also: Rohan, 2000). I elaborate on the values-driven cognitive process 
through which top managers’ personal norms are activated pertaining to secondary stakeholder 
demands (Harland, Staats, & Wilke, 2007; Schwartz, 1973, 1974; Stern, 2000), in order to 
determine the posture of the firm’s response. Further, I expand upon how passion toward the 
issues that form the basis of secondary stakeholder demands can be expected to have 
considerable influence over the self-regulation processes that will determine top managers’ level 
of commitment to their response (Cardon, Wincent, Singh, & Drnovsek, 2009; Vallerand et al., 
Chapter 2 – A Top Manager-driven Process Model of Firm Responsiveness to Secondary Stakeholders: The Role of Personal Values and Passion  
 22 
2003). In developing this framework, I provide four principal contributions to strategic 
management and organizational research.  
 The first contribution is to the upper-echelons and strategic leadership literature by 
emphasizing the specific role of top manager personal values in processing secondary 
stakeholder demands and subsequently shaping their response to these entities’ demands. 
Scholars have acknowledged that, “values are undoubtedly important factors in executive choice, 
[which] have not been the focus of much systemic study” (Finkelstein et al., 2009: 57). In this 
essay I enrich upper-echelons research by outlining the intervening cognitive and psychological 
mechanisms through which top managers’ personal values come to be reflected in an 
increasingly important strategic action: responding to secondary stakeholder demands. 
Moreover, by articulating these arguments within the scenario of a secondary stakeholder 
demand, I heed a call for further understanding and examination of how executives’ personal 
values and specific situations interact to influence choice (Finkelstein et al., 2009). This is also 
consistent with recent suggestions that scholars apply a more configurational approach to 
studying the firms’ top managers; for instance, by accounting for how attributes of top managers 
as individuals interact with features of their environment (Busenbark, Krause, Boivie, & Graffin, 
2016). My theoretical framework also contributes to an emergent stream of research interested in 
understanding how top managers, and specifically the firm’s CEO, may mold the firm to reflect 
their own personal values and ideologies (e.g. Berson, Oreg, & Dvir, 2008; Chin, Hambrick, & 
Trevino, 2013; Hutton, Jiang, & Kumar, 2014; Petrenko, Aime, Ridge, & Hill, 2016) by 
examining how their personal values are ultimately reflected in their firm’s response to 
secondary stakeholder demands, which can be seen emblematic of breadth of the firm’s approach 
to managing its array of current and potential stakeholders.  
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Second, this work contributes to stakeholder theory by specifying the means by which top 
managers’ personal values influence both these individuals’ interpretations of secondary 
stakeholder salience. Within stakeholder theory, the stakeholder salience framework (Mitchell et 
al., 1997) has long been used to explain why certain stakeholders garner the attention of—and 
are prioritized by—the firm’s top managers, and has since been extended to understand 
secondary stakeholder salience as well as firm responsiveness to secondary stakeholder demands 
(e.g. David et al., 2007; Eesley & Lenox, 2006; Julian et al., 2008). The stakeholder salience 
framework draws primarily on resource dependence theory and institutional theory to argue that 
stakeholder salience is a function of three attributes: power, legitimacy, and urgency. However, 
as noted by Mitchell and colleagues, stakeholder attributes are variable and socially constructed, 
and their “presence or absence […] shapes or is shaped by CEO values” (Agle et al., 1999: 510). 
By providing a sharper focus on top managers’ personal values, my model advances this field’s 
understanding of how and why top managers’ personal values affect the relative influence of 
each stakeholder attribute seen to comprise stakeholder salience. Further, in focusing on 
understanding firm responsiveness to secondary stakeholder demands specifically, I expand on 
the wealth of prior research in stakeholder theory to draw a sharper theoretical distinction 
between primary stakeholder demands and secondary stakeholder demands. Specifically, I 
highlight the relative situational weakness inherent in secondary stakeholder demands as well as 
several additional characteristics of these demands, which, altogether further motivate the need 
for a top manger-driven perspective of firm responsiveness to such demands.  
 Third, this work contributes to social movement theory by highlighting the characteristics 
of the firm’s top managers as important elements that influence firm interactions with secondary 
stakeholders.  Because secondary stakeholders typically represent a broader social movement 
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(den Hond & de Bakker, 2007), researchers building on social movement theory have focused 
extensively on understanding the various aspects of a firm’s opportunity structure (King, 2008; 
McDonnell et al., 2015; Schneiberg & Lounsbury, 2008; Soule, 2009), which refers to the 
features of individual firms that make them more (or less) attractive to activists, and hence, 
predict the likelihood of activist campaign success or of secondary stakeholders even mobilizing 
in the first place. The model developed in this paper draws attention to the firm’s top managers 
and their responses to secondary stakeholder demands as a potentially strong element of the 
firm’s opportunity structure. Moreover, by outlining how and why top managers’ personal values 
and passion are reflected in their response and, hence, potential receptiveness to activist 
campaigns, I provide scholars conducting work at the intersection of social movements and firms 
with starting points to build on recent calls and trends in this literature to refocus energy on 
identifying elements of firm’s opportunity structure that are internal to the firm itself (see: 
Briscoe et al., 2014; McDonnell & King, 2013). 
 Finally, by demonstrating how top managers’ personal values and passion may come into 
play when they consider certain types of strategic issues, the arguments presented in this paper 
also connect with theories related to managers’ general interpretation and labeling of strategic 
issues (e.g. Dutton & Jackson, 1987; Jackson & Dutton, 1988). While the labeling and 
categorization of strategic issues has traditionally been depicted as a process that accounts for 
how issues may imply various consequences for the firm, the developments within this work 
open the possibility of considering that the labeling and categorization of certain strategic issues 
involves much more fundamental cognitive and psychological processes that are primarily driven 
by managers’ individual personal values and passion. 
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2.1. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
  The question of what determines whether and how firms will respond to secondary 
stakeholder demands has become a matter of considerable scholarly attention and practical 
importance. Researchers concerned with understanding the interactions between secondary 
stakeholders and firms have usually leveraged theoretical perspectives that emphasize factors 
external to the firm itself. This emphasis on external or stakeholder-sided mechanisms finds its 
roots most prominently in stakeholder theory. The basic premise underlying this general research 
orientation is that secondary stakeholders play a part in shaping a firm’s domain (Freeman, 
1984), and have the ability to provide it with important performance-related resources as well as 
to take these resources away, impose important costs on the firm, and disrupt established 
practices and routines (Eesley & Lenox, 2006; Julian et al., 2008, Su & Tsang, 2015; Waldron et 
al., 2013).  
 Mitchell and colleagues’ (1997) theory of stakeholder identification and salience features 
prominently in most inquiries focused on how firms respond to secondary stakeholder demands. 
Stakeholder salience is defined as the degree to which a stakeholder and its demands resonate 
with and are prioritized by management (Bundy et al., 2013; Mitchell et al., 1997). According to 
the framework, stakeholder salience, in general (i.e. for primary and secondary stakeholders 
alike) is driven by three inter-related stakeholder attributes: power, legitimacy, and urgency. 
Power contributes to salience because it indicates the relative access to resources for the 
stakeholder group with respect to the firm being targeted, and consequently, determines the 
extent to which the relationship between the firm and the stakeholder group is one that is firm or 
stakeholder dominant, or one of mutual dependence. Legitimacy, defined as the generalized 
perception that stakeholder group conduct is “desirable, proper or appropriate within some 
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socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (1997: 866; see also: 
Suchman, 1995), contributes to salience because it influences the extent to which the stakeholder 
presents a credible threat in its ability to influence other potentially important firm stakeholders 
such as customers and labor supply (Eesley & Lenox, 2006). Finally, urgency also influences 
stakeholder salience because it refers to the degree to which stakeholder claims call for 
immediate attention and hence, places some pressure on the firm’s top executives to act. 
Building on these arguments, Eesley and Lenox (2006) found that secondary stakeholders with 
greater power relative to the target firm in terms of resources, and whose requests are deemed 
more legitimate in the eyes of the general public are considered more salient to the firm. 
Likewise, in related work on investor activism, which included many secondary stakeholder-
initiated shareholder proposals, David and colleagues (2008) demonstrated that managerial 
receptivity was positively associated with proposals filed by more salient shareholder activists; 
those with larger ownership stakes, affiliations to the Council of Institutional Investors and the 
Interfaith Center of Corporate Responsibility, and presenting demands affecting primary 
stakeholders.  
 This external focus is also found in related work outside of the stakeholder theory 
domain. For instance, because secondary stakeholders often represent a broader social movement 
(den Hond & de Bakker, 2007), findings from research leveraging social movement theories also 
offer some support for the role of stakeholder-sided mechanisms in shaping firm responses. For 
example, research in this stream suggests that the degree to which secondary stakeholders draw 
media attention increases the chances of firm concessions because media attention may be 
viewed as an indicator of potential consumer support for secondary stakeholders’ demands and 
as “a conduit of negative images and grievances brought by activists against the company” 
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(King, 2008: 400; see also: King & Soule, 2007). Others have focused on other external drivers 
of response, such as whether a firm’s competitors respond or the degree to which the firm is 
dependent on the market targeted by a social movement (Pacheco & Dean, 2015).  
  More recently, scholars have denoted the importance of re-balancing our understanding 
of the factors that drive firm response to secondary stakeholders toward a deeper consideration of 
influential factors internal to the firm (McDonnell & King, 2013; Waldron et al., 2013). As 
Julian and his colleagues remark: “variations across firms targeted by specific secondary 
stakeholder groups were not fully considered” (2008: 977). As such, alternative conceptions of 
firm response to secondary stakeholders have increasingly implicated ideas of strategic decision-
making, just as Freeman (1984) and others originally conceived during the stakeholder theory’s 
nascent stages of development. As Clarkson stated, “a company and its management are free to 
decide the extent to which they will acknowledge, recognize, or pursue obligations and 
responsibilities to their stakeholders” (1995: 105). Even Mitchell and colleagues note that the 
determinants of stakeholder salience are variable, as well as socially constructed (not objective 
realities), and that “managers are the only group of stakeholders with direct control over the 
decision-making apparatus of the firm” (1997: 871).  More recently, others remark, “activists 
cannot change industry practices unless the managers of each type of firm type decide to 
comply” (Waldron et al., 2013: 398). 
 Despite these suggestions, only limited research has focused on influential factors 
internal to the firm, or firm-sided mechanisms, to better understand firm responsiveness to 
secondary stakeholder demands. Yet, this emerging vein of research does suggest that the firm’s 
top managers are central drivers of the firm’s response; specifically, the firm’s response is 
regarded as commensurate to that of its top managers (Julian et al., 2008; Waldron et al., 2013; 
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see also: Bundy et al., 2013). In this regard, recent theorization suggests that top managers 
consider the meaningfulness of activist-contested practices to their firm’s defining qualities, and 
the extent to which social movement activism is aligned with their firm’s stakeholder culture (i.e. 
social [moralist] vs. economic [egoist]), in order to determine the degree to which an activist 
campaign threatens the firm and warrants substantive strategic changes (Waldron et al., 2013). In 
related research on firm responsiveness to stakeholders, in general, Bundy and his colleagues 
(2013) outline a strategic cognition framework of stakeholder issue salience, that suggests that 
managers consider stakeholder demands through the dual lenses of their firm’s identity and 
strategic frame, in order to evaluate stakeholder issues and determine an appropriate firm 
response strategy. However, these authors still “position issue salience as a central driver of firm 
responsiveness” (2013: 353). In the only empirical study to date considering firm-sided 
mechanisms, Julian and colleagues (2008) found that top managers’ urgency and manageability 
assessments of interest group pressures were each positively associated with the extent to which 
firms accommodated these entities demands. 
 The dearth of theory as to the attributes of the firm’s top managers themselves and the 
processes through which these attributes affect firm responsiveness to secondary stakeholder 
demands is apparent. Stakeholder-sided research, with its almost exclusive focus on the attributes 
of the stakeholders, provides an important perspective through which to further understand firm 
response to secondary stakeholder demands. However, argumentation in this tradition is limited 
by the presumption that top managers, and by extension their firms, differ in their responses only 
to the extent that the attributes and behaviors of secondary stakeholders they encounter differ. 
Firm-sided research does highlight the role of managerial decision-making but focuses on top 
managers’ perceptions of firm-level cognitive structures and filters (e.g. organizational identity, 
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strategic frame, stakeholder culture) in determining response, and provides little understanding 
of the relationship between the attributes of top managers themselves and the how these translate 
toward response to secondary stakeholder demands in particular. However, as I proceed to 
expand upon, there is reason to believe that response to secondary stakeholders is significantly 
influenced by factors related to the top managers themselves, specifically their personal values 
and passion. In order to further substantiate this argument, I now turn my attention to examining 
some of the key differences between primary stakeholder demands and secondary stakeholder 
demands. 
2.1.1. Primary Stakeholders, Secondary Stakeholders, and the Firm’s Top Managers 
 In order to motivate the need for a top manager-driven model of firm responsiveness to 
secondary stakeholders, it is important to understand some of key distinctions that differentiate 
primary stakeholders and their demands from secondary stakeholders and their demands. As 
Table 2 summarizes, primary and secondary stakeholders and their demands differ along four 
main dimensions; the first two reflects differences in the nature of primary and secondary 
stakeholders themselves, and the last two reflect distinctive manners in which their respective 
interpretation varies for top managers.  
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TABLE 2 
Differences Between Primary and Secondary Stakeholder Demands 
Dimension Primary Stakeholders Secondary Stakeholders 
Relationship to the firm Permanent and necessary Ad-hoc and unnecessary 
Issues forming basis for 
demands 
Routinized, within the scope 
of the firm’s domain and 
operations 
Socio-political, values-laden, 
and emotional 
Situational strength High Æ Low to moderate 
managerial discretion 
Low Æ High managerial 
discretion 
Cognitive basis Cold, deliberate and 
analytical, reliant on objective 
and external cognitive frames 
and filters 
Hot, intuitive and affective, 
reliant on individual cognitive 
frames and filters 
 
  
 The first row of Table 1 suggests a critical difference between primary and secondary 
stakeholders: their relationship to the firm. A primary stakeholder group is essential for the firm 
to continue surviving, one that the firm is often beholden to as a result of legal or contractual 
mechanisms. “Primary stakeholder groups typically are comprised of shareholders and investors, 
employees, customers, and suppliers, together with what is defined as the public stakeholder 
group: the governments and communities that provide infrastructures and markets, whose laws 
and regulations must be obeyed, and to whom taxes and other obligations may be due.” 
(Clarkson, 1995: 106). In contrast, firms are not dependent on—and in all but very rare cases, 
legally or contractually beholden to—secondary stakeholders in the same fashion as they are on 
primary stakeholders such as investors, employees, customers, and suppliers (Clarkson, 1995; 
den Hond & de Bakker, 2007; Eesley & Lenox, 2006). As Clarkson explains, “if any primary 
stakeholder group, such as customers or suppliers, becomes dissatisfied and withdraws from the 
corporate system, in whole or in part, the corporation will be seriously damaged or unable to 
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continue as a going concern” (1995: 106). Correspondingly, there is no obvious way in which the 
firm’s top managers may understand the strategic and performance-related implications of 
secondary stakeholder demands in a similar manner to the way in which they may understand the 
consequences of primary stakeholder demands. In this regard, Bundy and colleagues note the 
following: 
Consider stakeholder activists such as PETA or Greenpeace, which often use 
extreme smear campaigns against companies they perceive as violating animal or 
environmental rights. Often lacking legitimacy in the eyes of the public (Mitchell 
et al., 1997), such campaigns generally have little impact on a target firm’s 
strategic performance. Without a solid connection to strategic outputs or goals, 
these issues are unrelated to strategic frames (2013: 367). 
 The second row of Table 1 highlights a key distinction between the issues forming a basis 
for primary and secondary stakeholder demands. Secondary stakeholder demands are often 
emotionally charged and revolves around broader socio-political issues. For example, 
McDonnell and King examined secondary stakeholder activists’ boycott activity from 1990-2005 
and noted that these boycotts “contest a remarkable range of issues that span the political 
spectrum, from animal rights issues to environmental issues; labor rights issues to moral or 
religious issues like support of abortion or gay marriage” (2013: 396). Secondary stakeholders 
emerge as a result of collective action, typically predicated on some level of discontent with the 
firm eventually targeted by the request (Rowley & Moldoveanu, 2003; Tilly, 1978). Work on 
social movements also speaks to the importance for such entities to establish emotional 
connections with other individuals and groups otherwise initially unrelated to the focal 
movement (Dunn, 2004). Secondary stakeholders, therefore, often attempt to create situations to 
‘‘not-think, not-question, not-calculate, only to feel and ultimately to act on the ‘truth’ that has 
been presented’’ (Bailey, 1996). A key implication resulting from the emotional, ambiguous, and 
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complex nature of secondary stakeholder activism is that it makes top managers’ task of 
determining how to formulate an adequate response extremely challenging and complicated. 
 Building on the first two distinguishing features of primary and secondary stakeholder 
demands, the third and fourth rows of Table 1 demonstrate that primary and secondary 
stakeholder demands vary in the degree to which they contribute to situational strength and the 
cognitive basis that top managers may leverage to interpret such demands. Mischel (1968) first 
proposed that different situations vary in their capacity to enable or constrain human agency; 
situations can be categorized as being strong or weak. Strong situations are characterized by the 
presence of obvious norms and rigid roles, which tend to constrain the manifestation of 
individual differences and the potential for human agency to shape situational outcomes. In 
contrast, weak situations allow for more latitude or opportunity for the human agency to bear a 
strong influence on outcomes. Consistent with these insights, Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987) 
developed the concept of managerial discretion in an attempt to reconcile various viewpoints 
regarding the overall influence that the firm’s top managers have over firm-level actions and 
outcomes. It is argued that managerial discretion is determined by three inter-related factors: the 
firm’s environment, the firm’s industry, and characteristics of the focal executive. The influential 
combination of the three factors that determine discretion is liable to vary situationally; weak 
situations foster high managerial discretion and strong situations foster low levels of managerial 
discretion. In scenarios characterized by relatively weak situational strength, firm actions are 
argued to be increasingly reflective of top managers own cognitive limitations in some fashion 
(Finkelstein et al., 2009).  
 Finally, the last row of Table 1 distinguishes primary and secondary stakeholder demands 
in relation to the degree to which top managers are reliant on their individual cognitive bases to 
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interpret such demands. Given executives’ well-known cognitive limitations and their operating 
under conditions of bounded rationality, top managers can rely on a number of cognitive filters 
and concrete reference points to engage in deliberate, reflective, and orderly processing of a 
range of uncertain, ambiguous, and potentially emotional issues (see: Hodgkinson & Healey, 
2007; Narayanan, Zane, & Kemmerer, 2011; Porac & Thomas, 2002). Extant theory in strategic 
leadership and cognitive and social psychology conclusively indicates that decision makers tend 
to cope with emotional, ambiguous, and complex scenarios in part by relying on heuristic and 
intuitive processes that are based largely on subjective representations distilled from prior 
personal experiences (Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Kahneman, 2011; 
Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). More specifically, cognitive and social psychologists generally 
agree that when faced with stimuli encapsulating many of the characteristics of secondary 
stakeholder demands, individuals become increasingly reliant on dispositional interpretation or 
appraisal tendencies (Lerner & Keltner, 2010), heuristics (Forgas, 1995), or “prewired action 
patterns” (Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989). Moreover, individuals have been shown to 
become increasingly reliant on their personal values as important cognitive reference points or 
filters, whereby they are “likely to be value-biased whether or not [they are] clearly aware of or 
overtly displays such bias” (Stolte & Fender, 2007: 60; see also: Rohan, 2000). This ‘hot’ 
cognitive dimension (Bernheim & Rangel, 2004; Hodgkinson & Healey, 2011) often leads to an 
outcome or action that is different from what would otherwise have been envisioned under 
conditions of deliberate, structured and rational decision-making (Gaudine & Thorne, 2001), 
which typifies the process by which top managers interpret primary stakeholder demands .  
 In light of the expectation that firm responses to secondary stakeholder demands is likely 
to be influenced by top manager-level factors, the remainder of this essay is devoted to 
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developing a model that outlines a theoretically grounded process through which important top 
manager attributes influence firm response to secondary stakeholder demands.  
2.2. A TOP MANAGER-DRIVEN MODEL OF RESPONSIVENESS TO SECONDARY 
STAKEHOLDERS 
 My conceptualization of top manager responsiveness adopts an upper-echelons 
perspective and focuses on key attributes of top managers as predictors of firm responsiveness, 
which I define as the degree to which the firm’s top managers are willing to accept secondary 
stakeholder demands and commit to continued work on the issues forming a basis for these 
demands (Bundy et al., 2013; IRRC, 1993; Waldron et al., 2013).  This perspective is consistent 
with the recent shift of scholarly attention toward understanding the role of the firm’s top 
managers’ socio-cognitive interpretation of secondary stakeholder demands as an important 
driver of firm response to those demands (Bundy et al., 2013; King, 2008; Waldron et al., 2013). 
However, I suggest a novel focus by moving away from firm-level factors that influence those 
interpretations toward individual-level factors. In line with prior social psychological theory and 
research, I develop my framework in accordance with the causal process depicted in social 
psychological theories of planned behavior, in which cognition influences intentions, which in 
turn influence actions (Ajzen, 1991; Fishbein, 1975). Specifically, I build on a foundation of 
value-driven theories (e.g. value theory, norm-activation theory, value-belief-norm theory) and 
passion-driven theories of behavior (Rohan, 2000; Schwartz, 1973, 1977; Stern, Dietz, Abel, 
Guagnano, & Kalof, 1999; Vallerand et al., 2003). From this perspective, social actors execute 
actions and engage in behaviors based on personal norms that are activated by beliefs they form 
about environmental stimuli as a result of their worldviews, presumptions about the possible 
consequences of the issues under consideration, and the consequences of their actions (see: 
Chapter 2 – A Top Manager-driven Process Model of Firm Responsiveness to Secondary Stakeholders: The Role of Personal Values and Passion  
 35 
Harland et al., 2007; Stern, 2000). I argue that managers response to secondary stakeholder 
demands originates from a dual process rooted in a sense of obligation—given what firm’s top 
managers perceive and understand about a particular secondary stakeholder demand—to take 
action, and in the degree of passion that a top managers have toward the focal issues that form 
the basis for a given secondary stakeholder demand. Figure 1 depicts the overall framework 
developed in this paper. 
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FIGURE 1 
Process Model of Top Manager-Driven Responsiveness to Secondary Stakeholder Demands 
 
 
Chapter 2 – A Top Manager-driven Process Model of Firm Responsiveness to Secondary Stakeholders: The Role of Personal Values and Passion  
 37 
 The model highlights two attributes of a given top manager that are expected to influence 
response. Personal values are first expected to influence perception of secondary stakeholder 
salience. Once a secondary stakeholder is perceived as being salient, a top manager’s personal 
values activate personal norms related to which way to respond to the secondary stakeholder’s 
demands. In a parallel pathway, a top manager’s passion toward the issues forming a basis for a 
secondary stakeholder’s demands will come to influence the manager’s degree of commitment to 
the chosen response posture. The model also highlights the influence of other managerial 
attributes, CSE and charisma. For ease of exposition, and to emphasize the cognitive processes 
that drive firm responsiveness, the model is articulated at the individual-level, placing the focus 
on a single top manager’s interpretation of secondary stakeholder demands and the influence of 
this interpretative process on firm responsiveness. However, I do recognize the influence of the 
TMT, which is depicted in dashed lines because it falls outside the scope of this particular 
model’s purpose. 
2.2.1. Gaining Attention: Top Manager Values and Perceptions of Secondary Stakeholder 
Salience 
 The firm’s top managers must first focus their selective attention on the stakeholder and 
its demands, and prioritize it (Daft & Weick, 1984; Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Hoffman & 
Ocasio, 2001; Nadkarni & Barr, 2008). As described above, in the stakeholder theory literature, 
stakeholder salience refers to the degree to which a firm’s top managers might actually attend to, 
and prioritize, a given stakeholder group within the array of firm stakeholders. It follows, 
therefore, that stakeholder salience can be seen as a powerful predictor of response to secondary 
stakeholder demands because interpretations of salience implicates various resource dependence, 
institutional, and other strategic considerations (David et al., 2007; Eesley & Lenox, 2006; Julian 
Chapter 2 – A Top Manager-driven Process Model of Firm Responsiveness to Secondary Stakeholders: The Role of Personal Values and Passion  
 38 
et al., 2008). Others have suggested that because business principles and moral norms expectedly 
vary between executives based on various factors such as time, location, and culture, the 
“presence or absence of stakeholder attributes shapes and is shaped by CEO values” (Agle et al., 
1999: 510).  
 Values are expected to be especially critical attributes in the evaluation of the salience of 
secondary stakeholders because, as described previously, individuals are argued to rely on their 
personal values as important cognitive filters to interpret stimuli consistent with that represented 
by secondary stakeholder demands. Further, secondary stakeholder demands might also provide 
top managers with an opportunity to have the firm increasingly reflect their own ideologies 
(Busenbark et al., 2016), which are supported by personal values (Rohan, 2000). For instance, in 
a recent case, Chick-fil-A’s CEO Dan Cathy, an evangelical Christian, responded in an overtly 
strong fashion against some LGBT advocacy groups that stirred up public criticism over his 
firm’s history of making political campaign contributions to politicians unsupportive of same-sex 
marriage. In an interview with the Baptist Press, Cathy stated he was “guilty as charged” when 
asked about his, and by extension the firm’s, position on same-sex marriage, proceeding to 
explain “we are very much supportive of the family—the biblical definition of the family unit”, 
adding “we intend to stay the course” (see: Blume, 2012). Recent upper-echelons research 
suggests that a top managers’ values operate within the perceptual filtering process that 
influences their perceptions of secondary stakeholder salience (Finkelstein et al., 2009; see also: 
England, 1967), but it does not expand upon how the structure of a top manager’s personal 
values influences perceptions of secondary stakeholder attributes and thus, overall assessments 
of secondary stakeholder salience.  
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  Values are “desirable trans-situational goals, varying in importance, that serve as guiding 
principles in the life of a person or other social entity” (Schwartz, 1994: 21). Schwartz (1992, 
1994) articulates a framework that identifies two motivational dimensions that form a basis for 
an individual’s value system: an openness to change-conservation dimension, and a self-
enhancement-self-transcendence dimension (see also: Rohan, 2000; Schwartz, 1996b). The 
openness to change-conservation dimension reflects “the extent to which they (values) motivate 
people to follow their own intellectual and emotional interests in unpredictable and uncertain 
directions versus to preserve the status quo and the certainty it provides in relationship with close 
others, institutions, and traditions” (Schwartz, 1992: 43). The self-enhancement-self-
transcendence dimension relates to “the extent to which they (values) motivate people to enhance 
their own personal interests even at the expense of others versus the extent to which they 
motivate people to transcend selfish concerns and promote the welfare of others, close and 
distant, and of nature” (Schwartz, 1992: 43). Schwartz then proceeds to consider that personal 
values systems consist of ten value types arranged—or structured—along those two dimensions: 
power, achievement, hedonism, stimulation, self-direction, universalism, benevolence, 
conformity, tradition, and security. While other notable value theories and frameworks have been 
developed (e.g. Rokeach, 1973), there is little disagreement among social psychologists and 
value theorists that Schwartz’s value theory constitutes not only the most accurate representation 
of the structure and content of the human value system, but also offers the best understanding of 
how people differ in terms of the “dynamic organization of the value priorities on the 10 value 
types contained in the value system” (Rohan, 2000: 262; see also: Stern et al., 1999).  
Schwartz’s value theory states that individuals will vary in terms of how their respective 
value systems are structured along the openness to change-conservation and self-enhancement-
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self-transcendence dimensions. Additionally, it suggests that differences in the structure across 
different individuals’ value systems present different implications for the general motivated 
cognition process through which values influence perception and judgment (Hitlin, 2003; Kunda, 
1990; see also: Finkelstein et al., 2009; Hambrick & Mason, 1984). For example, adopting 
Schwartz’s framework, Matusik and her colleagues (2008) found that venture capitalists’ (VC) 
evaluations of new venture founders’ human capital were more favorable when those founders 
had acquired their human capital in accordance with the structure of VCs’ values along the 
openness to change-conservation dimension of the value system. 
 According to Schwartz’s value theory, the structure of top managers’ value systems will 
influence the attention that these individuals devote to specific secondary stakeholder attributes 
in their overall perceptions of secondary stakeholder salience. For instance, as the strength of a 
manager’s self-enhancement values increases—leading to an increasingly shareholder-centric 
view of the organization (Agle et al., 1999; see also: Chin et al., 2013)—the manager’s 
perceptions of secondary stakeholder salience would be influenced by the presence or absence of 
secondary stakeholder attributes that have some influence over the manager’s motivation to 
maximize shareholder wealth. In related work, Tetlock (2000) found differences between 
politically conservative and liberal (or egalitarian) middle managers in terms of their attitudes 
toward alternative corporate governance models. He concluded that conservatives consider 
property rights to be more important than other claims and that a focus on shareholder wealth 
uses resources most efficiently; they favor the shareholder model of governance over the 
stakeholder model. In contrast, liberals believe that firms should care more about societal needs; 
they are more likely to endorse the firm’s social engagement and its higher degree of 
responsibility to multiple stakeholders. Schwartz (1996) explicated and found that political 
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ideologies may be seen as accurate manifestations of individuals’ personal values. Concretely, 
people who are more liberal in their political ideology are more likely than those more 
conservative in their ideology to be sensitive to social issues in general and to such specific 
issues as diversity, social change, human rights, and the environment (i.e. strong motivations 
toward self-transcendence). 
 Because more powerful secondary stakeholders might be able to withhold or re-direct 
resources that influence the firm’s ability to maximize shareholder wealth, top managers with 
strong self-enhancement values would be expected to devote considerable cognitive effort or 
attentional focus toward ascertaining secondary stakeholder power in their overall assessment of 
secondary stakeholder salience, as well as weigh power relatively heavily in their assessment of 
secondary stakeholder salience. This logic suggests that the structure of top managers’ personal 
values will influence the cognitive effort (attention) focused on specific secondary stakeholder 
attributes in their overall perceptions of secondary stakeholder salience, and the relative 
importance of specific secondary stakeholder attributes (i.e. power, legitimacy, urgency) in their 
overall perceptions of secondary stakeholder salience. Perceptions of salience are a necessary 
precursor to evaluation of whether and how to respond to a secondary stakeholder, but do not, in 
and of themselves, determine whether an executive will respond and if so, the nature of that 
response.  In the proposed model, norm activation and passion strongly influence these decisions. 
2.2.2. Determining a Course-of Action: Top Manager Values and the ‘Activation’ of 
Personal Norms 
 Once deemed to be salient to the firm’s top managers, a secondary stakeholder demand 
will trigger a value-driven process that ‘activates’ top managers’ personal norms vis-à-vis the 
demands. Personal norms can best be understood as “feelings of moral obligation to perform or 
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refrain from specific actions” (Schwartz & Howard, 1981: 191). It is important to note that 
personal norms differ from social norms. Social norms and the consequences of adhering to or 
breaking them are anchored in the social and institutional environment. Conversely, expectations 
and sanctions from personal norms stem from the individual’s self (Harland et al., 2007). In the 
present context, a top executive’s personal norms are defined as his or her personal sense of 
obligation to take action in light of the secondary stakeholder demand (e.g. Harland et al., 2007; 
Stern, 2000). 
 According to value-driven theories of behavior—most notably, Schwartz’s (1973, 1977) 
norm-activation theory (NAT) and Stern and colleagues’ (1999) values-beliefs-norms theory 
(VBN)—actions and behavior occur in response to personal norms that are activated as a result 
of the extent to which an individual’s personal values align with a situation-at-hand (Harland et 
al., 2007; Schwartz, 1973, 1977; Stern et al., 1999). As depicted in Figure 1, this alignment 
process involves a values-driven sequential chain of three stages that lead to the activation of 
personal norms: the development of a situation-specific worldview (WV), which in turn 
influences the development of an awareness of adverse consequences (AC) which then 
influences the ascription of responsibility to the self to avert those consequences (AR) (Schwartz, 
1973, 1977; Stern et al., 1999). Considerable empirical support has been offered for this causal 
process in various literatures, particularly among those that seek to understand the drivers of pro-
environmental behavior (e.g. Liere & Dunlap, 1978; Nordlund & Garvill, 2002; Steg & de Groot, 
2010; Stern, Dietz, Kalof, & Guagnano, 1995; Widegren, 1998).  
 According to values-driven theories of behavior, differences in how top managers’ 
personal values are structured will result in the adoption of different situation-specific 
worldviews (WV). Whereas values are representative of an individual’s cognitive structure, a 
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worldview is set of conscious beliefs that reflect the way in which people contemplate the way 
the world should be (Rohan, 2000). For example, Altemeyer (1998) examined the association 
between individual’s worldviews and their personal value systems, finding the strongest 
relationships between the right-wing authoritarian worldview and a personal value system that 
prioritizes tradition and conformity (see also: Rohan & Zanna, 1996). For instance, the manner in 
which top managers’ personal values are structured along the self-enhancement-self-
transcendence dimension will have implications for these individuals’ worldviews pertaining to 
their general beliefs and conjectures about their firm’s role in society as well as their role as 
leader of the firm. It follows that those top managers whose values are more heavily structured 
toward self-enhancement will adopt a shareholder-centric worldview; one in which they believe 
the normative objective of the firm is to maximize shareholder wealth, which also contributes to 
the greater good. In contrast, those top managers whose values are more heavily structure toward 
self-transcendence will adopt a broader, stakeholder-centric worldview; one in which they 
believe the normative objective of the firm is to satisfy any and all stakeholders (Agle et al., 
1999; see also: Chin et al., 2013).  
 While the prevailing assumption might be that top managers’ values are 
disproportionately structured toward self-enhancement, and therefore indicative of a shareholder-
centric worldview, recent research and examples suggest that notable variance exists in this 
regard (Briscoe et al., 2014; Chin et al., 2013; Christensen, Dhaliwal, Boivie, & Graffin, 2015). 
For instance, in regards to the notion of maximizing shareholder value, John Mackey, co-CEO of 
Whole Foods, condemned businesses that “view their purpose as profit maximization and treat 
all participants in the system as means to that end”. On this same topic, Mark Benioff, Chairman 
and CEO of Salesforce, remarked: “the business of business isn’t just about creating profits for 
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shareholders—it’s also about improving the state of the world and driving stakeholder value” 
(Denning, 2015) 
 Once the firm’s top managers have adopted a situation-relevant worldview, they will 
proceed to diagnose the possible adverse consequences (AC) of the situation-at-hand to 
themselves and to other groups with which they identify, and then ascribe to themselves a level 
of responsibility for alleviating those consequences (AR). For instance, in the context of 
understanding how AC is manifest in the context of pro-environmental behavior, Stern notes: 
“people who value other species highly will be concerned about environmental conditions that 
threaten those valued objects, just as altruists who care about other people will be concerned 
about environmental conditions that threaten the other people’s health or well-being” (2000: 
413). Based on this, those top managers whose values are more heavily structured toward self-
enhancement, and that adopt shareholder-centric worldview, will be concerned with the types of 
adverse consequences that secondary stakeholder demands present for the firm’s shareholders. In 
contrast, those top managers whose values are more heavily structure toward self-transcendence, 
and that adopt a stakeholder-centric worldview, will be concerned with diagnosing the types of 
adverse consequences that secondary stakeholder demands present for the firm’s primary 
stakeholders, and possibly other secondary stakeholders and society-at-large. Based on the 
severity of the expected adverse consequences of the secondary stakeholder demand, top 
managers will then ascribe themselves proportionate levels of responsibility for alleviating those 
adverse consequences.  
 Finally, altogether the causal process WV o ACo AR leads to the activation of a 
personal norm that encompasses top managers’ sense of obligation concerning the posture the 
firm should respond to a secondary stakeholder demand, whether in an accommodative or defiant 
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manner. Accordingly, the foregoing discussion suggests that the structure of top managers’ 
personal values will trigger a cognitive process by which top managers develop a situation-
specific worldview, awareness of adverse consequences, and ascription of responsibility, which 
activate personal norms—that is, feelings of moral obligation to perform or refrain from certain 
actions—toward secondary stakeholder demands. 
2.2.3. The Contributing Roles of Core Self-Evaluation (CSE) and Charisma in Activating 
Personal Norms 
 According to value driven theories of behavior—in particular Schwartz’s (1973, 1977) 
NAT—the activation of personal norms is also influenced by an individual’s sense of efficacy 
and ability. Efficacy refers to the extent to which actors are able to identify actions that might 
alleviate a need (i.e. “Will my effort be of any help?”) and ability refers to the actors’ perception 
about the availability of the resources or capabilities that are required to perform the focal 
behavior (i.e. “Am I able to perform these actions?”) (Harland et al., 2007). In the context of top 
managers, we suggest that charisma and core self-evaluation (CSE) inform perceptions of 
efficacy and ability, and thus, contribute to the activation of personal norms that dictate 
responsiveness. 
 Core self-evaluation (CSE). Core self-evaluation (CSE)—also sometimes referred to as 
positive self-concept—refers to how individuals generally evaluate themselves within their social 
environment (Judge, Locke, & Durham, 1997). Concretely, CSE is viewed as a broad 
dispositional trait comprised of four specific underlying traits: self-esteem, generalized self-
efficacy, locus of control, and emotional stability (Judge, Erez, Bono, & Thoreson, 2003; Judge 
et al., 1997). In organizational behavior and industrial-organizational psychology research, CSE 
is regarded as an important predictor of task performance and job performance because of its 
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influence on individuals’ motivation levels and goal setting tendencies. For instance, in a 
laboratory study, Erez and Judge (2001) found that individuals’ CSEs were positively related to 
self-reported task motivation, objective measures of task persistence, and task performance. In a 
second study—a field study of insurance agents—Erez and Judge found that CSE was positively 
related to sales goal level, goal commitment, and both objective (i.e. sales volume) and 
supervisory ratings of job performance. In both studies, Erez and Judge found that motivation 
mediated about half of the relationship between CSE and performance. More recently, empirical 
findings based on a cross-sectional survey of 283 employees in a Fortune Global 100 company 
located in Korea also support the argument that individuals perceive higher in-role job 
performance as CSEs and intrinsic motivation increase; intrinsic motivation partially mediating 
the relationship between CSE and job performance (Joo, Jeung, & Yoon, 2010).  
 In the context of executive behavior, Hiller and Hambrick (2005) theorized that variation 
in CSE among CEOs would present differing implications for their strategic decision-making 
and actions. Specifically, they suggested that CEOs with high levels of CSE—a reflection of 
greater self-regard—would engage in relatively fast, intuitive, and centralized decision-making, 
as well as execute large-stakes strategic initiatives that deviate from industry norms; altogether, 
resulting in extreme performance (i.e. “big wins and big losses”). In line with these arguments, 
Simsek and colleagues (2010) found a positive relationship between CEO CSE and the degree of 
their firms’ entrepreneurial orientation; a composite measure that reflects innovativeness, 
proactiveness, and risk-taking. Likewise, work examining the consequences of narcissism in 
CEOs—a trait that is seen by some as commensurate with “hyper” CSE—has found that 
narcissism in CEOs is positively related to risk-taking, volatile strategic changes, and extreme 
performance (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007, 2011). 
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 Accordingly, a top manager’s CSE contributes to the activation of personal norms 
because it can be regarded as a reflection of his or her perceived levels of efficacy and ability to 
execute gestures and actions that translate personal norms into tangible and desirable outcomes.  
 Charisma. According to Max Weber, charisma represents a form of authority based on 
the “devotion to the specific and exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an 
individual person, and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him” (1946: 
328). However, most of the research that focuses on charisma in leaders—or, charismatic 
leadership theory (CLT)—views charisma as a socially constructed attribute based in 
relationships characterized by specific leader behaviors (e.g. communicating high expectations, 
making sacrifices) and subordinates’ responses (e.g. trust and admiration for the leader) (Conger 
& Kanungo, 1998; House, Spangler, & Woycke, 1991; Shamir, 1995; Waldman & Yammarino, 
1999). As House and Baetz describe it, charismatic leaders are individuals who “by the force of 
their personal abilities are capable of having profound and extraordinary effects on followers” 
(1979: 399). 
 Most commonly, the influence of charisma in top managers sees its effect on the firm 
operate through the mobilization of internal stakeholders and the acquisition of resources from 
key external organizational stakeholders. For example, Fanelli and Misangyi (2006) theorize that 
CEOs are more likely to be perceived as charismatic when they more aptly utilize symbolic 
action to enhance their relative power over important external stakeholders to obtain 
commitment from these constituents at critical moments of the organization’s life; for instance, 
by making more effective appeals to potential investors (Flynn & Staw, 2004). Correspondingly, 
empirical evidence confirms that CEOs that articulate their strategic vision in a more charismatic 
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manner receive more favorable analyst stock recommendations and uniformity across analysts 
(Fanelli et al., 2009). 
 Charisma, therefore, contributes to the activation of personal norms because it is a 
reflection of top managers’ ability and efficacy to gain the support of firm constituents in favor 
of a particular response toward secondary stakeholder demands. 
2.2.4. Committing to a Response: The Role of Top Managers’ Passion 
 While top managers’ personal values are proposed as a primary influence on the 
cognitive component of the process that drives the activation of personal norms vis-à-vis 
responding to secondary stakeholder demands and hence, determines the posture of a firm’s 
response to secondary stakeholders, it does not fully address the degree to which top managers 
might commit to such responses. Prior social psychological research suggests that accounting for 
top managers’ passion toward the issues that secondary stakeholders coalesce around can help 
better explain the commitment aspect of the response. 
 While there have been many conceptualizations of passion, there has been a general 
tendency to regard it as “any intense emotion that stirs humans with energy and deep longing to 
make a difference” (Cardon et al., 2009: 515). Accordingly, most social psychologists, such as 
Vallerand and his colleagues (2003), emphasize it as a conscious experience that presents 
motivational and goal-oriented qualities, and is central to a person’s sense of self or identity. 
Vallerand and his colleagues also further contend the existence of two types of passion, 
obsessive passion (OP) and harmonious passion (HP), which are each activated and lead to 
substantially different changes in core affect that depend on differences in contextual 
circumstances relating to a person engaging in an activity that he or she is passionate about. 
Similarly, others note that passion is activated by emotionally important goals that control and 
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guide desires, thoughts, plans, and behaviors and that persist over time, regardless of costs, 
external obstacles, and moral objections (Frijda, 2005). To this point, social psychologists also 
theorized and found passion to be a strong predictor of grit, which “entails working strenuously 
toward challenges, maintaining effort and interest over years despite failure, adversity, and 
plateaus in progress” (Duckworth, Peterson, Matthews, & Kelly, 2007: 1087).  
 When passion toward issues or an activity intensifies, it becomes internalized into one’s 
identity and acts as a powerful motivational force (Vallerand et al., 2007). For instance, “a 
person having a passion for the environmental cause would define himself or herself as an 
environmentalist or an eco-citizen and not only as someone who re- cycles from time to time” 
(Gousse-Lessard, Vallerand, Charbonneau, & Lafrenière, 2013: 19). As such, passion shapes 
actions and behavior in notable ways, and in a variety of contexts (Vallerand et al., 2007). For 
instance, Bunderson and Thompson (2009) note that passion and moral obligations to “save the 
planet” were key drivers in the calling that led individuals to undertake careers as zookeepers, 
and also the extent to which these individuals sacrificed money, time, and personal well-being 
for their work. In the context of environmental activism, empirical evidence also shows that 
greater levels of passion toward environmentalism is positively associated with the adoption of 
mainstream environmental activism behaviors such as establishing a car pool system at work, 
and with the adoption of radical environmental activism behaviors such as physically attacking a 
polluting factory’s representative (Gousse-Lessard et al., 2013). Finally, empirical evidence in 
the entrepreneurship literature links entrepreneurs’ passion toward the entrepreneurial process to 
greater levels of entrepreneurial self-efficacy and greater time commitment dedicated to start-up 
activities (Murnieks, Mosakowski, & Cardon, 2012).  
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 In sum, prior work suggests that variation in the degree of passion that top mangers feel 
toward the focal issues that form the basis for secondary stakeholder demands results in variation 
their level of commitment to their chosen response. Further, accounting for passion might also 
help further explain why some top managers’ may also respond to secondary stakeholder 
demands on their own volition, with noticeable disregard for how their value-driven responses 
correspond with their organization’s values, those of other managers, or those of influential 
primary stakeholders (e.g. shareholders, customers). For example, in an instance where an a 
secondary stakeholder demand has activated a top managers’ personal norms to respond in a 
manner that is defensive, top managers that are highly passionate about the issues that form the 
basis for the demands may display a greater level of commitment to enacting their response by 
issuing it in a public forum and dedicating substantial firm resources to enacting it. Conversely, 
in a similar instance, top managers that are not very passionate about the issues that form the 
basis for the secondary stakeholder’s demands will have a lesser degree of commitment toward 
enacting their response. Accordingly, building on the previous logic, as Figure 1 depicts, the 
degree to which the top managers are passionate about the issues forming a basis for the 
secondary stakeholder demands will influence firm response toward secondary stakeholder 
demands by impacting the degree to which the firm’s top managers are committed to 
emphasizing their chosen response. I proceed to expand upon the outcomes of this process model 
below.  
2.2.5. Predicting Firm Responsiveness: The Joint Effects of Personal Values and Passion  
 Building on the theoretical process model illustrated in Figure 1, I now propose a 
typology of top manger-driven firm responsiveness to secondary stakeholder demands as jointly 
driven by the managers’ personal values and passion. It is important to note that the proposed 
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typology is outlined with the assumption that the firm’s top managers have already perceived the 
secondary stakeholder and its demands as being salient, and thus, warranting a response in some 
fashion. While I recognize the very real possibility that a firm’s top managers may not respond to 
a secondary stakeholder demand (i.e. nonresponsiveness), this outcome is generally viewed as 
being associated with perceptions that the stakeholder in question is not salient (Bundy et al., 
2013; Mitchell et al., 1997), thereby precluding the activation of personal norms and the infusion 
of managers’ passion into the process. 
 Each of the four proposed responses to a secondary stakeholder demand is presented as 
an “ideal type” (Doty & Glick, 1994) that captures different levels of two different 
responsiveness components: a posture component and a commitment component.  Posture is 
argued to reside along a continuum of accommodativeness, with the least accommodative 
responses often referred to as defensive or defiant and the most accommodative responses simply 
referred to as accommodative (see: Benoit, 1995; Coombs, 2007; Elsbach, 2003). Response 
commitment ranges on a continuum from symbolic to substantive (see: Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; 
Bundy et al., 2013; Waldron et al., 2013). A symbolic response is considered “an active attempt 
by firms to manipulate external expectations to be more closely aligned with firm goals” (Bundy 
et al., 2013: 364; see also: Oliver, 1991). Examples of symbolic responses would include public 
promises of change, espousing more socially acceptable goals while pursuing different and less 
socially acceptable goals, or initiating various nonbinding audits of policies and processes that 
secondary stakeholders are concerned with (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Bundy et al., 2013; 
Waldron et al., 2013). In contrast, a substantive response implicates the implementation of 
noticeable actions taken in response to the issue (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990). For example, 
substantive responses might include revamping distribution processes to reduce carbon 
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footprints, installing safety equipment in manufacturing facilities to protect employees, engaging 
in heavy lobbying, or launching large-scale publicity campaigns (Bundy et al., 2013; Waldron et 
al., 2013). The labels and descriptions that serve to illustrate the differences between each 
possible response are based on McAdam’s (1973) Reactive-Defensive-Accommodative-Proactive 
(RDAP) scale, revised by Clarkson (1995). This particular scale parsimoniously illustrates the 
combination of posture and commitment components of each response, and has been commonly 
utilized as a scale to describe stakeholder engagement strategies (Carroll, 1979; Clarkson, 1995).  
 Consistent with Doty and Glick’s (1994) recommendation, my typology of 
responsiveness proposes a specific relationship between top managers’ personal values and the 
posture of a response, as well as a specific relationship between top managers’ passion and the 
commitment toward the response. As Figure 2 depicts, the level of congruence between 
secondary stakeholder demands and top managers’ personal values influences the posture of a 
response as defensive or accommodative, and the intensity of top managers’ passion about the 
issues forming a basis for secondary stakeholder demands dictates commitment as substantive or 
symbolic. 
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FIGURE 2 
Proposed Responsiveness Characteristics Based on the Interactive Effects of Values and Passion 
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 Personal values and response posture. Secondary stakeholder demands can be seen as 
congruent or incongruent with top managers’ personal values, which ultimately present 
implications for the norm activation process through which values come to influence response 
posture. When secondary stakeholder demands are congruent with top managers’ personal 
values, those mangers will feel a sense of moral obligation to perform actions that seek to assist 
secondary stakeholders with achieving their goals. For example, according to publicly available 
information through the Center for Responsive Politics (OpenSecrets.org), Starbucks CEO 
Howard Schultz has an extensive history of making political campaign contributions to the 
Democratic Party. This contribution history suggests that Howard Schultz has a strongly liberal 
political ideology (Briscoe et al., 2014; Chin et al., 2013; Christensen et al., 2015), which is 
associated with personal values that are structured in a self-transcendent and open-to-change 
manner (Schwartz et al., 2014). Accordingly, following pressure from the anti-gun group Moms 
Demand Action, Howard Schultz wrote an open letter in which he requested that customers 
refrain from bringing their firearms into Starbucks locations (O'Connor, 2013), thereby 
accommodating Moms’ demands on behalf of his firm. 
 In contrast, under the conditions where secondary stakeholder demands are incongruent 
with top managers’ personal values, managers will feel a sense of moral obligation to perform 
actions that oppose secondary stakeholders in achieving their goals. As touched upon previously, 
a recent example is the case of Chick-fil-A CEO Dan Cathy’s response to LGBT advocacy 
groups criticizing him and his firm for making political campaign contributions to a candidate 
with a history of proposing and supporting legislation considered “anti-gay”. Cathy initially 
responded to such criticism in a manner that was quite antagonistic to the objectives of the 
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secondary stakeholders in question, being quoted by a number of media outlets as making 
incendiary anti-gay remarks (see: Blume, 2012; Hsu, 2012). 
 The above discussion therefore suggests that secondary stakeholder demands congruent 
with top managers’ personal values will result in accommodative response postures, as depicted 
in the top left and bottom left cells of Figure 2. Conversely, in instances where secondary 
stakeholder demands are incongruent with top managers’ personal values, response posture will 
be defensive, as illustrated in the top right and bottom right cells of Figure 2. 
 Passion and commitment to the response. As described earlier, top managers may also 
display varying degrees of passion toward the issues that form the basis for secondary 
stakeholder demands. Under circumstances where top managers’ passion toward certain issues 
intensify, they will exhibit much more substantive degrees of commitment toward their response 
posture. Consider Apple CEO Tim Cook, the first openly gay CEO of a Fortune 500 company, 
who displays considerable passion toward LGBT equality issues, once stating: “I'm proud to be 
gay, and I consider being gay among the greatest gifts God has given me" (Molina, 2014). 
Evidence in the popular press also suggests that Tim Cook substantively commits to any 
response that he would want his firm to issue toward secondary stakeholder demands revolving 
around LGBT equality issues. For example, Cook openly condemned religious freedom laws in 
the US by committing to visibly voicing his opinion in op-ed published in the Washington Post 
(Capehart, 2015). Conversely, under circumstances where top managers’ passion toward certain 
issues is not very intense, I would expect these managers will exhibit a much lower degree of 
commitment toward the response’s posture.  
 Therefore, as depicted in the top left and top right cells of Figure 2, when top managers 
have a high degree of passion toward the issues forming the basis of secondary stakeholder 
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demands, they will exhibit a substantive degree of commitment toward the response. Conversely, 
as depicted in the bottom left and bottom right cells of Figure 2, when top managers have a low 
degree of passion toward the issues that form the basis of secondary stakeholder demands, they 
will exhibit a symbolic degree of commitment toward the response. 
2.4. DISCUSSION 
 My purpose has been to develop and present a top manager-driven process model of firm 
response to secondary stakeholder demands. It is important to note that my model does not seek 
to discredit prior work or the potential influence of factors previously considered to be important 
drivers of firm responsiveness to secondary stakeholder demands. Instead, and consistent with 
prior suggestions in the literature (e.g. Weber et al., 2009), I seek to build on theoretical 
arguments and recent examples that suggest that top managers are key figures in determining 
whether and how firms respond to secondary stakeholder demands. Utilizing the upper-echelons 
perspective and drawing on work in cognitive and social psychology about values and passion, I 
developed a theoretically grounded process model that provides insight into why some firms are 
more responsive than others to secondary stakeholder demands.  The model identifies top 
manager attributes that are important in determining response, and the process through which 
these attributes influence that response. 
 I first explained how the structure of top managers’ personal values influence the 
cognitive effort (attention) focused on specific secondary stakeholder attributes in their overall 
perceptions of secondary stakeholder salience. Next, I outlined how top managers’ personal 
values will influence the activation of personal norms regarding obligations to act on secondary 
stakeholder demands, as mediated by a cognitive process implicating managers’ situation-
specific worldviews (WV), awareness of adverse consequences (AC), and ascription of 
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responsibility (AR). In addition, building on value-driven theories of behavior, which also 
account for the role of perceived ability and efficacy, I theorize that top managers’ CSE and 
charisma strengthen personal norms. Finally, I propose that top managers’ passion toward the 
issues forming a basis for secondary stakeholder demands impact the degree to which top 
mangers are committed to their chosen response. 
 Building on this process model, I further extend my theoretical arguments by developing 
a typology of “ideal types” of responses based on the interactive effects of top managers’ 
personal values and passion. Specifically, I outline how response can be viewed as the outcome 
of specific relationships between response posture and the orientation of top managers’ personal 
values toward secondary stakeholder demands, and between the intensity of passion toward the 
issues forming a basis for the demands and top managers’ commitment level to the response. 
2.4.1. Theoretical and Practical Contributions 
 The model I have set forth has important implications for strategic management and 
organizational scholars, as well as for practitioners.  The first contribution is to the strategic 
leadership and upper-echelons literature by more clearly outlining the intervening cognitive and 
psychological mechanisms through which top managers’ personal values eventually come to be 
reflected in an increasingly important strategic leadership behavior: determining whether and 
how to respond to secondary stakeholder demands. Moreover, by articulating these arguments 
within the scenario of a secondary stakeholder demand, I addressed a call to further understand 
and examine how executives’ personal values and specific situations interact to influence choice 
(Finkelstein et al., 2009). Additionally, by outlining a values- and passion-influenced executive 
cognition process, the theoretical developments in this paper provide a more nuanced 
understanding of the potential individual-level sources of motivation behind executives’ 
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influence over the interactions between organizations and secondary stakeholders specifically, 
and executive management of various external entities in the firm’s environments more 
generally. Further, I also add to an emergent stream of research interested in understanding how 
top managers, and specifically the firm’s CEO, may mold the firm to reflect their own personal 
values and ideologies by explaining how their personal values are ultimately reflected in their 
firm’s response to secondary stakeholder demands.  
 Second, this work contributes to stakeholder theory by specifying the means by which 
personal values influence perceptions of stakeholder attributes. By providing a sharper focus on 
top managers’ personal values and passion, my model advances this field’s understanding of how 
and why top managers’ personal values influence the relative influence of each stakeholder 
attribute seen to comprise stakeholder salience. Although stakeholder theorists have suggested 
that perceptions of stakeholder attributes might be shaped by the values of the top executives 
(Agle et al., 1999; Mitchell et al., 1997), this work stops short of specifying the socio-cognitive 
mechanisms and pathways that connect an executive’s personal values to his or her attributions 
of stakeholder salience.  
 This work also contributes to social movement theory by highlighting the characteristics 
of the firm’s top managers as important elements that influence firm response to secondary 
stakeholders.  Researchers building on social movement theory have focused extensively on 
understanding the various aspects of a firm’s opportunity structure. To the extent that social 
movement scholars agree that a managers roles in shaping responses to a secondary stakeholder 
demands may be regarded as an important aspect of the firm’s opportunity structure, I provide 
scholars conducting work at the intersection of social movements and firms with theoretical 
arguments that might help to address calls to refocus energy on identifying elements of a firm’s 
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opportunity structure that are internal to the organization itself. Specifically, research should 
address and investigate how different top managers value-infused responses to secondary 
stakeholder demands might shape the subsequent behavior of these entities and their perceptions 
of the organization’s opportunity structure. 
 In addition to theoretical contributions, important practical advice may be gleaned from 
my model as well. First, it can make managers aware of their own natural tendencies to inject 
their personal values into decision-making and evaluations of secondary stakeholder activist 
campaigns. A consequence of these tendencies is that the firm’s top managers may respond to 
secondary stakeholders in a fashion that is inconsistent with the strategic objectives of the firm or 
with the priorities of its primary stakeholders. By extension, outlining how personal values 
impact certain key interpretive processes, such as perceptions of secondary stakeholder salience, 
may assist executives in more effectively evaluating secondary stakeholder activism. For 
instance, whether an executive attends to different secondary stakeholder attributes than he or 
she might otherwise do as a result of personal values may engender different evaluations of the 
activist demands and responses that are more amenable to the firm’s primary stakeholders and 
strategic orientation. 
2.4.2. Methodological Considerations and Future Directions 
 While studying top managers presents some challenges for empirical testing, several 
proposed relationships in my framework lend themselves to quantitative study, which may be 
carried out by adopting existing scales and validated measures. However, testing the proposed 
model still requires careful consideration of several issues, especially regarding how researchers 
measure such difficult-to-observe constructs as top manager personal values. While an 
individual’s personal values and the structure of these values is not easily observable, it is 
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possible to find important traces of them in more accessible attributes such as political ideologies 
(Rohan, 2000; Schwartz et al., 2014). Fortunately, recent strategic leadership and upper-echelons 
research offers some guidance in this regard. For example, recent work in the upper-echelons 
tradition has contributed promising evidence that managers’ political ideologies may be 
measured using these individuals’ histories of political campaign contributions and represent a 
valid unobtrusive proxy for these individuals’ personal values (Briscoe et al., 2014; Chin et al., 
2013; Christensen et al., 2015).  
 Additional top manager-level factors may also be important to consider as possible 
predictors of their response to secondary stakeholder demands. For instance, secondary 
stakeholder demands may represent important scenarios for certain top managers to engage in 
narcissistic displays of power or self-indulgence. The interactions between secondary 
stakeholders and their targeted firms have also been noted for occurring in very public forums 
(e.g. David et al., 2007; Julian et al., 2008; see also: McDonnell & King, 2013). Consequently, 
examining how top manager, especially CEO, narcissism influences these individuals’ responses 
to secondary stakeholder demands may represent an additionally interesting line of inquiry. 
2.4.3. Conclusion 
 In the preceding pages I progressed toward understanding how top managers’ personal 
values and passion influence firm responsiveness to secondary stakeholder demands. While this 
perspective is not intended to explain all pathways through which top managers evaluate and 
eventually respond to secondary stakeholder demands, I contend that this model does present an 
accurate and theoretically parsimonious portrayal of this process. I strive toward theoretically 
depicting top manager behavior in accordance with how it unfolds in practice, and contribute 
toward upholding the central role of top managers within the fabric of strategic management and 
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organizational research (Hambrick, 1989). I hope understanding the important issues related to 
the increasingly common interactions between secondary stakeholders and firms may be 
enriched through further study of this phenomenon by promoting greater awareness of the 
influence top managers, and their individual attributes, such as their personal values, in this 
process. 
Chapter 3 - Firm Receptivity to Secondary Stakeholders: The Role of Managerial Political Ideology 
 62 
Chapter 3 
FIRM RECEPTIVITY TO SECONDARY STAKEHOLDERS: THE ROLE OF 
MANAGERIAL POLITICAL IDEOLOGY 
“ The business of business isn’t just about creating profits for shareholders — it’s 
also about improving the state of the world and driving stakeholder value.”—
Marc Benioff, Chairman and CEO of Salesforce 
 
 Why are some firms more receptive than others to secondary stakeholders? Firm 
receptivity is best understood as representing the extent to which a firm is willing to entertain, 
and commit to working on, secondary stakeholder issues (Bundy et al., 2013; David et al., 2007; 
IRRC, 1993; McDonnell et al., 2015). Understanding why certain firms are more, or less, 
receptive than others to secondary stakeholders is a matter of considerable interest for strategic 
management and organization research because it implicates important considerations regarding 
the allocation of firm resources, the nature of firm practices, and the implementation of firm 
policies (Julian et al., 2008; McDonnell et al., 2015; Pacheco & Dean, 2015; Waldron et al., 
2013). A firm’s receptivity to its secondary stakeholders, in general, also presents important 
consequences for how it can manage its external environment. As Shu and Tsang describe it: 
“maintaining relationships with secondary stakeholders helps firms gain social legitimacy and 
learn how to better manage their external constraints given the increasing institutional pressures 
from their sociopolitical environments” (2015: 1129).  
 To date, most extant research suggests that firm receptivity to secondary stakeholders is 
primarily driven by factors external to the firm, and emphasizes social forces (den Hond & de 
Bakker, 2007; Weber et al., 2009), contextual conditions (King, 2008; Pacheco & Dean, 2015), 
and superficial features of secondary stakeholders (Eesley & Lenox, 2006). Although others have 
recently noted the importance of re-balancing our understanding of the factors that drive firm 
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receptivity to secondary stakeholders toward a deeper consideration of potentially influential 
factors internal to the firm (McDonnell & King, 2013; Waldron et al., 2013), little theoretical or 
empirical attention has been placed on understanding the impact of influential factors related to 
the firm’s decision-makers themselves—namely, its top managers. This is an important 
omission, because an argument can be made that the firm’s overall receptivity to its secondary 
stakeholders is ultimately at the discretion of its top managers (Briscoe et al., 2014; Clarkson, 
1995; Mitchell et al., 1997; Waldron et al., 2013).  
 I address this omission and build on a guiding notion in strategic leadership research: that 
firms are a reflection of their top managers (Finkelstein et al., 2009; Hambrick & Mason, 1984). 
From this perspective, the attributes of the firm’s managers, including their personal values, 
drive the interpretation of environmental stimuli and firm actions in response to these. 
Specifically, I theoretically and empirically investigate the impact of an under-examined but 
potentially important individual attribute—political ideology—on firm receptivity to secondary 
stakeholders.  
 Political ideologies are central, and relatively stable attributes, which are reflective of 
individuals’ personal values and broader cognitive makeup (Jost, 2006); top managers are noted 
to vary quite extensively in their political ideologies (Francia, Green, Herrnson, Powell, & 
Wilcox, 2005; Tetlock, 2000). Moreover, as a reflection of individuals’ personal values, political 
ideologies also offer insights regarding individuals’ beliefs, preferences, and motivations about 
broader societal issues and the achievement of collective goals (Briscoe et al., 2014; Chin et al., 
2013; Jost, 2006). Secondary stakeholders coalesce around issues that are affect-laden, revolve 
around broader socio-political issues and espouse various values about purportedly desirable 
modes of firm conduct (McDonnell & King, 2013; Soule, 2009; Waldron et al., 2013). As such, I 
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contend that a firm’s top management is prone to relying on dispositional interpretation or 
appraisal tendencies (Lerner & Keltner, 2010) and injecting their personal values into how 
receptive they ultimately determine that their firm should be to its secondary stakeholders (Stolte 
& Fender, 2007; see also: Rohan, 2000). Accordingly, I develop and test the overarching 
proposition that top managers’ political ideologies, a visible reflection of their personal values, 
ultimately shape their firm’s receptivity toward its secondary stakeholders.  
 Substantively, I hypothesize that the degree of liberalism in TMTs political ideology is 
positively related to the firm’s receptivity to secondary stakeholder demands. Recognizing that 
firm receptivity to secondary stakeholders likely implicates important debates within the 
executive suite, I also argue that the degree of political ideology separation within a focal 
TMT—reflecting the potential to consider more diverse perspectives and also the potential for 
greater conflict to arise—may negatively or positively moderate the relationship between TMT 
liberalism and firm receptivity. Finally, I consider the influential role of the firm’s CEO; 
hypothesizing that the CEO’s degree of liberalism is positively associated with firm receptivity 
to secondary stakeholders. I also argue that the influence of the CEO’s political ideology is 
moderated by the degree of ideological separation between the CEO and the other members of 
the TMT; specifically, I hypothesize that the positive relationship between CEO liberalism and 
firm receptivity to secondary stakeholder demands will be stronger as separation between the 
CEO’s ideology and that of the TMT decreases. 
 By focusing on these relationships, I make noteworthy contributions to strategic 
management and organization research. First, I contribute to research on upper echelons and 
strategic leadership by emphasizing the role of mangers’ personal values in shaping their firm’s 
receptivity to secondary stakeholder demands. Specifically, this study provides further evidence 
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that substantiates the general theoretical proposition in the upper echelons perspective that a 
firm’s top managers’ values are injected into their strategic decisions by demonstrating this 
influence on firm receptivity to secondary stakeholders. This study also distinguishes itself as 
one that examines how top managers values may be reflected in firm behavior as a result of 
external stimuli, compared to initial work that has largely focused on the influence of top 
manager values on the general strategic profile of the firm (Chin et al., 2013; Christensen et al., 
2015). Finally, this study’s findings highlight top managers’ values as important drivers that help 
better understand how and why firms impact general social welfare and entities that are situated 
beyond the scope of their competitive environment (i.e. secondary stakeholders) (Carroll, 2009; 
Lamin & Zaheer, 2012; Whetten & Mackey, 2002). 
 This study also contributes to stakeholder theory by outlining new theoretical and 
empirical insights concerning the role of top managers’ personal values and articulating how 
these characteristics act as important firm-sided drivers of firm receptivity to secondary 
stakeholders (Eesley & Lenox, 2006). Current stakeholder theory insights stop short of 
explaining how and why the characteristics of the firm’s top managers themselves would 
expectedly affect firm receptivity to its to secondary stakeholders. In addition, few studies have 
considered or attempted to empirically capture the extent to which firms vary in their receptivity 
to secondary stakeholders (for a possible exception, see: McDonnell et al., 2015). Prior work has 
tended to focus almost exclusively on the likelihood of firm concession (a binary outcome) (e.g. 
Eesley & Lenox, 2006; Julian et al., 2008; Pacheco & Dean, 2015), treating firms that do not 
conceded to secondary stakeholder demands (i.e. defiant and neutral firms) as empirically 
identical, thereby conflating firms that are defiant or neutral in their willingness to entertain and 
commit to working on secondary stakeholder issues. Therefore, in examining and measuring 
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receptivity per se, a continuous outcome, I provide important insights pertaining to how firms 
generally engage with secondary stakeholders as an element of their broader strategic agenda.  
3.1. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 Research that seeks to understand how secondary stakeholders influence firm strategies 
and behavior has become an increasingly cross-disciplinary and multi-theoretical undertaking. 
Traditionally, researchers have leveraged theoretical perspectives that emphasize factors external 
to the firm. For instance, Eesley and Lenox (2006) applied Mitchell and colleagues’ (1997) 
theory of stakeholder identification and salience to understand how secondary stakeholder 
attributes such as power (i.e. the relative access to resources for the stakeholder group with 
respect to the firm being targeted), legitimacy (i.e. the generalized perception that group 
stakeholder conduct is appropriate), and urgency (i.e. the degree to which stakeholder claims call 
for immediate attention) each influence the likelihood that a firm will concede to a given 
secondary stakeholder’s demands. In line with these efforts, more recent work has turned to 
competitive dynamics theories. For example, Pacheco and Dean (2015) argue that the likelihood 
that firms will concede to secondary stakeholder demands is dependent upon the degree to which 
the firm’s competitors concede to secondary demands, and the degree to which the firm is 
dependent on the market targeted by a secondary stakeholder (or social movement). Studying the 
incidence of wind power adoption by electric utility firms in deregulated U.S. markets, the 
authors found that when competitors’ increasingly conceded to secondary stakeholder demands 
or when firm dependence on targeted markets (i.e. geographic markets that were targeted by 
activists, which the firm depend ended on for sales) increase, the positive effect of secondary 
stakeholder pressure on firm concession decreased. In other words, secondary stakeholders 
required less pressure to force wind power adoption if they focused their efforts in geographic 
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markets that the firm were highly dependent on for sales. Others have leveraged insights from 
social movement theory to focus on how secondary stakeholders’ tactics and contextual social 
forces shape firm concessions to secondary stakeholder demands. Most notably, King (2008) 
finds that the media attention plays a prominent role in increasing the likelihood of firm 
concessions because the media acts as a conduit of negative images and grievances brought forth 
by secondary stakeholders, allowing them to rally support from the firm’s consumers and the 
general public, and hence, translates as high levels of a movement’s threat toward a firm. 
Similarly, Eesley, DeCelles, and Lenox (in press) also show that social movement organizations 
rely on protests and boycotts to drag companies “through the mud” with media attention in order 
to coerce firms to concede to their demands. 
 More recently, work has begun to more explicitly emphasize various firm-level factors 
that influence managers’ evaluations of secondary stakeholders and their demands, and how 
these eventually come to influence the extent to which the firm and its managers will entertain 
and commit to working on secondary stakeholder issues. For instance, Bundy and his colleagues 
(2013) outline a strategic cognition framework of stakeholder issue salience, to suggest that the 
firm’s managers consider stakeholder demands (i.e. primary and secondary stakeholders alike) 
through the dual lenses of their firm’s identity and strategic frame, in order to evaluate 
stakeholder issues and determine an appropriate response. Along these same lines, others have 
stressed that managers consider the meaningfulness of secondary stakeholder-contested practices 
to their firm’s defining qualities, and the extent to which secondary stakeholder demands are 
aligned with their firm’s stakeholder culture (i.e. social [moralist] vs. economic [egoist]), in 
order to determine the degree to which secondary stakeholder campaigns threaten the firm and 
warrant substantive strategic changes (Waldron et al., 2013). Though focused on the influence of 
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firm level factors on responsiveness, this research does suggest that the firm’s top management 
has a consequential role to play in determining the extent to which their firm will be receptive to, 
and thus engage with, its secondary stakeholders. 
 The present manuscript builds on this promising line of inquiry by focusing on an 
individual characteristic that may reflect top managers’ underlying attitudes toward secondary 
stakeholders, and subsequently shape the firm’s receptivity toward such entities: personal 
political ideology. To do so, I rely on a key theoretical premise of the upper-echelons 
perspective—that observable characteristics of top managers are proxies for their underlying 
cognitive frames or values and help to explain how they interpret strategic situations and inform 
their strategic choices and actions (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). In this manner, the overarching 
thesis that I develop in this study is that top managers’ political ideologies, observable proxies of 
their personal values, ultimately shape their firm’s degree of receptivity toward its secondary 
stakeholders. 
3.1.1. Receptivity to Secondary Stakeholders: A Top Management-Driven Strategic 
Initiative 
 A firm’s receptivity to secondary stakeholders, previously defined as the extent to which 
it is willing to entertain and commit to working on secondary stakeholder issues, is an important 
element of its broader strategic agenda because it reflects the extent to which a firm allows 
secondary stakeholders—entities that are not essential to its survival—to shape its policies, 
practices, and resource commitments (Eesley & Lenox, 2006; King & Soule, 2007; Pacheco & 
Dean, 2015). Prior work suggests that the firm’s top managers are responsible for determining 
which types of stakeholders the firm may prioritize over others, or the extent to which the firm 
will entertain certain stakeholder issues and commit to working on them (Bundy et al., 2013; 
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Fanelli & Misangyi, 2006; Mazutis, 2013; Mitchell et al., 1997; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; 
Waldron et al., 2013). However, as discussed above, current depictions of firm behavior toward 
secondary stakeholders, with their predominant focus on factors external to the firm or the 
characteristics of the firm itself, provide little insight into how the characteristics of the firm’s 
top managers themselves affect the degree to which the firm is receptive to its secondary 
stakeholders.  
 The upper echelons perspective explicates that a firm’s strategic actions and behavior 
result from a sociocognitive process through which its top managers’ perceive and evaluate 
environmental stimuli according to their cognitive bases and personal values (Hambrick & 
Mason, 1984). Noting the difficulties of directly measuring socio-cognitive processes, this 
perspective argues that observable characteristics of top managers act as suitable unobtrusive 
proxies for the cognitive bases and personal values of top managers (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). 
Although this approach presents certain limitations insofar as understanding the actual socio-
cognitive processes that govern executive behavior (see: Carpenter, Geletkanycz, & Sanders, 
2004; Finkelstein et al., 2009), its prevalent application has yielded substantial evidence that 
certain demographic profiles of top managers provide considerable explanatory power for firm 
actions and behavior (Finkelstein et al., 2009; Hambrick, 2007). 
 A rich history of prior research in the upper echelons tradition demonstrates that focusing 
on certain observable characteristics of a firm’s top managers helps to explain a range for firm-
level strategic actions and behavior. For instance, recent findings demonstrate that CEO 
narcissism is linked to relatively risky/grandiose firm-level strategic actions (Chatterjee & 
Hambrick, 2007; Gerstner, Konig, Enders, & Hambrick, 2013), CEO temporal focus influences 
firms’ new product introduction (NPI) efforts (Nadkarni & Chen, 2014), and CEO motivational 
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tendencies such as regulatory focus affect the nature of firm merger and acquisition (M&A) 
activities (Gamache, McNamara, Mannor, & Johnson, 2015).  
 I sum, when the firm’s top managers are faced with situations in which they might be 
called upon to look beyond shareholders and expend their efforts on other stakeholders such as 
secondary stakeholders, they have appreciable latitude-of-action or discretion, as such situations 
are difficult to evaluate (Petrenko et al., 2016; Waldman & Siegel, 2008). Based on upper 
echelons logic, firm actions and behavior in such situations—namely, a firm’s receptivity to 
secondary stakeholders—are likely predicted by top managers attributes that are a reflection of 
their underlying cognitive frames and personal values (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Expanding on 
the previous insights, the following section focuses on the motivation of applying an upper 
echelons perspective to the study of firm receptivity to secondary stakeholders and on identifying 
the focal managerial attributes—personal values—that are expected to be most influential, given 
the nature of secondary stakeholder demands.  
3.1.2. Secondary Stakeholders and Top Managers’ Personal Values 
 Different attributes of a firm’s top managers may more effectively explain different types 
of firm actions and behaviors than others based on the nature of the strategic situation or decision 
at-hand (Busenbark et al., 2016; Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987). For example, Petrenko and 
colleagues examine the relationship between CEO narcissism and a firm’s Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) profile, arguing that CSR initiatives provide narcissistic supply for 
narcissistic CEOs, because  
An organization’s social responsibility projects and overall external perceptions 
often bring attention in the form of praise or criticism not just to the firm, but 
often more directly to the CEO. As such, these projects are likely to engage 
aspects of the CEO’s self-image (2016: 265). 
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Nadkarni and Chen (2014) argue that CEO temporal focus is associated with a firm’s rate of NPI 
because variation in how CEOs focus on time frames is related to the two core tasks involved 
with NPI: detection and development (see also: Yadav, Prabhu, & Chandy, 2007). Kish-Gephart 
and Campbell (2015) examine the role of CEO social class background on firm strategic risk-
taking (i.e. research and development (R&D) expenditures, capital expenditures, and the value of 
the firm’s long-term debt), based on the logic that  
childhood social class—and its attendant resources and rank—directs his or her 
attention toward avoidance (or threat) or opportunity. This emphasis on avoidance 
or opportunity shapes an individual’s social class imprint, persisting across time 
and influencing strategic decisions years later (2015: 1618). 
Finally, Chin, Hambrick, and Treviño (2013) argue that CEOs’ personal values are likely to be 
reflected in their firms’ Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) profiles because CSR initiatives 
relate to considerations about the purpose of firms in society, which are influence primarily by 
individuals’ personal values. 
 Just as the relative uniqueness of each strategic context informs prior work’s justification 
for studying the influence of specific managerial attributes on firm actions and behavior, 
secondary stakeholder demands also present important characteristics that ought to be noted, in 
order to support this study’s focus on top managers’ values. Secondary stakeholders often issue 
demands that are affect-laden, revolve around broader socio-political issues and espouse various 
values about purportedly desirable modes of firm conduct (Hercus, 1999; McDonnell & King, 
2013; Rowley & Moldoveanu, 2003). For example, McDonnell and King examined secondary 
stakeholder boycott activity from 1990-2005, which “contest a remarkable range of issues that 
span the political spectrum, from animal rights issues to environmental issues; labor rights issues 
to moral or religious issues like support of abortion or gay marriage” (2013: 396). Waldron and 
colleagues’ (2013) also note that secondary stakeholder demands predominantly attempt to 
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modify socially or environmentally detrimental industry practices. Furthermore, secondary 
stakeholders often conduct themselves in ways that are considered illegitimate or even radical 
and their emergence is often view as being predicated on some level of discontent with the firm 
(den Hond & de Bakker, 2007; Markman et al., 2016; Rowley & Moldoveanu, 2003; Tilly, 
1978).  
Social psychologists generally agree that when faced with stimuli encapsulating many 
characteristics that are exhibited by secondary stakeholders (i.e. emotional, ethically-oriented, 
values-laden, radical, ambiguous), individuals become increasingly reliant on dispositional 
interpretation or appraisal tendencies (Lerner & Keltner, 2010), heuristics (Forgas, 1995), or 
“prewired action patterns” (Frijda et al., 1989). In particular, individuals have been shown to 
become increasingly reliant on their personal values as important cognitive reference points and 
determinants of behavior in these contexts (Stolte & Fender, 2007; see also: Rohan, 2000). For 
example, as Verplaken and Holland (2002) illustrate, 
in discussions of the legalization of abortion, values related to the prolife and 
prochoice viewpoints are the main issues of the discussion and are thus 
automatically activated. Values may also be activated if they are implied by the 
situation or by the information a person is confronted with. For instance, a choice 
between studying and going out with friends might activate the values of being 
ambitious and maintaining friendships (2002: 436).  
In line with the argument that individuals rely on their values as important cognitive references 
points when faced with situations that activate them, prior work shows that individuals primed 
with environmental values put more weight on environmental considerations involved with 
purchasing a television set (Verplaken & Holland, 2002). Additionally, Shaw and colleagues 
found that individuals’ universalism values—reflective of self-transcendent concerns—were 
important determinants of ethical consumer decision-making (2005). In addition, Stern and 
colleagues (1999) theorize that individuals’ personal values are important predictors of pro-
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environmental behavior. Therefore, when faced with secondary stakeholder demands, the firm’s 
top managers find themselves in ambiguous, emotional, possibly radical situations that implicate 
fundamental considerations about the moral or ethical purpose of their firm and about the 
primacy of shareholders versus stakeholders. Based on the nature of these situations, as prior 
work in social psychology demonstrates, top managers’ personal values can be considered a 
powerful predictor of their decision-making, behavior, and therefore just how receptive their 
firms will be to secondary stakeholders.  
 Personal values are generally defined as intrinsic, enduring cognitive representations of 
individuals’ broad goals and ways of behaving in life, that apply across a wide array of 
situations; they are transituational (Rokeach, 1973). Moreover, personal values are “conceptions 
of the desirable that guide the way social actors (e.g. organizational leaders, policy-makers, 
individual persons) select actions, evaluate people and events, and explain their actions and 
evaluations” (Schwartz, 1999: 24; emphasis added). Schwartz’s (1992, 1994) well-accepted 
framework identifies two motivational dimensions as forming a basis for every individual’s 
value system: an openness to change-conservation dimension, and a self-enhancement-self-
transcendence dimension. The openness to change-conservation dimension reflects “the extent to 
which they (values) motivate people to follow their own intellectual and emotional interests in 
unpredictable and uncertain directions versus to preserve the status quo and the certainty it 
provides in relationship with close others, institutions, and traditions” (Schwartz, 1992: 43). The 
self-enhancement-self-transcendence dimension relates to “the extent to which they (values) 
motivate people to enhance their own personal interests even at the expense of others versus the 
extent to which they motivate people to transcend selfish concerns and promote the welfare of 
others, close and distant, and of nature” (Schwartz, 1992: 43).  
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 According to value-driven theories of behavior—most notably, Schwartz’s (1973, 1977) 
norm-activation theory (NAT) and Stern and colleagues’ (1999) values-beliefs-norms theory 
(VBN)—actions and behavior occur in response to personal norms that are activated based on 
the extent to which the structure of an individual’s personal values align with a situation-at-hand 
(Harland et al., 2007; Schwartz, 1973, 1977; Stern et al., 1999). This alignment process involves 
a values-driven sequential chain of three stages that lead to the activation of personal norms: the 
development of a situation-specific worldview, which influences the development of an 
awareness of adverse consequences, which then influences the ascription of responsibility to the 
self to avert those consequences (Schwartz, 1973, 1977; Stern et al., 1999). Building on this 
logic, differences in how top managers’ personal values are structured will result in the adoption 
of different situation-specific worldviews. Once the firm’s top managers have adopted a 
situation-specific worldview, they will proceed to diagnose the possible adverse consequences of 
the situation-at-hand for themselves, their firm, and/or other groups with which they identify, and 
then ascribe to themselves a level of responsibility for alleviating those consequences.   
 Applying values-driven theory of behavior, I argue top managers’ personal values will 
influence their firm’s receptivity to secondary stakeholders via two interlinked mechanisms. 
First, top managers are likely to have dispositional preferences for the extent to which their firms 
strive toward narrow (i.e. shareholder-centric) versus broader (i.e. stakeholder-centric) strategic 
objectives, which are a reflection of the structure of their personal values along the self-
transcendent-self-enhancement dimension (Agle et al., 1999; Mazutis, 2013). More specifically, 
the manner in which top managers’ personal values are structured along the self-enhancement-
self-transcendence dimension will have implications for these individuals’ worldviews pertaining 
to their general beliefs and conjectures about their firm’s role in society, as well as for the 
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awareness of adverse consequences and personal norms that are activated as a result of 
secondary stakeholder demands. Self-transcendent top managers can be expected to consider a 
broader array of stakeholder issues than their self-enhancing counterparts. Second, Schwartz’s 
theory also suggest that top managers will vary in the extent to which they will embrace novelty 
and change, versus upholding the status quo (i.e. personal values structured along the openness-
to-change-conservation dimension). Accordingly, open-to-change top managers can be expected 
are likely to view secondary stakeholders differently than conservation-oriented managers, and 
perceive a wider range of secondary stakeholder demands as being reasonable and feasible to 
entertain and work on. 
 As I shall now proceed to discuss, prior research suggests that political ideology is 
reflective of the overall structure of top managers’ values. However, it is not equivalent to, or a 
proxy for any specific personal value. 
3.1.3. The Relationship Between Personal Values and Political Ideology 
 Ideologies constitute value-laden constructions people use to inform their decision-
making (de St. Aubin, 1996; Rohan, 2000). Consistent with this notion, political ideologies 
encapsulate attitudes and values about the proper goals of society and how they should be 
achieved (Jost, 2006). As such, there is general agreement that political ideologies reflect the 
structure of individuals’ underlying value systems and thus, provide an accurate overall 
indication of an individual’s underlying values priorities (Rohan, 2000; Rokeach, 1973). For 
instance, Schwartz and his colleagues remark: 
People tend to favor ideologies or policies that can promote their important basic 
values in any given societal context. They tend to oppose ideologies and policies 
that threaten or frustrate attainment of their important basic values in that context. 
People who attribute high priority to security and power values, for example, tend 
to favor nationalist policies because they seemingly promise greater security and 
they express power goals. People who attribute high priority to universalism 
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values tend to oppose nationalist policies because nationalism gives less weight to 
the equality and dignity of those who are not members of the nation (2014: 906). 
 Concretely, political ideologies reside along a continuum of liberalism-conservatism 
(Schwartz, 1996a) which helps to organize individuals’ overall beliefs and values pertaining to a 
range of issues. Evidence from the U.S. suggests that the two major political parties (e.g. 
Democrat and Republican) articulate different positions relating to two issue dimensions that 
resonate with the American public: (1) economic and social welfare issues and (2) cultural and 
moral issues (Layman, Carsey, & Horowitz, 2006). For instance, Republicans articulate a 
position on the issue of wealth redistribution consistent with self-enhancement (e.g. achievement 
and power) and conservation dimensions of the value system (Schwartz et al., 2014)—less 
wealth redistribution and lower taxes are preferred because individual effort should determine 
income (Alesina & Angeletos, 2005; Christensen et al., 2015). As such, the Republican Party has 
a tendency to attract individuals displaying a more pronounced level of political conservatism 
because these individuals tend to fear losses, desire financial and job security (i.e. self-
enhancement), and have greater aversion to ambiguity and uncertainty than those who are less 
politically conservative (i.e. conservation) (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003). On the 
other hand, the Democrats articulate a position on the issue of wealth redistribution consistent 
with self-transcendent (e.g. universalism and benevolence) and openness-to-change value 
dimensions (Schwartz et al., 2014)—more wealth redistribution and higher taxes are preferred 
because luck, birth, connections, and/or corruption determine wealth (Alesina & Angeletos, 
2005; Christensen et al., 2015). Therefore, the Democratic Party has a tendency to attract 
individuals displaying a more pronounced level of political liberalism because these individuals 
tend to favor equality (i.e. self-transcendence), and tend to embrace change and social novelty 
(i.e. openness-to-change) (Jost et al., 2003).  
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 In general, individuals exhibiting certain political ideologies come to develop a certain 
affinity for a political party that espouses beliefs and values consistent with their own because 
individuals evaluate external stimuli (e.g. persons, groups, organizations) and make choices in a 
manner that is consistent with their values (Matusik et al., 2008; Meglino & Ravlin, 1998). 
Figure 3 visually depicts how political ideologies can be seen as a reflection of an individual’s 
personal values. Since Schwartz’s seminal work (1992, 1994), it is well established that 
individuals’ personal values systems are universally comprised of nine distinct values—
hedonism, self-direction, universalism, benevolence, achievement, power, security, conformity, 
and tradition—structured along two axes: an openness-to-change-conservation axis, and a self-
transcendence-self-enhancement axis. Further, values scholars traditionally depict individuals’ 
value systems in a pie-style fashion (e.g. Rohan, 2000; Schwartz, 1992, 1994, 1999; Schwartz et 
al., 2014). The boundaries between a liberal political ideology and a conservative political 
ideology, as they relate to personal values, are not always clear-cut because many individuals’ 
political ideologies reside along the liberalism-conservatism ideology continuum (rather than at 
the ends of the continuum) (Chin et al., 2013; Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009). However, prior 
research suggests that a liberal political ideology can generally be seen as a reflection of a value 
system that is structured more heavily toward openness-to-change and self-transcendent values; 
namely, hedonism, self-direction, universalism, and benevolence (red shaded area in Figure 3). 
In contrast, a conservative political ideology can be seen to reflect a value system that is 
structured more heavily toward conservation and self-enhancement values; namely achievement, 
power, security, conformity, and tradition (blue shaded area in Figure 3) (Schwartz et al., 2014). 
This is not meant to suggest that liberal or conservative individuals do not possess the values that 
are not shaded by their respective ideologies in Figure 3 (Rohan, 2000; Schwartz, 1994; 
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Schwartz et al., 2014); only that, on average, the shaded areas in Figure 3 will usually represent 
those values that are most salient in guiding the behavior and actions of liberal versus 
conservative individuals. 
FIGURE 3 
Political Ideology as a Reflection of Personal Values: A Qualitative Portrayal 
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3.2. HYPOTHESES 
3.2.1. Top Management Political Liberalism and Receptivity to Secondary Stakeholders   
 I begin with the baseline argument suggested by value driven theories of behavior that 
liberal top management teams (TMTs) will be associated with higher firm receptivity to 
secondary stakeholders. In a general, a liberal TMT’s self-transcendent value structure is more 
likely to lead to their adoption of a broader view of the firm with regards to its purpose within 
society; one that is more stakeholder-centric (Agle et al., 1999; Chin et al., 2013). According to 
values-driven theories of behavior, liberal-leaning managers are also likely to envision more 
severe adverse consequences for themselves and the firm that may arise from refusing to work 
on secondary stakeholder issues, and ascribe themselves a greater degree of responsibility for 
avoiding such adverse consequences (Schwartz, 1973, 1977; Stern et al., 1999). As a result, 
consistent with their self-transcendent nature and motivations, liberal TMTs are also more likely 
to identify compelling strategic and business-related reasons for entertaining secondary 
stakeholder demands (Higgins & Molden, 2003). Even when a secondary stakeholders champion 
issues that might be considered incongruent with liberal top managers’ personal values, a more 
liberal TMT can still be reasonably expected to be motivated by their stakeholder-centric view of 
the firm and remain receptive to such a stakeholder’s demands (Inbar, Pizarro, & Bloom, 2008). 
Furthermore, liberal TMTs’ inherent disposition toward openness-to-change will push them to 
embrace the often socially progressive and possibly radical nature of secondary stakeholder 
issues. Liberal TMTs are likely to see secondary stakeholder demands as a way to challenge and 
even transcend the status quo within their own firm and perhaps even within their industry. 
 In contrast, conservative TMT’s self-enhancement value structure is more likely to lead 
to their adopting a narrow view of the firm with regards to its purpose within society; one that is 
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more stakeholder-centric (Agle et al., 1999). According to values-driven theories of behavior, 
conservative-leaning managers are also likely to envision more severe adverse consequences for 
themselves and the firm that may emerge from cooperating with secondary stakeholders, and 
ascribe themselves a greater degree of responsibility for avoiding such adverse consequences 
(Schwartz, 1973, 1977; Stern et al., 1999). As such, consistent with their self-enhancing 
motivations, conservative managers are more likely to identify reasons for defying secondary 
stakeholder demands (Higgins & Molden, 2003). Even when a secondary stakeholder promotes 
issues that might be considered congruent with conservative top managers’ personal values, a 
more conservative TMT can be expected to be motivated by their shareholder-centric view of the 
firm, and be less receptive to such a stakeholder’s demands. Chin and colleagues’ (2013) 
findings offer support for this general logic; they found that conservative CEOs invest more 
heavily in CSR initiatives as firm performance increased, reflecting a dispositional preference 
toward first maximizing shareholder wealth. Finally, conservative TMTs’ inherent disposition 
toward conservation will motivate them to reject the often socially progressive and radical nature 
of secondary stakeholder issues because of they will strongly negative prejudicial attitudes 
toward the deviant nature of secondary stakeholders and experience disgust with these entities 
(Inbar et al., 2008; Jost, 2006). Consequently, I hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 1: The degree of liberalism in the top management team’s (TMT) political 
ideology will be positively associated with the firm’s receptivity to its secondary 
stakeholders. 
3.2.2. Top Management Ideological Separation and Receptivity to Secondary Stakeholders  
 Firm receptivity to secondary stakeholders may emanate from debates and deliberations 
that take place within the executive suite (Briscoe et al., 2014). Since top managers are known to 
vary greatly in their respective political ideologies (Chin et al., 2013; Francia et al., 2005), 
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managers in a given firm might disagree considerably with regards to how they might generally 
deal with secondary stakeholders, as the spectrum of political ideologies within in the TMT 
become increasingly separated.  
 Separation refers to the composition of differences in opinion among unit members in 
values, beliefs, or attitudes (Harrison & Klein, 2007). Minimum separation occurs when all of 
the members of a unit occupy the same position at any location along a continuum representing a 
common characteristic.  Minimum separation can occur anywhere along the continuum of 
interest; teams may be close to one another, for example, on where they fall on the liberal-
conservative continuum. On the other hand, maximum separation occurs when unit members are 
equally split and at opposing ends along the continuum of interest. In other words, “the utmost 
separation occurs when there are two (and only two) staunchly divided but balanced blocs within 
a team” (Harrison & Klein, 2007: 1204), for example, half the team is highly liberal and the 
other half is highly conservative. Moderate or limited separation occurs under circumstances in 
which unit members depict some spread of difference along the continuum. Concretely, as 
Harrison and Klein explain, “perhaps most unit members occupy the same position, and only a 
few hold differing positions. Or perhaps unit members are uniformly spread across the 
continuum” (2007: 1204).  
 Prior work suggests that separation of values, beliefs, or attitudes within a unit implicates 
important consequences for intra-unit dynamics and for performance-related outcomes such as 
decision-making. The traditional argument holds that greater levels of similarity—or lower 
degrees of separation—yield higher levels of cooperation, trust, and social integration (Locke & 
Horowitz, 1990). As Harrison and his colleagues observe “people find it more pleasurable to 
interact with others who have similar psychological characteristics, because that interaction 
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verifies and reinforces their own beliefs, affect, and expressed behaviors” (2002: 1031). 
Therefore, as separation within units increases, so too does the potential for subgroups and/or 
factions to form, which is likely associated with instances in which members of subgroups may 
“cohere and share opinions more often within the subgroup than with the others, which may lead 
to irritation in the team and disputes between different factions” (Gibson & Vermeulen, 2003: 
203). Empirical findings demonstrate that lower levels of social integration and cooperation lead 
to lower levels of unit-level task performance (Harrison et al., 2002).  
 Based on the foregoing, TMT separation, indicative of a TMT containing a higher 
proportion of conservative managers, may negatively moderate the relationship between 
liberalism and receptivity. As discussed previously, conservative-leaning managers likely to 
envision more severe adverse consequences for themselves and the firm that may emerge from 
cooperating with secondary stakeholders, and ascribe themselves a greater degree of 
responsibility for avoiding such adverse consequences. Given the structure of their values, 
conservative managers also exhibit strong conviction in their beliefs and a tendency toward 
dogmatic aggression (i.e. using aggression toward those whose beliefs are different than their 
own) (Crowson, 2009). This suggests that conservative managers are likely to remain persistent 
and aggressive in their desires to limit the firm’s receptivity to secondary stakeholders, perhaps 
suppressing the influence of more liberal managers on the TMT. Therefore, I propose:  
Hypothesis 2: The positive relationship between TMT liberalism and firm receptivity will 
be moderated by the degree of separation in the TMT’s political ideology, such that 
the relationship will be less positive (weaker) as ideological separation increases. 
 Conversely, while conflict, in general, does reduce team effectiveness under various 
circumstances (De Dreu & Weingart, 2003), it is also argued to be an essential dimension in 
successful TMTs (Amason, Hochwarter, Thompson, & Harrison, 1995; Bourgeois, 1997; 
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Bromiley & Rau, 2016; Kellermanns, Walter, Lechner, & Floyd, 2005), especially when that 
conflict is cognitive in nature (or C-type conflict) (Amason et al., 1995; Amason & Sapienza, 
1997).  
C-type conflict is beneficial because it requires teams to engage in activities that 
are essential to a team's effectiveness. C-type conflict focuses attention on the all-
too-often ignored assumptions that may underlie a particular issue. By facilitating 
frank communication and open consideration of different alternatives, C-type 
conflict encourages innovative thinking and promotes creative solutions to 
problems that otherwise might seem insurmountable. As a consequence, C-type 
conflict improves the quality of team decisions. In fact, without C-type conflict, 
team decisions are little more than the decisions of a team's most vocal or 
influential member (Amason et al., 1995: 23).  
 Therefore, it is also possible to theorize that greater degrees of separation in the political 
ideology of the TMT fosters greater levels of values-based cognitive conflict, in which members 
are forced to examine, compare, and reconcile differences between their own value-laden ways 
of looking at secondary stakeholders. Further, because secondary stakeholders often frame their 
demands as opportunities—albeit not always obvious ones (Benford & Snow, 2000; den Hond & 
de Bakker, 2007)—the type of cognitive conflict that might be expected as a result of increased 
TMT political ideology separation is consequential for allowing TMTs to recognize the possible 
opportunities associated with entertaining and working on secondary stakeholders issues. In 
attempting to reconcile opposing viewpoints present under higher levels of political ideology 
separation, TMTs are forced to expend greater cognitive effort and also think more creatively, 
which is typically associated with recognizing non-obvious opportunities (Grégoire, Barr, & 
Shepherd, 2010; Miron-Spektor, Gino, & Argote, 2011). In other words, greater degrees of TMT 
political ideology separation can “result in more extensive discussion of strategic options, more 
learning opportunities, and thereby reduce the likelihood of a groupthink-type phenomenon 
occurring” (Lant, Milliken, & Batra, 1992: 592). Taken together, the foregoing discussion 
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suggests that TMT political ideology separation should positively moderate the relationship 
between liberalism and receptivity. Therefore, I hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 2-alternate:  The positive relationship between TMT liberalism and firm 
receptivity will be moderated by the degree of separation in the TMT’s political 
ideology, such that the relationship will be more positive (stronger) as ideological 
separation increases. 
3.2.3. CEO Political Liberalism and Receptivity to Secondary Stakeholders: The 
Contingent Role of TMT Separation 
 When theorizing about the role of top manager political ideologies in firm receptivity to 
secondary stakeholders, it is important to account for the noteworthy role of the CEO as the most 
influential actor within the TMT (Busenbark et al., 2016; Crossland & Hambrick, 2011; 
Hambrick, 1995; Kellermanns et al., 2005). For instance, building on the observation that that 
the role of the CEO has seemed to gain increasing importance in the popular media, Quigley and 
Hambrick utilized a variance partitioning approach to examine the proportion of variance in firm 
performance that could be attributed to CEO factors, concluding: 
perceptions of increased CEO influence might be explained, at least in part, by an 
increase in actual CEO influence. Across multiple performance measures, we 
show that the effects of individual chief executives on company outcomes rose 
considerably over the period 1950–2009 (2015: 827).  
 Indeed, recent research demonstrates that CEO attributes are important influencers of a 
number of boundary-spanning strategic initiatives such as undertaking strategic alliances, joint 
ventures, and mergers. For example, research shows that CEOs who are promotion-focused are 
quicker to enter into long-term strategic alliances (Das & Kumar, 2011) and are more likely to 
pursue mergers and acquisitions (Gamache et al., 2015) than CEOs who are prevention focused; 
someone high in promotion focus pursues goals based on a striving towards their “ideal self”, 
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and someone high in prevention focus exhibits a strong sense of what “ought to be” and 
considers goals based on a sense of duty and responsibility (Crowe & Higgins, 1997; Higgins, 
1998; Johnson, Smith, Wallace, Hill, & Baron, 2015). Additionally, CEOs exhibiting signs of 
hubris have also been found to pay higher premiums for acquisitions (Hayward & Hambrick, 
1997), and CEO negative relative pay standing is positively associated with acquisition activity 
(Seo, Gamache, Devers, & Carpenter, 2015). Finally, prior work examining the social dynamics 
within TMTs also demonstrates that the CEO is a central authority within the TMT(Haleblian & 
Finkelstein, 1993; Iaquinto & Fredrickson, 1997; Peterson, Smith, Martorana, & Owens, 2003), 
to the point where firm-level actions might be a reflection own the CEO’s own inclinations, 
regardless of the TMT’s. I therefore also investigate the influence of CEO liberalism on firm 
receptivity, considering the possibility that firm receptivity may be reflective of the CEO’s 
political ideology and hence, underlying values. 
 The logic supporting the relationship between CEO liberalism and firm receptivity 
parallels that supporting the hypothesized relationship between TMT liberalism and firm 
receptivity. Synthesizing these arguments, liberal CEOs’ self-transcendent values make them 
inherently disposed to taking a broader view of their firms, centered on the creation of social 
value for various stakeholders, thereby making them more receptive to secondary stakeholders 
and their initiatives. Furthermore, based on values-driven theories of behavior, liberal-leaning 
CEOs are also likely than conservative-leaning CEOs to envision more severe adverse 
consequences for themselves and for the firm that may arise out of refusing to entertain the 
firm’s secondary stakeholders and ascribe themselves a greater degree of responsibility for 
avoiding such adverse consequences (Schwartz, 1973, 1977; Stern et al., 1999). In support of 
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these arguments, Mazutis (2013) finds evidence that CEO open orientation (a construct that 
includes political liberalism) is associated with broader corporate social strategies.  
 By comparison, conservative CEOs’ self-enhancing values make them inherently 
disposed to taking a narrower view of their firms, centered on the creation of shareholder wealth. 
Furthermore, based on values-driven theories of behavior, conservative CEOs are also likely than 
liberal CEOs to envision more severe adverse consequences for themselves and the firm that may 
arise out of working with the firm’s secondary stakeholders and ascribe themselves a greater 
degree of responsibility for avoiding such adverse consequences. As such, I hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 3: The degree of liberalism in the CEO’s political ideology will be positively 
associated with the firm’s receptivity to its secondary stakeholders. 
 At the same time however, it is possible that the degree to which a firm will be receptive 
to its to its secondary stakeholders is not the unilateral decision of the CEO; although he or she is 
surely am important determinant (Briscoe et al., 2014). Given the highly contestable nature of 
determining whether to entertain and work with secondary stakeholders, it is reasonable to 
expect that liberal CEOs would have to engage in some degree of selling the prospect of 
entertaining secondary stakeholder demands as comprising an important element of the firm’s 
strategic agenda to the other managers on the TMT; these other managers may require some 
convincing that working on secondary stakeholder issues is worth their time and attention 
(Dutton & Ashford, 1993).  
 The ability of CEOs to impart their own ideologically driven intentions pertaining to 
secondary stakeholders also likely depends on the degree to which the CEO and the rest of the 
TMT’s respective ideologies are separated. TMTs with a high level of separation between the 
CEO and the other TMT members are those where the ideologies—and hence underlying 
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values—of the CEO differ from those of the other managers on the TMT. For example, consider 
a TMT where the CEO is extremely liberal and each of the other managers is extremely 
conservative. Alternatively, low ideological separation could also be represented by a TMT in 
which the CEO is extremely conservative and each of the other managers is extremely liberal. By 
comparison, TMTs with a low degree of separation between the CEO and the other TMT 
members are those where the ideologies—and hence the underlying values—of the CEO and 
those of the other managers on the TMT are perfectly convergent. For example, consider a TMT 
where the CEO is extremely liberal and each of the other managers on the TMT are also 
extremely liberal, or a TMT in which the CEO is extremely conservative and the other managers 
on the TMT are also extremely conservative.  
 As the degree of separation between the CEO’s ideology and that of the other members 
of the TMT increases, it may be difficult of a liberal-leaning CEO to establish consensus with the 
other TMT members in regards to how the firm may cope with secondary stakeholders 
(Kellermanns et al., 2005; Knight et al., 1998; Wooldridge & Floyd, 1990). For example, de Jong 
and colleagues (2013) find evidence that founder personality influences task and relationship 
which impacts new venture performance. For example, Bromiley and Rau’s (2016) recent review 
focused on social, behavioral, and cognitive influences in the upper-echelons during strategy 
process also suggests that the potential for faultlines—that is, the division of the TMT into 
subgroups—increases with a higher degrees of separation between the CEO’s political ideology 
and that of the other TMT members. 
 Therefore, I argue that the influence of the CEO’s political ideology over the firm’s 
receptivity to secondary stakeholders will be moderated by the degree of separation between the 
CEO’s ideology and that of the rest of the TMT. Specifically, I anticipate that the positive 
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relationship between the CEO’s liberalism and the firm’s receptivity to secondary stakeholders 
will be less positive as separation increases. Under high degrees of separation, the CEO is likely 
to experience some coordination obstacles and disagreements that are likely to attenuate the 
influence of his or her own ideology on receptivity. However, as separation decreases, the CEO 
is likely to experience greater ease in imparting his views on the TMT. Therefore, I propose: 
Hypothesis 4: The positive relationship between the degree of liberalism in the CEO’s 
political ideology and the firm’s receptivity to its secondary stakeholders will be 
moderated by degree separation between the CEO’s political ideology and that of the 
other TMT members, such that the relationship will be weaker as separation 
increases. 
3.3. METHOD 
3.3.1. Sample 
 I gathered data on secondary stakeholder activity targeted toward publicly traded firms 
that took place in the United States between 2007-2012. Consistent with prior work (e.g. 
Nadkarni & Chen, 2014), a five-year time frame is considered long enough to identify patterns of 
firm receptivity and also to captures economic downturns (2007 to 2009) and upturns (2009 and 
beyond) that typically impact the business environment (see: NBER.org). Because the secondary 
stakeholder activity—specifically the likelihood that they target firms—is tied to firm 
performance (King, 2008), using a sampling from that included economic downturns and upturns 
ensures that receptivity is not a spurious outcome resulting from systemic increases or decreases 
in secondary stakeholder activity. The decision to focus on secondary stakeholder demands 
targeted toward publicly traded companies is rooted in two important considerations. First, 
Standard and Poor’s Compustat and ExecuComp databases provide important data on these firms 
and their top managers. This is essential for gathering data on managers’ personal political 
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contributions history from other databases, which I expand upon below. Second, these firms “are 
the kind of organizations that should be highly sensitive to shareholders’ concerns while giving 
less credence to the demands made by secondary stakeholders” (King, 2008: 403). As such, these 
types of firms are not necessarily incentivized be responsive to secondary stakeholder demands; 
willingness to work with secondary stakeholders is discretionary (Clarkson, 1995; McWilliams 
& Siegel, 2001). Thus, looking at the influence of top managers’ political ideologies on these 
firms’ receptivity to their secondary stakeholders is a strong test of my hypotheses. 
 I focus specifically on secondary stakeholder activity in the form of shareholder proxy 
proposals. Proxy proposals are written proposals presented to be voted on at a company’s annual 
meeting, and have been historically utilized as a platform to bring a wide range of social issues to 
the attention of a firm’s management. As noted in prior work, it is now commonplace for entities 
fitting the traditional conceptualization of secondary stakeholders to purchase enough shares in 
firms to allow them to table proxy proposals (see: Eesley & Lenox, 2006; McDonnell et al., 
2015). For example, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) reports holding shares 
in over 80 meat producers, clothing retailers, fast food and grocery chains, and pharmaceutical 
companies. As PETA goes on to explain: 
[W]e purchase small amounts of stock in companies that abuse animals in some 
way—whether for food or clothing or in animal tests—and then use our position 
as stockholders to submit shareholder resolutions calling on the companies to 
adopt better animal welfare standards (or in the case of some companies, to adopt 
any animal welfare standards). We’ve won major victories for animals through 
using this tactic, like getting Carl’s Jr. and Hardee’s to adopt improve their animal 
welfare practices and getting Dow Chemical to reduce the number of animals 
killed in its tests (2008). 
 Although holding shares makes secondary stakeholders shareholders de facto primary 
stakeholders, little disagreement exists that such entities purchase shares to submit proxy 
proposals merely as an influence tactic and that these entities fundamentally remain secondary 
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stakeholders in the eyes of academics and practitioners (Eesley & Lenox, 2006). Consequently, 
focusing on secondary stakeholder-initiated proxy proposals presents little concern over the 
authenticity of such demands being issued by entities that conform to prevailing definitions of 
secondary stakeholders. Looking at firm receptivity to secondary stakeholder activity in the form 
of proxy proposals also offers the advantage of controlling for the possible confounding effects 
of contextual factors such as media coverage (Eesley et al., in press; Eesley & Lenox, 2006; 
King, 2008). Furthermore, the extent to which secondary stakeholder actions such as boycotts 
reported in the media are actually attended to by the firm’s top management is unclear. 
Additionally, temporal delay between when such activities are covered in the media and when 
they garner the attention of the firm’s top management—if at all—is unclear. In comparison, “by 
placing issues on the corporate proxy, social movement organizations like PETA work to assure 
that their issues will be considered on the corporate agenda” (McDonnell et al., 2015: 7), and 
thus garner the attention of the firm’s top management. Given this study’s interest in 
understanding the influence of top managers’ personal values on receptivity to secondary 
stakeholders, proxy proposals are an ideal form of secondary stakeholder action to examine. 
 Data on these proxy proposals were collected from Institutional Shareholder Services 
(ISS), formerly known as RiskMetrics. Considerations related to the validity and generalizability 
of the results required that I apply some notable sampling criteria to the data. First, I limited the 
data to proxy proposals that are considered to be of the “socially responsible investing” (SRI) 
category. Second, I limited the data to proxy proposals that are put forth by sponsors categorized 
as “special interest”, “religious”, or “church”. Examples of secondary stakeholders categorized in 
this manner are such major players as PETA, the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility 
(ICCR), and the As You Sow Foundation. This criteria eliminates the possible confounding 
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effects of including major primary stakeholders, institutional investment firms, or other large 
block individual shareholders that are categorized as SRIs in the sample (e.g. Walden Asset 
Management, Service Employees International Union). This stage of building the sample led to 
the retention of 438 distinct secondary stakeholder-initiated proxy proposals, issued toward 131 
unique firms. After constructing the dependent variable (more details on this process below), the 
final sample for analysis included 292 firm-year observations, grouped across 126 unique firms. 
3.3.2. Dependent Variable(s): Firm Receptivity 
 I measured firm receptivity as the overall variance in its responses to all secondary 
stakeholder-initiated proxy proposals that it received in the focal year (year t) (see: McDonnell et 
al., 2015). The status of proxy proposals, as recorded in the ISS database, provides a valuable 
piece of evidence pertaining to the firm’s receptivity to its secondary stakeholders; it can react to 
shareholder proposals in three distinct and traceable ways. First, the firm could be 
accommodative and willing to—at least—negotiate with secondary stakeholders without putting 
the proposal up to a vote, in which case the proposal is withdrawn. Second, the firm could 
indicate a more neutral stance toward the shareholder resolution and voluntarily allow the 
proposal to go to a vote at the annual meeting. Third, the firm could adopt a more defensive 
stance and seek to challenge the proposal by petitioning the SEC for permission to exclude it 
from the annual proxy, in which case the proposal is omitted (David et al., 2007; McDonnell et 
al., 2015). Additionally: 
Responses to shareholder proposals are a particularly useful tool for studying 
corporate receptivity because, unlike other forms of activism, the processes for 
resisting a shareholder proposal are both formalized and public, which makes it 
possible to separate resistant firms that actively fight against a challenge and more 
neutral firms that simply ignore the challenge. This is contrasted with the case of 
challenges like boycotts, where firm responses can typically only be captured as a 
binary variable indicating whether a target did or did not concede, conflating 
resistant and neutral firms (McDonnell et al., 2015: 661). 
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 Accordingly, utilizing the status of the proxy proposals offers the unique advantage of 
building a measure that more closely captures how the firm strategically engages with secondary 
stakeholders in a general and ongoing manner. To do so, I followed McDonnell and colleagues’ 
(2015) approach to capturing responsiveness, which relies on the Janis-Fadner (JF) coefficient of 
imbalance. The JF coefficient is a measure that has traditionally been used to capture the overall 
tenor of media articles (Janis & Fadner, 1965). Strategic management and organization scholars 
have commonly utilized the JF coefficient to measure such things as firm reputation or celebrity, 
as it is portrayed in the popular media (e.g. Deephouse, 2000; Pfarrer, Pollock, & Rindova, 2010; 
Pollock & Rindova, 2003). The JF coefficient has commonly been obtained by coding media 
articles as negative, neutral, or positive, then transforming them into a variable that captures 
these articles’ overall tenor. Like media articles, outcomes of secondary stakeholder-initiated 
proxy proposals are negative, neutral, or positive; the JF coefficient, therefore, applies nicely to 
measuring a firm’s responsiveness to its secondary stakeholders. The JF coefficient is computed 
as follows: 
( P2 – PN ) / V2 if P > N; 0 if P = N; 
and ( PN – N2 ) / V2 if N > P 
P is the number of positive response outcomes to secondary stakeholder-initiated proxy 
proposals (i.e. withdrawn), N is the number of negative responses (i.e. omitted), and V is the total 
number of secondary stakeholder-initiated proxy proposals submitted to the firm in a given year. 
The final variable has a range from -1 to 1. Firms with a JF coefficient of -1 challenged all proxy 
proposals submitted in a given year and firms with a JF coefficient of 1 voluntarily agreed to 
work with secondary stakeholders toward implementing all of the social proxy proposals they 
received. 
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3.3.3. Focal Independent Variables and Moderators 
 Managerial political ideology. Based on an approach that has been validated by, and 
used in, prior research (e.g. Briscoe et al., 2014; Chin et al., 2013; Christensen et al., 2015; 
Hutton et al., 2014), top managers’ political ideologies were measured using their history of 
personal contributions to election campaigns. Prior studies have considered all individuals at the 
vice-president level or higher to comprise the TMT (e.g. Hambrick & D'Aveni, 1992; O'Reilly, 
Main, & Crystal, 1988). However, there is tremendous variation across industries both pertaining 
to the average number of vice-presidents on a given TMT as well as to the meaning of the title 
“vice-president” (Finkelstein et al., 2009). Following prior work, the TMT in this study is 
defined as top managers at the firm as reported in the ExecuComp database (see: Carpenter, 
Sanders, & Gergersen, 2001; Hutton et al., 2014); in most cases, this comprises the five highest 
paid managers at the firm but there is variation in the number of top managers that are listed in 
the ExecuComp database for each firm. This operationalization is reasonable as ExecuComp 
generally lists the most highly compensated and most prominent top managers at the firm, which 
constitutes the dominant coalition—perhaps even within a larger group that may include 
directors—that is primarily held responsible for key strategic initiatives and performance 
outcomes (Siegel & Hambrick, 2005). This operationalization is also appropriate for the present 
study, since understanding firm receptivity to secondary stakeholders implicates considerations 
of firm boundaries and managing complex and interwoven relationships among the firm’s 
various stakeholders, which is likely the domain of only the true elites in the TMT (Finkelstein et 
al., 2009). Furthermore, since secondary stakeholder demands frequently conflict with the 
priorities of the firm’s primary stakeholders, those most highly visible and compensated 
managers find themselves at the greatest risk of being scapegoats (Boeker, 1992), primary 
Chapter 3 - Firm Receptivity to Secondary Stakeholders: The Role of Managerial Political Ideology 
 94 
stakeholder—especially shareholders—are displeased with how the firm deals with secondary 
stakeholders.  
 I proceeded to gather information on top managers’ personal political contributions made 
to PACs, Parties, Senate, House, or Presidential candidate during the 10-year window prior to the 
occurrence of a secondary stakeholder activist-initiated proxy proposal. These contributions are 
tracked by the Federal Election Commission (FEC)—any contribution of $200 or above made 
since 1979 is available on the FEC website, as well as from non-partisan research institutes such 
as the Center for Responsive Politics (www.opensecrets.org). These data files list the donor’s 
employer and job title that, along with the donor’s name, are the key identifiers for linking the 
contribution data to other managerial characteristics reported in the ExecuComp database.  
 A top manager’s personal political ideology—specifically, his or her degree of political 
liberalism—is calculated based on four representative indicators (see: Briscoe et al., 2014; Chin 
et al., 2013).  First, I computed the number of donations to Democrat recipients divided by the 
number of donations to recipients of both parties (to handle zero values, I added 0.1 to all 
numerators and 0.2 to all denominators). Second, I took the dollar amount of donations to 
Democrats divided by the amount of donations to both parties. Third, I calculated the number of 
years the manager made donations to Democrats divided by the number of years donations were 
made to either party. Finally, I added the number of distinct Democratic recipients to which the 
manager made donations divided by the total number of distinct recipients of both parties. 
Together, these four indicators represent an top manager’s behavioral commitment, financial 
commitment, persistence of commitment, and scope of commitment reflective of a liberal 
ideology (Briscoe et al., 2014; Chin et al., 2013). The final measure is the average of all four 
indicators and yields an overall measure of managerial political ideology between 0 and 1; with 0 
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indicating a perfectly conservative individual and 1 indicating a perfectly liberal individual. For 
example, consider a manager gave 4 gifts to Democrats and two to Republicans; gave $3000 to 
Democrats and $700 to Republicans; made gifts to Democrats in five calendar years and gifts to 
Republicans in three years; and gave to five distinct Democratic recipients and only one 
Republican recipient. This top manager’s scores for each of the four indicators are as follows: 
Liberalism in number of donations = 4 + 0.1 
6 + 0.2 
= 0.66 
Liberalism in dollar value of donations = 3000 + 0.1 
3700 + 0.2 
= 0.81 
Liberalism in number of donation years = 5 + 0.1 
8 + 0.2 
= 0.62 
Liberalism in number of distinct recipients = 5 + 0.1 
6 + 0.2 
= 0.82 
 
Taking the average of the four indicators, this manager’ overall political liberalism score is 0.73; 
a relatively liberal manager. 
 I measured the political ideology of the TMT in two distinct ways, in order to account for 
different ways of operationalizing and conceptualizing the political ideology of a team. First, I 
measured TMT political liberalism using the average of the political liberalism measure of the 
individual managers’ political ideologies (Chan, 1998). While others have opted for a weighted 
average (e.g. Christensen et al., 2015), I have no theoretically valid reason that would support my 
assigning specific weights to managers’ political ideology scores in determining the political 
ideology of the TMT (Chan, 1998). Further, to the extent that dealing with secondary 
stakeholders involves open conversations within the executive suite, as Briscoe and colleagues 
(2014) describe, I proceed along a safer assumption that each manager’s, including the CEO’s, 
voice and ideology will be represented in a more equally-weighted manner when calculating the 
TMT’s overall political ideology than would otherwise be the case using pre-determined—and 
arguably arbitrary—weights. 
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 Second, adopting an approach that has recently been utilized to study the strategic 
influence of diversity on TMTs and boards (Chen, Crossland, & Huang, 2016; Post & Byron, 
2015), I also measured TMT liberal representation as the as the proportion of liberal-leaning 
executives on the TMT in a given firm-year. Individual managers were considered as liberal-
leaning if their political ideology measure was greater than 0.5. In subsequent analyses (which I 
expand upon below), I also estimated models using a weighted average of TMT liberalism and 
using a categorical measure of Liberal TMT presence using a dummy variable where one (1) 
indicated a TMT that had at least one liberal-leaning manager; zero (0) otherwise (Chen et al., 
2016).  
 TMT ideology separation. Ideology separation on the TMT was measured using the unit-
level standard deviation (SD) of top managers’ ideology scores, based on Harrison and Klein’s 
approach, which is “indexed at the unit level by cumulating absolute or squared distances 
between pairs of individuals. Within-unit SD reflects such cumulative distances”  (2007: 1210; 
see also: Chan, 1998; Kellermanns, Walter, Lechner, & Floyd, 2005). While the separation 
measure does not offer any insight as to the relative position of any individual top manager in 
either “ideological camp” (i.e. it is agnostic as to whether the CEO or any individual manager is 
liberal or conservative) it does adequately capture the extent to which opposing ideology-driven 
viewpoints are present and how oppositional they might be.   
 CEO-TMT ideology separation. I measured ideology separation between the CEO and 
the other members of the TMT by comparing each team’s member’s ideologies against those of 
the CEO (Kellermanns et al., 2005; Wooldridge & Floyd, 1990). Specifically, I computed the 
averaged the Euclidian-distance scores between the CEO and each TMT member (Harrison & 
Klein, 2007; Iaquinto & Fredrickson, 1997; West & Schwenk, 1996). This measure accurately 
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reflects a construct of interest related to the “alignment of opinion around a specific view” 
(Kellermanns et al., 2005: 730; see also: Smith-Jentsch, Mathieu, & Kraiger, 2005). As such, for 
ease of interpretation, this measure is the inverse of the measure I used for TMT separation, 
where higher values actually reflect lower degrees of separation between the CEO and the rest of 
the TMT. 
3.3.4. Control Variables 
 Prior work has demonstrated that a number of TMT-level factors may influence various 
strategic decisions and actions, such as the degree to which the firm might be receptive to 
secondary stakeholders, and I accounted for them in this study. I controlled for TMT age, the 
average age of the top managers, because older top managers might be more risk-averse (Bantel 
& Jackson, 1989; Finkelstein et al., 2009; Wiersema & Bantel, 1992). Further, recent work also 
demonstrates that gender in the executive suite might be associated with important strategic 
decisions and actions, such as undertaking acquisitions (Chen et al., 2016; see also: Dezsö & 
Ross, 2012; Post & Byron, 2015); I therefore controlled for TMT female representation as the 
proportion of women on the TMT. In order to control for the TMT’s degree of total political 
activism, I included a control for TMT political activism, a count variable of the total number of 
donations made to all political parties by the TMT members during the 10 years prior to the focal 
year (Chin et al., 2013). In the models estimating the influence of TMT political ideology 
separation, I also controlled for TMT size, as the number of top managers on the TMT, given its 
influence on cognitive conflict (Amason & Sapienza, 1997; Bromiley & Rau, 2016; Eisenhardt 
& Schoonhoven, 1990; Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1993), and for CEO political liberalism, 
because of the possibility that the CEO’s decision-making authority over receptivity to secondary 
stakeholders may be most prevalent in scenarios where the TMT is increasingly separated. At the 
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firm-level, prior work suggests that larger firms and better performing firm are more visible and 
thus, susceptible to drawing public scrutiny when secondary stakeholders issues demands (David 
et al., 2007; King, 2008); I controlled firm size as the log of total employees (McDonnell et al., 
2015) and for firm performance as the log of ROA. Finally, because other intra-industry firms’ 
receptivity may influence the focal firm’s TMT in determining how they will receive secondary 
stakeholder demands (Pacheco & Dean, 2015), I controlled for industry membership using one-
digit SIC codes (Krause, Priem, & Love, 2015). The use of one-digit SIC codes is driven by 
considerations for estimating the best possible model, while saving on degrees of freedom (e.g.  
Chin et al., 2013). To account for other possible macroeconomic factors, I also estimated models 
that controlled for year effects. Including these effects in the models did not alter the results and 
none of the year effects were consistently significant predictors of receptivity; I omitted them 
from the final models for considerations related to saving on degrees of freedom. Furthermore, 
additional tests for including time fixed effects (testparm in STATA 13.1) revealed that year 
effects were not significant, and therefore, not required in the models (Allison, 2009). Although 
it is possible to control for industry membership using two-digit SIC codes, doing so renders it 
impossible to utilize robust standard errors clustered by firm. In the analyses pertaining to the 
CEO, I controlled for analogous factors at the individual-level of the CEO—namely CEO age 
and gender. 
3.3.5. Addressing Possible Endogeneity 
 It is possible that secondary stakeholders may pay attention to the composition of the 
firms’ TMTs to determine which firms might be more receptive to their demands. As mentioned 
above—although unlikely—to the extent that key secondary stakeholder decision-makers were 
inclined to gather information on top managers’ political campaign contribution history, it would 
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be possible for them to ascertain the extent to which firms’ TMTs presented more liberal 
political ideologies. In this regard, firms with liberal-leaning TMTs would appear to present a 
more attractive corporate opportunity structure for secondary stakeholders (Briscoe et al., 2014) 
and receive a higher number of secondary stakeholders demands, on average. As a result of 
potentially receiving a higher number of secondary stakeholder demands, and hence being 
subjected to more intense pressure, such firms might naturally be more inclined to be receptive to 
secondary stakeholder demands. 
 To explore this possibility, I first regressed the number of secondary stakeholder claims 
received by a firm in the focal year (year t) against the TMT’s political ideology in the prior year 
(year t-1). I then estimated other models that included a broader set of potential antecedent 
factors alongside the TMT’s ideology: the firm’s prior degree of receptivity (year t-1), the 
TMT’s level of political activity in the prior year (year t-1), and the firm’s location (whether it 
was headquartered in one of the top-10 most Democratically-oriented States, according to 
Gallup: Rhode Island, Massachusetts, Hawaii, Vermont, New York, Connecticut, Maryland, 
Illinois, and Delaware). None of these models revealed that the TMT’s political ideology was a 
significant predictor of the number of secondary stakeholder challenges received by the firm; 
none of the other factors were significant either. 
3.3.6. Estimation Approach 
 My data contained a varying number of annual observations clustered by firm. Because 
of this, when testing my hypotheses, it is necessary to take into account that each firm’s degree 
of receptivity is possibly autocorrelated across different years of observation because of 
permanent but unobserved firm-level attributes. These correlations violate the assumption of 
independence across observations necessary for ordinary least squares regression. To address this 
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issue, I rely on the method of generalized estimating equations (GEE)—a population-average 
technique—that allows me to model the variance both between firms and across time for each 
firm. GEE estimators produce consistent, normally-distributed solutions, even in cases involving 
misspecification of the covariance structure of the panel data (Liang & Zeger, 1986; Zeger, 
Liang, & Albert, 1988).  
 In comparison to other prevalent modeling techniques when using panel data—namely, 
fixed- or random-effects models—GEE offers two distinct advantages: it does not assume that 
the dependent variable is normally distributed, and it is more robust because it estimates multiple 
correlation matrix structures to best fit the data (Liang & Zeger, 1986). Specifically, I used the 
xtgee command in STATA 13.1, and specified robust standard errors clustered by firm to further 
relax the assumption of independence of observations (Williams, 2000). I also conducted the 
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation (Drukker, 2003) to see whether a GLS estimation technique 
might be more appropriate than a GEE estimation, using the xtserial command in STATA 13.1. 
The results of the Wooldridge test demonstrate that autocorrelation was not present in the data. 
While the results of the Wooldridge test suggest that GLS estimations were not necessary, I 
conducted supplementary analyses using GLS estimations and other techniques to demonstrate 
the robustness of the results. 
3.4. RESULTS 
 Descriptive statistics and correlations for my study variables are shown in Table 3. It 
should be noted that the mean values and standard deviations for my measures of TMT ideology 
are highly consistent with those found in prior work (e.g. Chin et al., 2013; Christensen et al., 
2015). The main implication worth noting, is that the high degree of consistency between my 
measures and those utilized in studies examining a broader sample of firms (including many that 
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have not been targeted by secondary stakeholders), suggests that sample selection bias is not a 
worrisome issue in this case (Antonakis, Bendahan, Jacquart, & Lalive, 2010; Certo, Busenbark, 
Woo, & Semadeni, in press). In other words, the high degree of consistency between my TMT 
ideology measures and those found in prior work having studied a broader population of top 
managers strongly suggests that the average characteristics of both observable and omitted 
variables in my sample mirror those of the general population in an adequate manner (Vella, 
1998). 
 Table 4 presents the GEE results estimated to test hypothesis 1. All models were highly 
significant according to the Wald χ2 test. Models 1 and 2 estimate the relationship between TMT 
political liberalism and receptivity using different measures. Additionally, all variance inflation 
factors (VIFs) were less than 10, a generally accepted rule-of-thumb cutoff for VIF (Neter, 
Kutner, Wasserman, & Nachtsheim, 1996). Specifically, the average VIF value was 1.63 and the 
highest was 3.33.  As such, multicollinearity was not a problem for the analyses. 
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TABLE 3 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Variable Mean S. D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1. Firm receptivity 0.13 0.57               
2. TMT liberalism 0.39 0.29 0.04              
3. TMT liberal rep. 0.23 0.26 0.08 0.85             
4. TMT liberal pres. 0.59 0.49 0.05 0.81 0.73            
5. TMT separation 0.20 0.14 0.11 0.38 0.23 0.59           
6. TMT consensus 0.24 0.18 0.11 0.32 0.17 0.48 0.88          
7. CEO liberalism 0.39 0.32 0.08 0.81 0.71 0.62 0.19 0.12         
8. CEO age 56.91 5.25 0.03 -0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.06 -0.10        
9. CEO gender 0.04 0.21 -0.03 -0.07 -0.06 -0.11 -0.18 -0.15 -0.05 -0.09       
10. TMT age 53.95 2.96 0.18 -0.19 -0.04 -0.15 -0.25 -0.21 -0.13 0.38 0.07      
11. TMT size 6.01 1.34 -0.17 0.02 -0.05 0.05 0.02 -0.03 -0.01 0.06 -0.06 -0.19     
12. TMT female rep. 0.09 0.12 -0.14 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 0.00 0.07 -0.03 -0.09 0.19 0.01 -0.08    
13. TMT politics 45.18 51.45 -0.05 0.22 0.25 0.21 -0.07 -0.15 0.22 0.12 -0.12 0.15 0.33 -0.15   
14. Employees  139.86 283.15 -0.05 0.01 -0.04 0.05 0.20 0.21 -0.09 0.11 -0.04 -0.06 -0.07 -0.04 -0.09  
15. ROA 0.88 0.69 0.08 -0.11 -0.16 -0.20 -0.05 -0.07 -0.05 0.20 -0.02 0.23 -0.03 0.07 -0.05 0.34 
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TABLE 4 
Influence of Top Management Liberalism on Receptivity 
 Receptivity = E0 + E1 Political Ideology + 6Ek Controls + H 
 Model 1  Model 2 
Variables E p LCI95% UCI95%  E p LCI95% UCI95% 
TMT liberalism 0.299 
(0.154) 
0.02 -0.003 0.601      
TMT liberal 
rep. 
     0.330 
(0.167) 
0.02 0.004 0.656 
Controls          
TMT age 0.033 
(0.013) 
0.01 0.007 0.059  0.032 
(0.013) 
0.02 0.006 0.057 
Female rep. -0.668 
(0.368) 
0.07 -1.390 0.054  -0.715 
(0.366) 
0.05 -1.432 0.002 
TMT politics -0.001 
(0.001) 
0.31 -0.003 0.001  -0.001 
(0.001) 
0.22 -0.003 0.001 
Employees -0.075 
(0.365) 
0.04 -0.146 -0.003  -0.078 
(0.037) 
0.03 -0.150 -0.006 
ROA 0.081 
(0.083) 
0.33 -0.082 0.244  0.077 
(0.084) 
0.36 -0.088 0.241 
Intercept -1.300 
(0.733) 
0.08 -2.738 0.136  -1.167 
(0.720) 
0.11 -2.577 0.244 
Industry effects Yes     Yes    
Cluster by firm Yes     Yes    
N 270     270    
F2 261.14     208.76    
Notes: Coefficient estimates are reported with robust standard errors in parentheses. One-tailed tests for 
hypothesized variables, two-tailed tests for control variables. 
  
 Hypothesis 1 predicted that degree of liberalism in the top management team’s (TMT) 
political ideology would be positively associated with the firm’s receptivity to its secondary 
stakeholders. Together, Models 1 and 2 offer support for this hypothesis. First, as the average 
level of liberalism in the TMT increases, firms become more receptive to secondary stakeholders 
(E = 0.299, p = 0.02). Second, as the proportion of liberal-leaning executives in the TMT 
increases, firms become more receptive to secondary stakeholders (E = 0.330, p = 0.02). More 
specifically, it is possible to conclude with 98% confidence that the relationship between TMT 
liberalism and firm receptivity is positive. In terms of effect size, if the representation of liberal-
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leaning top managers increases by 20%, the firm’s receptivity increases an average of 
approximately 17%. Figure 4 graphically depicts the relationship between TMT liberal 
representation and firm receptivity. 
FIGURE 4 
The Effect of TMT Liberal Representation on Receptivity 
 
 
 
 Table 5 presents the GEE results estimated to test hypotheses 2, and 2-a. Again, all 
models were highly significant according to the Wald χ2 test and all VIFs were less than 10; the 
average VIF value was 2.05 and the highest was 3.74. Multicollinearity was not a problem for 
these analyses. Hypothesis 2 predicted that the TMT’s ideological separation would negatively 
moderate the relationship between TMT liberalism and firm receptivity; hypothesis 2-a predicted 
that ideological separation would be positively moderate the relationship between TMT 
liberalism and firm receptivity. Consistent with hypothesis 2-a, the results of Model suggest that 
TMT ideology separation moderates the relationship between TMT liberalism and firm 
receptivity (E = 2.098, p = 0.07). However, it is only possible to conclude with 93% confidence 
that the positive relationship between TMT liberalism and firm receptivity is moderated by the 
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degree of separation in the TMT’s political ideology, such that the relationship is more positive 
as ideological separation increases. Figure 5 displays the simple slopes of the relationship 
between TMT liberalism and receptivity, as moderated by TMT ideological separation (all 
values are mean-centered). 
TABLE 5 
Influence of Top Management Ideology Separation on Receptivity 
 Receptivity = E0 + E1 Political Ideology + 6Ek Controls + H 
 Model 3  Model 4 
Variables E p LCI95% UCI95%  E p LCI95% UCI95% 
TMT separation 0.721 
(0.323) 
0.01 0.088 1.353  0.654 
(0.329) 
0.04 0.158 1.449 
TMT liberalism      0.012 
(0.281) 
0.45 -0.787 0.304 
TMT lib. u TMT 
sep. 
     2.098 
(1.445) 
0.07 -0.735 4.932 
Controls          
CEO liberalism 0.173 
(0.173) 
0.32 -0.166 0.512  0.318 
(0.245) 
0.19 -0.164 0.814 
TMT size -0.056 
(0.026) 
0.03 -0.107 -0.005  -0.054 
(0.026) 
0.03 -0.105 -0.004 
TMT age 0.047 
(0.016) 
0.00 0.016 0.077  0.044 
(0.015) 
0.00 0.017 0.076 
Female rep. -0.564 
(0.424) 
0.18 -1.394 0.266  -0.544 
(0.414) 
0.19 -1.387 0.242 
TMT politics -0.001 
(0.001) 
0.37 -0.003 0.001  -0.001 
(0.001) 
0.27 -0.002 0.001 
Employees -0.104 
(0.033) 
0.00 -0.169 -0.039  -0.105 
(0.032) 
0.00 -0.168 -0.038 
ROA 0.120 
(0.078) 
0.12 -0.032 0.272  0.120 
(0.079) 
0.13 -0.048 0.259 
Intercept -1.609 
(0.970) 
0.10 -3.510 0.291  -1.162 
(0.946) 
0.11 -3.478 0.230 
Industry effects Yes     Yes    
Cluster by firm Yes     Yes    
N 200     200    
F2 246.92     261.14    
Notes: Coefficient estimates are reported with robust standard errors in parentheses; coefficients in interaction are mean-
centered. One-tailed tests for hypothesized variables, two-tailed tests for control variables. 
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FIGURE 5 
The Joint Effect of TMT liberalism and Separation on Receptivity 
 
 
 
 Table 6 presents the GEE results estimated to test hypotheses 3 and 4. As with the 
previous models, all models were highly significant according to the Wald χ2 test. Model 5 
estimates the relationship between CEO liberalism and receptivity; Model 6 estimates the 
interaction between CEO liberalism and TMT ideological consensus. Hypothesis 3 predicted that 
the CEO’s political liberalism would be positively associated with receptivity. The results of 
Model 5 do not offer strong support this hypothesis (E = 0.269, p = 0.07). More specifically, it is 
possible to conclude with 93% confidence that the relationship between CEO liberalism and firm 
receptivity is positive. Hypothesis 4 predicted that the positive relationship between CEO 
liberalism and receptivity would be negatively moderated by degree of ideological separation 
between the CEO and the rest of the TMT. Model 6 offers support for this hypothesis (E = 1.063, 
p = 0.02). More specifically, it is possible to conclude with 98% confidence that the positive 
relationship CEO liberalism and firm receptivity is moderated by the degree of ideology 
separation between the CEO and the others on the TMT. Figure 6 displays the simple slopes of 
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the relationship between CEO liberalism and receptivity, as moderated by TMT ideological 
consensus (all values are mean-centered). As with the previous models, all VIFs were less than 
10; the average VIF value was 1.64 and the highest was 3.12.  Therefore, multicollinearity was 
not a problem for these analyses.  
TABLE 6 
Influence of CEO Ideology and Separation on Receptivity 
 Receptivity = E0 + E1 Political Ideology + 6Ek Controls + H 
 Model 5  Model 6 
Variables E p LCI95% UCI95%  E p LCI95% UCI95% 
CEO liberalism 0.269 
(0.180) 
0.07 -0.085 0.622  0.177 
(0.156) 
0.13 -0.127 .483 
CEO-TMT separation      0.612 
(0.235) 
0.01 0.150 1.073 
CEO lib. u CEO-TMT 
sep. 
     1.063 
(0.527) 
0.02 0.010 2.12 
Controls          
CEO age -0.013 
(0.010) 
0.19 -0.033 0.007  -0.010 
(0.010) 
0.33 -0.030 0.010 
CEO gender 0.068 
(0.180) 
0.71 -0.285 0.421  0.215 
(0.232) 
0.36 -0.239 0.669 
TMT size -0.040 
(0.026) 
0.05 -0.091 0.011  -0.049 
(0.025) 
0.05 -0.098 0.001 
TMT age 0.055 
(0.017) 
0.00 0.021 0.088  0.051 
(0.015) 
0.00 0.021 0.081 
Female rep. -0.577 
(0.418) 
0.17 -1.397 0.242  -0.689 
(0.400) 
0.09 -1.474 0.096 
TMT politics -0.001 
(0.001) 
0.32 -0.003 0.001  -0.001 
(0.001) 
0.43 -0.002 0.001 
Employees -0.081 
(0.037) 
0.03 -0.154 -0.009  -0.100 
(0.032) 
0.00 -0.161 -0.037 
ROA 0.045 
(0.084) 
0.59 -0.119 0.210  0.100 
(0.078) 
0.21 -0.161 0.037 
Intercept -1.403 
(1.060) 
0.19 -3.480 0.054  -1.187 
(0.978) 
0.23 -3.103 0.730 
Industry effects Yes     Yes    
Cluster by firm Yes     Yes    
N 215     200    
F2 226.67     316.40    
Notes: Coefficient estimates are reported with robust standard errors in parentheses; coefficients in interaction are mean-centered. 
One-tailed tests for hypothesized variables, two-tailed tests for control variables. 
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FIGURE 6 
The Joint Effect of CEO Political Ideology and TMT Separation on Receptivity 
 
 
 
3.4.1. Supplementary Analyses 
 To examine the robustness of the findings, I conducted some supplementary analyses. 
First, to account for the possibility that not all top managers’ political ideologies are weighted 
evenly in the TMT, I re-estimated my models using Christensen and colleagues’ (2015) weighted 
measure of the TMT political liberalism. Specifically, this measure assigns a weight to each 
manager’s political ideology as the inverse of his or her rank at the firm, based on his/her 
compensation. For example, the highest paid manager (in all but very rare cases, the CEO) 
receives s a weight of 1, the second highest receives a weight of 1/2, the third highest receives a 
weight of 1/3, the fourth highest receives a weight of 1/4, and the fifth highest receives a weight 
of 1/5, and so on. I also re-estimated the model using a coarser measure of TMT liberal presence 
using a dummy variable where one (1) indicated a TMT that had at least one liberal-leaning 
manager; zero (0) otherwise. As Table A1 of Appendix A demonstrates, the results using these 
alternative measures of TMT liberalism are consistent with those reported above. Specifically, 
Model 7 demonstrates, using a weighted measure, that as average level of liberalism in the TMT 
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increases, firms become more receptive to secondary stakeholders (E = 0.265, p = 0.04). Second, 
Model 8 demonstrates that TMTs with at least one liberal-leaning managers are more receptive 
than TMTs with no liberal-leaning managers (E = 0.176, p = 0.04).  
 Additionally, given some support for Hypothesis 2-a, I also explored whether separation 
had any curvilinear properties; considering the possibility that the effect of ideology separation 
does wane somewhat. However, as Model 10 in Table A2 demonstrates, ideology separation did 
not display any curvilinear properties (E = 0.039, p = 0.49). This offers further support to the 
argument that, at least in scenarios where top managers are determining whether the firm will be 
receptive to secondary stakeholders, ideology separation increases cognitive conflict, and 
without necessarily increasing affective conflict (which a curvilinear relationship might have 
suggested). 
 Finally, as touched upon above, to demonstrate the robustness of my findings across 
various estimation methods, I re-estimated the hypotheses using a range of techniques, including 
GLS, and Tobit models (given the range restriction on the receptivity variable) (Wooldridge, 
2002). Generally, the results of these analyses were consistent with the GEE estimations. 
However, the interaction hypotheses were not significant in the GLS estimations, suggesting that 
conclusions pertaining to hypotheses 3 and 5 might not be strongly generalizable; although it is 
important to note that the GLS estimations resulted in a number of observations being dropped 
from the models. Tables A3, A4, and A5 of Appendix A report the GLS estimations conducted 
as supplementary analysis. Although earlier deemed non-significant, these models also included 
year fixed effects (omitting year fixed effects did not change the results) to further demonstrate 
the robustness of findings. 
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3.5. DISCUSSION 
 Secondary stakeholders have become an increasingly prevalent and important source of 
environmental pressure for firms (Clarkson, 1995; Eesley & Lenox, 2006; Su & Tsang, 2015), 
and the extent to which a firm will entertain and commit to working on secondary stakeholder 
issues entails consequential resource commitments and/or policy changes that affect the way the 
company does business (McDonnell et al., 2015; Pacheco & Dean, 2015; Waldron et al., 2013). 
To date, empirical research on understanding how firms deal with secondary stakeholders has 
been largely limited to investigations of stakeholder-sided and firm-level factors (e.g. Eesley & 
Lenox, 2006; Julian et al., 2008; McDonnell & King, 2013). In contrast, I argued that political 
ideologies are unobtrusive reflections of top managers’ personal values, which in turn ultimately 
shapes their firm’s receptivity toward its secondary stakeholders. Given the characteristics of 
secondary stakeholder demands (i.e. affect-laden, ethically-driven, politically-oriented, radical), 
applying an upper echelons perspective to the study of firm receptivity to these entities presents 
noteworthy advantages for understanding both firm receptivity toward secondary stakeholders 
and the socio-cognitive mechanisms of top managers that support this type of strategic behavior. 
Accordingly, this study provides important evidence that top managers’ political ideologies—a 
reflection of their personal values—are critical determinants of firm receptivity to secondary 
stakeholders.  
 I found that TMT liberalism is positively associated with firm receptivity to secondary 
stakeholders. This finding suggests that top managers personal values are reflected in the extent 
to which the firm will be receptive to secondary stakeholders. More generally, this finding also 
offers further evidence that top managers do, in fact, mold the firm to reflect their own values. 
However, while prior work demonstrates the occurrence of the phenomenon through a more 
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proactive means of investing in CSR initiatives (Chin et al., 2013; Mazutis, 2013), the present 
study highlights how top managers may mold the firm to reflect their own values through more 
reactive means of entertaining and working on a wider, or narrower, set of secondary stakeholder 
issues.   
 I also found that TMT ideological moderated the positive relationship between TMT 
liberalism and firm receptivity, such that the relationship became more positive (stronger) as 
separation increased; however, this finding is only supported with 93% confidence. This set of 
findings suggest, in line with prior theory on cognitive conflict in TMTs (Amason et al., 1995; 
Amason & Sapienza, 1997), that TMTs increasingly separated in their ideologies may envision a 
greater variety of adverse consequences for themselves and the firm that may emanate from 
refusing to work on a wider range secondary stakeholder issues, and ascribe themselves a greater 
degree of responsibility for avoiding such adverse consequences, and establish personal norms 
consistent with entertaining and working on a greater proportion of secondary stakeholder issues. 
In other words, the type of cognitive conflict that might be expected as a result of increased TMT 
ideological separation would appear to enable TMTs to recognize the possible opportunities 
associated with working on a wider breadth of secondary stakeholders issues. Further, these 
findings also appear to disconfirm the alternative argument that the presence of conservative 
managers on highly separated TMTs might suppress the influence of liberal-leaning managers. In 
fact, the findings appear to suggest that conservative-leaning managers and liberal-leaning 
managers are capable of engaging in productive forms of debate and conflict when discussing 
secondary stakeholder issues. 
 Finally, I found that the influence of the CEO’s political ideology on firm receptivity is 
moderated by the degree of separation between the CEO’s and the other members of the TMT’s 
Chapter 3 - Firm Receptivity to Secondary Stakeholders: The Role of Managerial Political Ideology 
 112 
ideology. Substantively, the positive influence of CEO liberalism on firm receptivity gets 
stronger as separation decreases (or under conditions where low separation is present). In line 
with Briscoe and colleagues’ (2014) remarks, this finding suggests that firm receptivity to 
secondary stakeholders—while implicating the firm’s CEO in an integral fashion—emerges from 
debates and deliberations in the executive suite. In other words, it appears that entertaining and 
working on secondary stakeholder issues is not the unilateral decision of the firm’s CEO; rather, 
it appears to involve the other members of the TMT. However, the finding does suggest that 
CEOs may face less resistance in implementing their vision for how receptive the firm with be to 
secondary stakeholders when the political ideologies—and thus, underlying values—of the other 
members of the TMT are aligned with those of the CEO. 
3.5.2. Contributions to Theory and Implications for Practice 
 This study’s findings make three notable contributions to strategic management and 
organizational research. First, in focusing on the role of top managers within the context of 
secondary stakeholder activism, this study contributes to research on upper echelons and 
strategic leadership by emphasizing the role of mangers’ personal values in shaping their firm’s 
receptivity to secondary stakeholder demands. In particular, leveraging top managers’ political 
ideologies as an unobtrusive proxy for their personal values, I contribute to developing more 
initial evidence that substantiates the general theoretical proposition in the upper echelons 
perspective that a firm’s top managers’ values are injected into their strategic decisions by 
demonstrating this influence on firm receptivity to secondary stakeholders. While the idea that 
top managers are prone to molding the firm to reflect their own personal values has been 
theorized (see: Finkelstein et al., 2009; Hambrick & Mason, 1984), the extent to which they do 
so and the circumstances under which this is likely to occur have remained less well understood. 
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Further, early empirical work on the topic of top manager values has tended to examine the 
influence of top manager values on the general strategic profile of the firm, specifically on the 
firm’s CSR profile (Chin et al., 2013; Mazutis, 2013) and on its tax avoidance tendencies 
(Christensen et al., 2015). In contrast, the present study distinguishes itself as one that examines 
how top managers values may be reflected in firm behavior as a result of external stimuli. In 
doing so, I offer important theoretical insights as to why and how top managers’ values and 
specific situations interact to influence choice (Busenbark et al., 2016; Finkelstein et al., 2009); 
specifically, by outlining how secondary stakeholder demands represent a certain type of 
external stimuli that is likely to make top managers’ personal values important predictors of firm 
behavior. Finally, this study’s findings relate to calls for further work on understanding the role 
of top managers ideologies and how they importantly influence possible moral aspects of 
running a firm (Christensen et al., 2015), given the increased importance for understanding how 
and why firms impact general social welfare and entities that are situated beyond the scope of 
their competitive environment (Carroll, 2009; Lamin & Zaheer, 2012; Whetten & Mackey, 
2002).   
 This study also contributes to stakeholder theory, as well as to the literature on social 
movements in a related way. I outline new theoretical and empirical insights concerning the role 
of top managers personal values and articulating how these characteristics act as important firm-
sided drivers of firm receptivity to secondary stakeholders (Eesley & Lenox, 2006). As Waldron 
and his colleagues noted: “activists cannot change industry practices unless the managers of each 
type of firm type decide to comply” (Waldron et al., 2013: 398). Consequently, this is an 
important undertaking because current stakeholder and social movement theory insights stop 
short of explaining how and why the characteristics of the firm’s top managers themselves would 
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expectedly affect firm receptivity to its to secondary stakeholders. Furthermore, empirically, few 
studies have considered or attempted to capture the extent to which firms vary in their receptivity 
to secondary stakeholders. Despite clear evidence that firms vary in the nature of their 
willingness to entertain and work on secondary stakeholder demands (Julian et al., 2008; 
Laplume, Sonpar, & Litz, 2008), prior work has tended to focus almost exclusively on the 
likelihood of firm concession. Therefore, in examining and measuring receptivity per se, a 
continuous outcome, I provide important insights pertaining to how firms may generally engage 
with secondary stakeholders as an element of their broader strategic agenda.  
 In addition to theoretical contributions, important practical advice may be gleaned from 
this manuscript. First, it can make top managers aware of their own natural tendencies to inject 
their personal values into decision-making and evaluations of secondary stakeholder demands.  
Second, by outlining a values-influenced managerial cognition process, the theoretical 
developments in this paper allows for a more nuanced understanding of the potential individual 
sources of motivation behind executives’ influence over the interactions between firms and 
secondary stakeholders—specifically—and management of various external entities in the firm’s 
environments—more generally. Hence, it would appear that the infusion of certain managerial 
cognitive processes and actions with personal values might be beneficial in helping these 
individuals navigate certain strategic situations that are ambiguous, in which rational and 
structured decision-making processes are potentially inapplicable. 
3.5.2. Limitations 
 As with any empirical project, this study does have some limitations that are worth 
noting. First, although validated extensively in prior work (e.g. Briscoe et al., 2014; Chin et al., 
2013; Christensen et al., 2015), my measure of managerial political ideology represents a proxy 
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for an admittedly more complex socio-psychological concept. Although this measure still 
expectedly represents a meaningful indicator of the general structure of top managers’ personal 
values, it would be advisable for future work to continue to refine the validity of unobtrusive 
measurement of top managers’ personal values. In a related manner, given the archival nature of 
this study, it also does not offer empirical evidence pertaining to the actual cognitive processes 
that translate top mangers’ personal values into firm receptivity to secondary stakeholders. Based 
on value-driven theories of behavior, I have generally theorized that values influence firm 
receptivity through activating top managers’ personal norms in regard to secondary stakeholder 
demands. However, I have not been able to investigate this process empirically. As such, future 
research might consider a range of methodologies that would help advance understanding for the 
processes that translate top managers’ values into firm-level actions. 
 My focus on the top management team might also be considered a limitation, as it is 
possible that directors also have some influence over the firm’s receptivity to secondary 
stakeholders (Carpenter et al., 2004; Finkelstein et al., 2009; Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 1997). 
As such, it might be interesting to further understand the role of directors in influencing 
receptivity to secondary stakeholders. Along these same lines, the measure of the TMT’s 
political ideology does not offer insights into the relative social dynamics or configurational 
attributes of the TMT that might influence receptivity to secondary stakeholders. As such, it 
might be interesting to apply different types of measures and methods to studying the influence 
of TMT ideology on various firm outcomes, in order to account for configurational influences. 
 Finally, it is possible that undetected endogeneity may exist in the relationship between 
TMT political ideology and firm receptivity to secondary stakeholders. It is possible that certain 
top managers might be selected into firms that receive more secondary stakeholders demands 
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because they may be more suited to deal with these sorts of issues. However, prior work suggests 
that firm receptivity is not entirely—if at all—explained by self-selection factors, in which 
liberal-leaning top managers disproportionately selected into (or self-select into) firms that seem 
to exhibit features that are consistent with their own personal values (Chin et al., 2013; 
Christensen et al., 2015). Additionally, I have demonstrated through analyses, that secondary 
stakeholders do not disproportionately target firms with more liberal TMTs. 
3.5.3. Future Directions 
 Given this study’s initial and encouraging results, future research may consider additional 
managerial attributes as possible predictors of firm receptivity to secondary stakeholders. For 
example, Eesley and Colleagues (in press) recently demonstrated that many interactions between 
secondary stakeholders and their targeted firms unfold through the media. Given narcissistic 
managers’ desires to showcase themselves toward audiences (Gerstner et al., 2013), and their 
tendencies to engage in extreme strategic behaviors (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007), it may be 
interesting to examine the extent to which secondary stakeholder demands represent important 
scenarios for certain managers to engage in narcissistic displays of self-indulgence, and the 
extent to which more narcissistic managers’ behaviors vary as these situations unfold. Future 
research could also explore how the political ideology of the firm’s top managers and/or CEO 
configures with other governance factors (e.g. board heterogeneity, minority representation) to 
influence receptivity.   
 Moreover, this study is among the first in strategic management and organizational 
research to examine firm receptivity to secondary stakeholders as an indicator of its overall 
strategic priorities and potential resource investments across these priorities. Specifically, results 
pertaining to the positive relationship between TMT liberalism and firm receptivity suggest that 
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a firm’s receptivity to secondary stakeholders is reflective of strategic priorities consistent with 
prioritizing social and environmental issues, and with the adoption of a broader stakeholder-
centric posture of the firm. As such, there are many remaining and interesting avenues for future 
research to consider some of the consequences of receptivity on firm performance. Although 
being receptive to secondary stakeholders may deplete resources and conflict with the firm’s 
primary stakeholders, these possible negative effects may be offset by gains in firm celebrity or 
reputation with the general public and other entities, which may result in positive performance 
consequences (Bonardi & Keim, 2005; Cheng, Ioannou, & Serafeim, 2014; Deephouse, 2000; 
Tepper Marlin, 1997). However, developing an understanding as to whether, how, and why this 
might occur remains an open research question. 
3.5.4. Conclusion 
 In the preceding pages I progressed toward understanding top managers’ personal values 
influence firm receptivity toward secondary stakeholders. By considering the role that political 
ideology—a proxy for personal values—play in TMTs cognitive processes when faced with 
secondary stakeholder, I demonstrated that top managers personal values do, in fact, influence 
the firm’s receptivity to secondary stakeholders. Secondly, and perhaps surpassingly, the results 
suggest that TMTs with a greater degree of values-based diversity are actually more receptive.  
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Chapter 4 
EXPLORING MANAGERIAL RHETORIC TO SECONDARY STAKEHOLDERS: 
RESPONSE POSTURE AND THE USE OF IMPRESSION MANAGEMENT 
“Wise men speak because they have something to say; fools because they have to 
say something...”—Plato 
 
“Speak softly and carry a big stick; you will go far…”—Theodore Roosevelt 
 
 Top managers play a critical role managing the firm’s external stakeholders through 
symbolic action taking the form of ceremonies, symbols, and especially language or rhetoric 
(Fanelli et al., 2009; Finkelstein et al., 2009; Gao, Yu, & Cannella, 2016; Pfeffer, 1981; Westley 
& Mintzberg, 1989). Among external stakeholders that top mangers—specifically the firm’s 
CEO—may be called upon to interact with and manage, secondary stakeholders have been noted 
in academic research and the popular press for their increased influence over firm behavior and 
performance (see: Barr, 2014; Eesley & Lenox, 2006; King, 2008; Soule et al., 2014). In recent 
years, the firm’s top managers’ themselves have become prominently featured in the mainstream 
media when addressing secondary stakeholder issues, and when commenting on social issues 
that form the basis for many secondary stakeholder demands (Chatterji & Toffel, 2016; Molina, 
2014). As Michael Toffel from Harvard Business School recently remarked on the topic, in an 
interview with Forbes: “we hadn’t seen as much of that in the past, as corporate leaders tended to 
stay out of the fray on these types of issues” (Nobel, 2016). 
 Recent scholarly work, as well as examples in the mainstream media suggest that 
variation in how top management responds to secondary stakeholders may entail different 
consequences for the firm (Chatterji & Toffel, 2016). For example, when Starbucks CEO 
Howard Schultz requested that Starbucks customers not bring firearms into Starbucks locations, 
in response to a demand from Moms Demand Action (a “common sense” gun reform group), 
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Schultz and Starbucks were publicly thanked and received much positive coverage in the media 
(e.g. Carr, 2015; O'Connor, 2013). Conversely, when Chick-Fil-A’s Dan Cathy spoke out against 
gay marriage in 2012, his statements prompted a great deal of escalation in the threatening 
behaviors from the secondary stakeholder groups that had originally denounced Chick-Fil-A’s 
apparent “anti-gay” stance (Blume, 2012; Nobel, 2016). However, prior work has predominantly 
focused on identifying the antecedents and contextual moderators that influence isolated types of 
responses toward secondary stakeholders (Eesley & Lenox, 2006; King, 2008; McDonnell & 
King, 2013; Weber et al., 2009). By comparison, little attention has been directed at examining 
the consequences of management’s response in such situations, a form of symbolic action that 
might be used to influence secondary stakeholders in ways that are strategically advantageous (or 
detrimental) for the firm. As a result, it remains difficult to determine whether top managers’ 
rhetoric impacts secondary stakeholder behavior in any substantive way, what types of responses 
toward secondary stakeholders may be more effective than others in curtailing (or eliminating) 
the potentially undesirable behavior and actions of secondary stakeholders, and why these 
differences matter. 
 To address this omission, I investigate secondary stakeholders’ evaluations of—and 
behavioral inclinations toward—managerial responses to their demands. More specifically, I 
examine two related and hitherto unanswered research questions: How and why do different 
managerial responses to secondary stakeholder demands influence the subsequent behavior and 
actions of secondary stakeholders? To what extent can top managers strategically ‘frame’ their 
responses to influence secondary stakeholder behavior and actions? To answer these questions, I 
draw on motivated cognition theory (Higgins & Molden, 2003; Kunda, 1990) and integrate it 
with pertinent work on cognitive appraisal theories of emotion (Roseman, Spindel, & Jose, 1990; 
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Smith & Lazarus, 1993), to investigate secondary stakeholder reactions to top manager response 
rhetoric. 
 I hypothesize that secondary stakeholders will intend to execute more threatening actions 
toward the firm as a manager’s response becomes more defiant (less accommodative). However, 
consistent with secondary stakeholders motivations to affect substantive changes within a firm 
and across an industry (den Hond & de Bakker, 2007; Waldron et al., 2013), I also hypothesize 
that secondary stakeholders’ evaluations of the firm’s corporate opportunity structure—whether 
the firm is a favorable target for additional targeting—will become stronger as a top manager’s 
response posture becomes more accommodative. Additionally, I consider whether and how top 
managers may also capitalize on the emotional mechanism of secondary stakeholders’ motivated 
cognitions (Hinsz, Tindale, & Vollrath, 1997; Weston, Blagov, Harenski, Kilts, & Hamann, 
2006) and strategically use impression management (IM) tactics to ‘offset’ the potential severity 
of the consequences associated with each of these response postures. Specifically, I hypothesize 
that managers’ use of flattery—a form of other-enhancement IM—will weaken the positive 
relationship between defensive responses and secondary stakeholder threatening behavior, and 
that the use of intimidation—a form of self-presentation IM—will weaken the positive 
relationship between accommodative responses and secondary stakeholders’ favorable 
evaluations of the firm’s corporate opportunity structure.  
 I test these arguments by conducting a two-by-two between subjects experiment in which 
participants assume the role of secondary stakeholders that have issued demands toward a firm. 
Each participant is presented a scenario in which managers’ usage of IM tactics have been 
manipulated as constituting either flattering or intimidating tactics (Jones & Pittman, 1982; 
Kuznekoff, 2013), and in which top managers’ response have been manipulated to represent 
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either accommodative or defiant postures (see: Benoit, 1995; Coombs, 2007; Elsbach, 2003). 
Study participants are asked to report their intentions to execute additional—potentially 
threatening—actions toward the firm, and their beliefs regarding the firm’s corporate opportunity 
structure. I base my experimental scenarios on well-documented instances of secondary 
stakeholder-firm exchanges found in prior academic work and the popular press; this enhances 
manipulation quality (Highhouse, 2009) and the external validity of the study’s findings (Aguinis 
& Bradley, 2014; Karren & Barringer, 2002). 
 This study contributes to strategic management and organizational research in multiple 
ways. First, the major contribution of the study is to draw attention to substantive 
consequences—namely, secondary stakeholders’ evaluations of the firm’s corporate opportunity 
structure, and their intentions to execute threatening actions toward the firm—of managers’ use 
of symbolic actions; specifically, response rhetoric. From a strategic management perspective, 
understanding managers’ usage of symbolic actions and how these translate to substantive 
implications for the firm is generally important for better understanding what top managers may 
do to influence firm outcomes (see: Gao et al., 2016; Pfeffer, 1981; Young, Morris, & Scherwin, 
2013); especially with regards to how managers may impact influential external stakeholders 
such as secondary stakeholders to the strategic gain or detriment of the firm (Fanelli & Misangyi, 
2006; Fanelli et al., 2009). To the extent that the firm’s top managers are able to influence 
secondary stakeholders through their responses, this may help the firm avoid the potentially 
costly resource commitments and policy changes that are involved with implementing secondary 
stakeholder demands. To the extent that the rhetoric of firm’s top managers have little influence 
over secondary stakeholder responses, this may provide further insight into whether top 
management is able to do anything to influence the behavior and actions of secondary 
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stakeholders short of substantively implementing whatever changes may be required as part of a 
secondary stakeholder’s demands. More generally, the study offers key insights into how top 
managers may effectively manage the firm’s external stakeholders by ‘framing’ their rhetoric in 
accordance with the interpretive schemes and/or cognitive biases of those constituents from 
whom the firm may require resources or from whom the firm may want to avoid further 
threatening behavior and actions.  
 By approaching this study from the perspective of a secondary stakeholder, this study 
presents notable theoretical implications for stakeholder theory. First, by investigating how 
managerial response influences secondary stakeholder behavior and evaluations of the firm, this 
study sheds much needed light on understanding the consequences associated with how top 
managers respond to secondary stakeholders. To date, stakeholder theory remains silent about 
the consequences of responses to secondary stakeholders. For instance, work in stakeholder 
theory generally assumes that defiant responses necessarily imply negative consequences and 
that accommodative responses imply positive consequences for the firm and its top management. 
Second, by theorizing about secondary stakeholders’ cognitive frames, this study is also among 
the first of its kind to draw attention to and expand upon the important cognitive and evaluative 
processes that appear to support secondary stakeholder actions toward a firm. 
 Finally, the present study also contributes toward further developing the construct of the 
corporate opportunity structure found in social movements research by articulating and testing a 
theory for understanding how top managers’ responses to secondary stakeholder activism may 
constitute an important aspect of the firm’s corporate opportunity structure, as evaluated by 
secondary stakeholders. Researchers invoking a corporate opportunity structure construct have 
generally assumed that it is comprised of various firm characteristics (e.g. firm performance, 
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CEO political ideology, social management devices), without ever measuring secondary 
stakeholder beliefs pertaining to it (e.g. Briscoe et al., 2014; McDonnell et al., 2015); an 
important component to developing a more detailed understanding of the corporate opportunity 
structure.   
4.1. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 Prior work offers important insights about secondary stakeholders that form a basis for 
the principle theories that I leverage to articulate this study’s hypotheses. First, secondary 
stakeholders are generally motivated by the desire to modify firm and industry practices that they 
usually deem socially and environmentally detrimental (den Hond & de Bakker, 2007; Waldron 
et al., 2013). For example, several secondary stakeholders exerted pressure on several firms in 
the apparel industry to curtail the use of “sweatshops” and improve the working conditions of the 
employees in their offshore facilities (den Hond & de Bakker, 2007; Lamin & Zaheer, 2012). 
Other entities such as Greenpeace and the Human Rights Campaign regularly publish reports that 
present the “state-of-affairs” and evaluate the effectiveness of target firm policies and practices 
that resonate with these entities and their followers’ interests (e.g. Ram, 2012; Trenor & 
Mitchell, 2013). 
 Second, secondary stakeholders are noted for the emotionality of their collective 
identities, which is usually predicated on some level of discontent with or animosity toward the 
firms that they desire to change (Markman et al., 2016; Rowley & Moldoveanu, 2003). Their 
reliance on building emotional identities lies in a need to build a critical mass of support (Rowley 
& Moldoveanu, 2003), acquire resources, and display urgency (Eesley & Lenox, 2006). Hercus’ 
(1999) work also suggests that anger is a centrally important emotion that facilitates frame 
alignment processes that underlie the formation of secondary stakeholder groups, because it 
Chapter 4 – Exploring Managerial Rhetoric to Secondary Stakeholders: Response Posture and the use of Impression Management 
 124 
drives the collective action frame supporting a sense of injustice; emotion therefore becomes 
embedded in these entities’ cognitive frames.  
 The social psychological theory of motivated cognition outlines that desired outcomes 
and motivations influence individuals’ cognitive frames regarding how information and various 
stimuli are interpreted and evaluated (Higgins & Molden, 2003; Kunda, 1990). In general, 
motivated cognition refers to a motivation-driven and emotion-biased decision-making process 
through which individuals may attempt to reduce cognitive dissonance, form beliefs about others 
on whom a focal individual’s outcomes depend, or evaluate evidence pertaining to their 
outcomes (Kunda, 1990). From a neuroscientific perspective, motivated cognition is “a form of 
implicit emotion regulation in which the brain converges on judgments that minimize negative 
and maximize positive affect states associated with threat to or attainment of motives” (Weston 
et al., 2006: 1947).  
 Motivated cognition argues that individuals perceive and evaluate stimuli and 
information in accordance with how it relates to their motivations and emotions. Specifically, 
individuals are seen as having a dispositional motivation to arrive at a desired conclusion (goal-
oriented), which enhances the accessibility of knowledge structures that are consistent with 
desired conclusions (Kunda, 1990). Lodge and Taber (2000) further argue that emotion is tied to 
the motivated cognition process and that information processing is naturally biased toward 
supporting beliefs and positions that individuals already hold. Neuroscientific research also 
concludes that motivated reasoning occurs when individuals have an emotional stake in arriving 
at a desired conclusion (Weston et al., 2006). In line with these arguments, Mittal and Ross 
(1998) find that decision makers selectively attend to issue characteristics and information that 
present valences consistent with their affective state. As such, those individuals in a positive 
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affective state attend more to data with a positive valence data, while decision makers in a 
negative affective state attend more to data that has a negative valence.  
Motivated cognition occurs in a variety of scenarios and under a variety of circumstances. 
For example, in a study seeking to ascertain college students’ appraisals of the risk of sexually 
transmitted diseases (STD), Blanton and Garrard (1997) found that male students rated the 
attractive women (with whom they were more highly motivated to engage in sexual activities 
with) as carrying less risk of STD infection compared to the less attractive women. More 
recently, research in political psychology shows that individuals reinforce their pre-conceived 
beliefs and issue positions when faced with information and arguments that are incompatible 
with their position (Lodge & Taber, 2000). 
 Although motivated cognition theory is articulated to explain the cognitive processes of 
individuals, prior work suggests that it can also be applied to study the cognitive processes of 
groups. For example, Hinsz and colleagues (1997) explain 
group-level information processing includes information, ideas, and cognitive 
processes that are shared, in that not only are they common among the group 
members but also that the information, ideas, and cognitive processes are being 
shared (i.e. exchanged and transferred) […] The sharing of information can be 
verbal and nonverbal, can take place in face-to-face situations or over long 
distances through the use of technology, and can refer to the task, group members, 
or aspects of the group (1997: 43-44). 
As a result, “these interdependencies make it difficult to isolate the role or impact of one aspect 
of group-level information processing from the other or from the individual-level process” 
(Hinsz et al., 1997: 44). Additionally, it might further be argued that secondary stakeholder 
groups are also subject to attraction-selection-attrition (ASA) processes in which individuals that 
comprise such an entity share similar attributes and motivations (Schneider, 1987), and thus, 
perceive social situations and information in a relatively uniform fashion, particularly as it relates 
to the behavior of firms and their top management.  
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 I generally anticipate that secondary stakeholders will evaluate and react to managers’ 
response rhetoric to their demands in two noticeable ways. First, based on their motivations to 
alter target firm and industry policies and practices and their emotionally-laden identities, 
secondary stakeholders’ behavioral intentions may be altered in light of the response posture of 
the target firm’s management; they may intend to intensify or diminish their threatening behavior 
toward the firm based on whether the response posture is defiant or accommodative. Second, 
motivated cognition theory also suggests that certain types of responses may influence secondary 
stakeholders’ evaluations of the firm’s corporate opportunity structure; whether they represent an 
attractive target for future demands. 
 In the next section, I use motivated cognition theory to hypothesize about how secondary 
stakeholders might be expected to react to (1) managers’ response posture (i.e. defiant vs. 
accommodative), and (2) how managers’ strategic use of impression management (IM) tactics 
might offset the behavior of secondary stakeholders that is expected to result from that response 
posture.  
4.2. HYPOTHESES 
 Top managers can opt to issue various types of responses toward secondary stakeholders. 
Prior research indicates responses issued toward secondary stakeholders, or in response to other 
entities and events, typically reside along a continuum of accommodativeness—the least 
accommodative responses are referred to as defiant and the most accommodative responses 
simply referred to as accommodative (see: Benoit, 1995; Coombs, 2007; Elsbach, 2003; Lamin 
& Zaheer, 2012). A traditional example of a highly defiant response might constitute an outright 
denial of any wrongdoing, such as was the case when Exxon Mobil was ordered to pay almost 
$105 million in damages related to the contamination of New York City’s groundwater. 
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Following the federal jury’s decision, Exxon Mobil spokesperson, Kevin Allexon, stated: “We 
do not believe we should be required to compensate the City of New York for someone else’s 
contamination” (Navarro, 2009). On the other hand, accommodative responses generally involve 
some aspects of accepting responsibility in the case of negative behaviors and acquiescing to the 
demands of affected entities. BP’s response to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of 
Mexico, provides a recent example of such a response: 
We acted to take responsibility for the clean-up, working under the direction of 
the federal government to respond swiftly to compensate people affected by the 
impact of the accident, to look after the health, safety and welfare of the large 
number of residents and people who helped respond to the spill, and to support 
the economic recovery of the Gulf Coast’s tourism and seafood industries 
impacted by the spill. We have conducted studies with federal and state natural 
resource trustees to identify and define the injury to natural resources in the Gulf 
of Mexico (BP, 2014). 
 Prior theory and research demonstrates that symbolic action in the form of managerial 
rhetoric, especially that which is expressed in a public forum, presents important consequences 
for how various external stakeholders might perceive the firm, and behave in light of these 
perceptions (Gao et al., 2016). For instance, Zajac and Westphal (1995) examined different 
explanations for the adoption of long-term incentive plans (LTIP) in CEO compensation 
arrangement and found that HR-based (rather than agency-based) explanations for adopting 
LTIPs resulted in comparatively higher levels of stakeholder support. Fanelli, Mysangyi, and 
Tosi (2009) found that CEOs communicating their strategic visions through more charismatic 
language was associated higher levels of favorability of securities analyst recommendations (see 
also: Fanelli & Grasselli, 2006). More recently, Lamin and Zaheer (2012) found that following 
scandalous accusations, accommodative responses result in positive evaluations of the firm’s 
legitimacy with the general public, but negative evaluations of the firm’s legitimacy with 
investors.  
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 The above discussion related to the influence of symbolic rhetoric on external 
stakeholders suggests that variation in the nature of managerial response (accommodative vs. 
defiant) toward secondary stakeholders should influence these entities’ behavior toward the firm 
and evaluations of the firm in markedly different ways. Building on motivated cognition theory, I 
now proceed to consider how defiant and accommodative responses—both ends of the 
continuum—influence secondary stakeholder behavior and evaluations of the firm. 
4.2.1. Response Posture and Secondary Stakeholder Threatening Behavior 
 Intuitively, it may be reasonable to posit that top managers issuing defiant responses to 
secondary stakeholders may have success in curbing the threatening behavior of these entities.  
However motivated cognition theory suggests otherwise. A defiant response is likely to conflict 
with secondary stakeholders main motivations to affect change within the firm. Based on 
motivated cognition theory, secondary stakeholders “likely experience unease at the mismatch, 
motivating them to neglect—if not actively reject—the painful information” (Hodgkinson & 
Healey, 2011: 1504) contained in a defiant response. For instance, defiant responses may be 
perceived as “self-serving rhetoric that puts industry interests ahead of the welfare of the public” 
(Elsbach, 1994: 75). Additionally, in a comparative examination of how Wall Street and Main 
Street—that latter of which is portrayed in the study as exhibiting motives and cognitive frames 
consistent with those of secondary stakeholders in the present study—evaluate firm responses to 
scandalous accusations, Lamin and Zaheer conclude that Main Street (i.e. the general public) 
“reacts negatively to denials as well as to any defiant assertions of being unfairly targeted 
“(2012: 62). Moreover, wanting to focus on information that is consistent with their motivations 
(Kunda, 1990), secondary stakeholders may assume that the firm’s managers are protesting too 
much when issuing defiant responses (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990), which is likely to greater 
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mistrust toward the firm than already existed (e.g. Lange & Washburn, 2012), motivating 
secondary stakeholders to “ramp up” their threatening behavior toward the firm.  
 In contrast, an accommodative response is likely to coincide with secondary 
stakeholders’ motivations to affect change within the firm, and such responses are more likely to 
persuade them that the firm will implement the sought-after changes (Wood, 1982), leading 
secondary stakeholders to curtail their threatening behaviors. Therefore, I hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 1: Secondary stakeholders will exhibit a higher degree of threatening 
behavior toward the firm as response posture becomes more defiant (less 
accommodative). 
4.2.2. Response Posture and the Evaluations of the Firm 
 Although the previous argumentation suggests that an accommodative response is likely 
to curtail the threatening behavior of secondary stakeholders (or at least not encourage it further), 
it may also have important unintended consequences for how these entities evaluate the firm, 
which may lead them to issue additional requests of the firm. Based on their aforementioned 
motivations to affect change within firms and across industries, secondary stakeholders may 
have additional issues that they would like to pursue with a focal firm. Accordingly, secondary 
stakeholders’ evaluations of the focal firm as targets for additional demands often implicate 
considerations such as “[calculating] whether the effort and risk is likely to pay off, or instead 
whether they will be effectively resisted or punished” (Briscoe et al., 2014: 1789).  These 
evaluations comprise to the firm’s “corporate opportunity structure”.  
   Building on prior sociological work on political opportunity structures (e.g. Campbell, 
2005; King & Pearce, 2010; Tilly, 1978), strategic management and organizational scholars have 
extended these ideas to develop the concept of the corporate opportunity structure, which refers 
to observable features of firms that may make them attractive targets for secondary stakeholders 
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and other entities that desire to affect change within the firm (King, 2008; Soule, 2009). Scholars 
have found evidence that several observable aspects of the firm such as the firm’s performance 
and reputation, its pro-social behavior, or the political ideology of its CEO are indicative of the 
firm’s corporate opportunity structure and predictive of various stakeholder groups mobilizing to 
issue demands of the firm. For instance, King (2008) theorized that firm performance and 
reputation are key elements of the corporate opportunity structure because they constitute critical 
sources of environmental feedback; when firms receive negative feedback in the form of sales or 
reputational declines, their managers may feel they have more freedom to pursue new policies 
and practices, thereby enhancing the attractiveness of the firm’s corporate opportunity structure 
for secondary stakeholders. Others have suggested that firms may initiate structural reforms and 
disclose them in an attempt to safeguard against activist challenges. However, these “social 
management devices” also appear to enhance the attractiveness of the firm’s corporate 
opportunity structure because they signal the firm’s receptiveness social issues (McDonnell et 
al., 2015). Finally, Briscoe and his colleagues (2014) argued that the political ideology of the 
firm’s CEO also constitutes an important element of the firm’s corporate opportunity structure as 
it signals the CEO’s likely response to activism directed toward the firm. In line with their 
argumentation, these authors found LGBT employee activists groups were more likely to form in 
U.S. firms with liberal CEOs during the period 1985-2004. 
 Building on the above insights, I argue that managerial response toward a secondary 
stakeholder demand, specifically an accommodative response, comprises a hitherto unconsidered 
element of the corporate opportunity structure. In general, accommodative responses are likely to 
“demonstrate more receptiveness to activists, which in turn signals that they have a more open 
opportunity structure than others in the field” (McDonnell et al., 2015: 8). More specifically, 
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according to motivated cognition theory, secondary stakeholders will actively seek out 
information and other cues that coincide with their goals of modifying firm practices and 
policies; hence, leading them to form more favorable evaluations of the firm’s corporate 
opportunity structure when the firm’s management issues an accommodative response. 
Furthermore, consistent with the emotional mechanism that also supports motivated cognitive 
processes, accommodative responses may elicit positive emotions such as joy, which are 
associated with seeking out more information that is consistent with maintaining such an 
affective state and consistent with one’s attitudes and motivations (Clark, Wegener, & Fabrigar, 
2008). As such, the positive emotion that an accommodative response is likely to elicit within 
secondary stakeholder group also results in their viewing such a response as opportunity 
consistent (Mittal & Ross, 1998), resulting in an overall more favorable evaluation of the firm’s 
corporate opportunity structure. As such, I hypothesize the following: 
Hypothesis 2: Secondary stakeholder evaluations of the firm’s corporate opportunity 
structure will be more favorable as response posture becomes more accommodative 
(less defiant). 
4.2.3. The Offsetting Use of Impression Management and Secondary Stakeholder Behavior 
and Evaluations of the Firm 
 To this point, the theoretical developments presented in the manuscript suggest an 
interesting conundrum when it comes to articulating a response to secondary stakeholders. On 
one hand, if top managers accommodate secondary stakeholder demands, there are compelling 
theoretical reasons to believe that doing so would reduce the risk that these entities intend to 
engage in threatening behaviors toward the firm. On the other hand, issuing accommodative 
responses toward secondary stakeholders may also lead to the unintended consequence that these 
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entities may evaluate the firm’s corporate opportunity structure as attractive—placing the firm at 
risk of being targeted in the near future. 
 Prior research suggests that the firm’s managers may be able to rely on utilizing 
impression management (IM) tactics in a strategic way so as to offset the potentially negative 
consequences associated with each response posture. Empirically, extant research demonstrates 
that firms and their top managers are involved in ongoing impression management efforts in 
order to gain the approval of certain constituents that may provide these firms with critical 
resources (Elsbach, Sutton, & Principe, 1998; Marquis, Glynn, & Davis, 2007; McDonnell & 
King, 2013). As such, there are strong reasons to believe that when facing secondary 
stakeholders, a firm’s top managers may rely on IM tactics to influence secondary stakeholders 
to the strategic advantage of the firm. 
 Impression management refers to the process by which individuals attempt to control the 
impressions others form of them in social situations (Leary & Kowalski, 1990; Schlenker, 1980; 
Wayne & Liden, 1995). Individuals are known to engage in IM tactics in order to affect positive 
outcomes for themselves in a range of situations (see: Gardner & Martinko, 1988; Harris, 
Kacmar, Zivnuska, & Shaw, 2007). For example, an extensive body of work in organizational 
research demonstrates that individuals utilize IM to succeed during interviews (Ellis, West, 
Ryan, & DeShon, 2002), subordinates utilize IM to influence the favorability of their 
supervisors’ performance ratings (Feldman, 1981; Wayne & Liden, 1995), and directors and 
other executives rely on IM to advance their careers (Westphal, 1998; Westphal, Park, 
McDonald, & Hayward, 2012 ; Westphal & Stern, 2007). As Leary and Kowalski describe it: 
“because the impressions people make on others have implications for how others perceive, 
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evaluate, and treat them, as well as for their own views of themselves, people sometimes behave 
in ways that will create certain impressions in others' eyes” (1990: 34).  
 Self-presentation and other-enhancement are commonly viewed as the two predominant 
forms of IM (Wayne & Liden, 1995). According to Schneider’s seminal work, self-presentation 
refers to “the manipulation of information about the self by the actor” (Schneider, 1981: 25). 
Self-presentation IM tactics typically take the form of intimidation, self-promotion, 
exemplification, and supplication (Jones & Pittman, 1982). By engaging in self-presentation and 
strategically and purposefully manipulating information about oneself, individuals may seek to 
be perceived as dangerous, competent, morally worthy, or pitiful (Gardner & Martinko, 1988; 
Jones & Pittman, 1982). Other-enhancement refers to the favorable evaluation of, or agreement 
with, the target (Wayne & Liden, 1995). Flattery, favor-doing, and opinion conformity are 
common forms of other-enhancement IM (Tedeschi & Melburg, 1984; Wayne & Liden, 1995). 
 Building on Schneider’s (1991) arguments, Wayne and Liden (1995) explain that IM 
tactics influence targets’ perceptions and evaluations of the focal actor through general cognitive 
information processing (or controlled categorization). Specifically, targets translate their 
perceptions of an individual’s IM into initial impressions, encode them into memory, and later 
retrieve and decode them when making attributions about the individual engaged in IM. In turn, 
these attributions provide information that the target utilizes to categorize or re-categorize the 
focal actor. Furthermore, prior work suggests that IM may have the most salient influence on 
targets when the relationship between the two is developing, which is when initial categorization 
occurs (Feldman, 1986). 
 As a result of their motivated cognition, secondary stakeholders are likely to hold strong 
pre-conceived beliefs about the target firm and its top management. For example, some more 
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radical secondary stakeholders may view firms as corrupt, evil, or unethical actors that have little 
regard for society and the environment (Markman et al., 2016). In other words, firms are “part of 
the problem” and certain secondary stakeholders may have natural distrust toward them. On the 
other hand, other more reformative secondary stakeholders may view firms are being “part of the 
solution” and strive toward having “good faith” interactions with firms and their managers (den 
Hond & de Bakker, 2007; Markman et al., 2016). When a firm’s top managers respond to a 
secondary stakeholder, it represents a distinct event in which the firm and its managers become 
actively engaged in an exchange with secondary stakeholders—as opposed to simply passive 
receptors of a demand—which may confirm or disconfirm secondary stakeholders pre-conceived 
beliefs. In other words, management’s response represents a new stimulus for secondary 
stakeholders, that triggers a controlled categorization process (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990) through 
which secondary stakeholders reconcile the difference between the rhetoric of the response and 
their initial impressions of the firm and its management. Because this controlled categorization 
process implicates the need to adjust or make new attributions about the firm and its 
management, secondary stakeholders are susceptible to IM tactics that are designed to 
manipulate their attributions of the firm and its management (Jones & Wortman, 1973).  
 Given that secondary stakeholders may be especially prone to the effects of IM tactics 
from target firm managers, top managers may be able to use IM tactics in a strategic way to 
offset the potentially negative consequences associated with each response posture; the greater 
degree of threatening behavior resulting from defiant responses and the favorable evaluations of 
the firm’s corporate opportunity structure resulting from accommodative responses. Yet, the 
question remains as to how different IM tactics may be utilized to influence secondary 
stakeholders’ intentions to engage in threatening behavior and evaluations of the firm as a target 
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following the firm’s response to their demands. To shed further light onto these issues, I consider 
the offsetting effect of a prominent other-enhancement IM tactic—flattery—on secondary 
stakeholders threatening behavioral intentions following a defiant response. In addition, I 
consider the offsetting effect of a prominent self-presentation IM tactic—intimidation—on 
secondary stakeholders evaluations of the firm’s corporate opportunity structure following an 
accommodative response. Given that both of these forms of IM constitute extreme forms (Harris 
et al., 2007; Wortman & Linsenmeier, 1977), they are best suited for developing an initial 
understanding for the offsetting role of IM tactics on secondary stakeholder threatening 
behaviors and evaluations of the firm, in light of responses that are issued by top management. 
 The offsetting role of flattery. As elaborated upon above, motivated cognition theory 
predicts that, defiant responses to secondary stakeholders conflict with those stakeholder’s 
motivations and goals, creating greater levels of mistrust, which motivates secondary 
stakeholders to “double down” on efforts to affect change and thus, exhibit greater degrees of 
threatening behavior toward the firm.  
 I anticipate that top managers’ use of flattery toward secondary stakeholders influences 
secondary stakeholders’ motivated cognition in such a way as to temper the positive relationship 
between issuing a defiant response and secondary stakeholders’ intentions to exhibit threatening 
behaviors toward the firm. Flattery is a form of other-enhancing IM tactic through which a social 
actor praises—at times, insincerely—another in an attempt to gain “gain favor” with the other 
individual (Vonk, 2002; Westphal, 1998). As a form of ingratiatory behavior, flattery creates 
psychic indebtedness toward the flatterer (Vonk, 1998; Yukl & Falbe, 1990; Yukl & Tracey, 
1992). For instance, individuals who are complimented may feel compelled to return the favor 
(Vonk, 2002). Related findings demonstrate that directors who engage in a high level of flattery 
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toward their peers increase their chances of affecting positive outcomes for themselves in the 
form of gaining further board appointments (Westphal & Stern, 2007).  
 Typically, flattery is either a) received at face-value (i.e. perceived as being genuine), or 
b) met with some suspiciousness because of assumptions about the flatterer’s ulterior motives 
(Vonk, 1998). In the case of top managers utilizing flattery to gain favor with secondary 
stakeholders, it is intuitively fair to envision that these entities may view flattery with some level 
of skepticism and be willing to expend some effort to form accurate impressions of the firm and 
its managers. However, secondary stakeholders cognitive resources are constrained by the fact 
that they are active participants their interaction with the firm and its management (rather than 
passive observers) (Gilbert, Pelham, & Krull, 1988), and by the fact that they are motivated to 
affect changes within the firm and likely to focus on any type of information that offers 
indication that they are meeting these goals (Kunda, 1990; Nickerson, 1998). Jones and 
colleagues succinctly conclude that “the targets of ingratiation […] may be less sensitive to the 
implications of ulterior motivation than bystanders” (Jones, Stires, Shaver, & Harris, 1968: 350). 
This suggests that secondary stakeholders may be less likely to engage in assessing the 
authenticity of top managers’ flattery, making it such that the sincerity of the behavior is not 
intensely questioned (Vonk, 2002). Vonk also describes the tendency to accept flattery at face 
value in a hypothetical scenario between Vanity, a college professor, and Sly, a student that has 
been assigned to work with Vanity and who engages in flattery: 
Sly is flattering her, so it is tempting to take his praise at face value. If she does 
this, everybody is happy: Sly has managed to make a friendly, positive start in the 
collaboration with his supervisor; Vanity’s ego is bolstered; Sly likes her, and she 
likes him, which is good because they are going to have to spend some time 
together (2002: 515). 
 Through the use of flattery toward secondary stakeholders, the firm’s top managers’ 
provide information to the secondary stakeholder that conforms to its motivated cognitive 
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processes. Flattery may leave them with the impression that they are beginning to affect change 
within the firm, which is consistent with their goal and so may lead to curtailing the intensity of 
their threatening behaviors. Furthermore, the use of flattery by the firm’s top managers may also 
tap into the emotional component of secondary stakeholders’ motivated cognitive processes. 
Flattery has been shown to elicit positive affect from the target of such efforts (Vonk, 2002; 
Wortman & Linsenmeier, 1977). For example, decision makers that display comparably greater 
levels of positive affect feel more optimistic about the probability of favorable outcomes from 
those decisions (e.g. winning the lottery) (Isen & Patrick, 1983). However, as decision-makers’ 
positive affect increases, they also become much more risk averse and are less willing to gamble 
(Mittal & Ross, 1998). This suggests that by tapping into the emotional component of secondary 
stakeholders’ motivated cognitive processes, top managers may make these entities may feel 
more optimistic about the probability that their demands will eventually be accommodated, 
precluding the need for them to intensify their threatening behavior toward the firm. Therefore, I 
hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 3: The positive relationship between defiant responses and secondary 
stakeholder threatening behavior will be moderated by the usage of flattery, such that 
the relationship will be weaker with the use of flattery.  
 The offsetting role of intimidation. Motivated cognition arguments suggest that 
accommodative responses toward secondary stakeholders might be taken as a cue that secondary 
stakeholders could use to evaluate the firm’s corporate opportunity structure. Accommodative 
responses are likely to signal a firm and its top managers’ receptiveness to secondary 
stakeholders, which in turn signals that they have an attractive corporate opportunity structure; 
potentially more so than other firms in the field.  
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 The use of intimidation rhetoric by managers may offset the extent to which secondary 
stakeholder form positive beliefs pertaining to the firm’s corporate opportunity structure. 
Intimidation is a self-presentation IM tactic that is used to project the image of being seen as 
tenacious or forceful (Jones, 1990). Concretely, intimidation refers to a behavior “in which 
individuals let others know that they can make things difficult for them if they are pushed too far, 
deal aggressively with individuals who get in their way, or use forceful behavior to get 
colleagues to behave appropriately” (Bolino & Turnley, 2003: 238). Generally, the use of 
intimidation is negatively associated with the extent to which individuals using such an 
aggressive IM tactic are perceived as being likeable (Jones & Pittman, 1982) because the use of 
pressure-laden tactics such as intimidation are often considered socially undesirable (Yukl & 
Tracey, 1992). Yukl and Tracey (1992) further argue that individuals are often angry and 
resentful of others who attempt to intimidate or manipulate them.  
 As touched upon earlier, secondary stakeholders’ motivated cognitions are also likely to 
lead them to view responses as important indicators of the effort and resource mobilization 
needed to sustain a campaign against the firm and influence their general appetite for entering 
into a likely situation of conflict with the firm and their perceived risks of the campaign paying 
off (Briscoe et al., 2014; McDonnell et al., 2015). By using intimidation rhetoric, the firm’s top 
managers provide information to secondary a stakeholder that is inconsistent with these entities’ 
motivated cognitive processes. In the face of intimidation rhetoric, secondary stakeholders will 
attempt to minimize the psychological discomfort resulting from intimidating IM (Karlsson, 
Loewenstein, & Seppi, 2009), leading to more superficial processing of the response posture 
itself, reducing the extent to which an accommodative response might otherwise signal an 
attractive corporate opportunity structure. The use of intimidation rhetoric, may also impact the 
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emotional component of secondary stakeholders motivated cognitive process by eliciting 
negative affect (Yukl & Tracey, 1992). Increased negative affect lowers the ability of secondary 
stakeholders to recognize subsequently positively-valanced information, such as an 
accommodative response, which may be interpreted in an opportunity-consistent manner (Mittal 
& Ross, 1998). Consequently, on the basis of these arguments, I suggest: 
Hypothesis 4: The positive relationship between accommodative responses and 
secondary stakeholder favorable evaluations of the firm’s corporate opportunity 
structure will be moderated by the use of intimidation, such that the relationship will 
be weaker with the use of intimidation. 
4.3. METHOD 
 To test these hypotheses, I conducted a two-by-two between-subjects experiment, in 
which participants assumed the role of secondary stakeholders that have issued demands toward 
a firm. While research that focuses on the interactions between firms and secondary stakeholders 
has not traditionally included many experiments, recent work demonstrates how beneficial 
experiments can be when examining questions that are concerned with a deeper understanding of 
decision-making processes—a key consideration of the present study (see: Agarwal, Croson, & 
Mahoney, 2010; Grégoire & Shepherd, 2012; Krause, Whitler, & Semadeni, 2014). In addition, 
an important advantage of leveraging an experimental design in this study is that it allows for 
higher levels of internal validity than cross-sectional and longitudinal studies, which enables the 
researchers to make clearer inferences about the causal processes involved between the variables 
(Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002). 
 These considerations are especially important for developing an initial understanding of 
the consequences of top manager responses to secondary stakeholders. Prior research highlights 
many confounding factors that may influence secondary stakeholder behavior, such as firm size, 
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reputation, and past performance (Eesley & Lenox, 2006; King, 2008; McDonnell et al., 2015), 
and these can be held constant in an experimental setting to focus on the variables of interest.  
 The principal drawback to this method is that external validity may be limited, in that 
generalizing from a laboratory environment to real-world settings is more difficult than 
generalizing from one real-world setting to another. However, as I describe below, I believe I 
struck the right balance between external and internal validity in this study by (1) carefully 
selecting an appropriate sample of participants—one in which participants might reasonably be 
expected to fit the profile of secondary stakeholders, and (2) building my experimental scenarios 
based on plausible and realistic instances of secondary stakeholder-firm interactions. 
4.3.1. Sample 
 I conducted an a priori power analysis, which revealed a desired sample size of at least 
125 participants for the experiment. To conduct the power analysis, I used version 3.1 of the 
G*Power software. I specified an anticipated effect size of 0.25, derived from an K2 = 0.06, 
which is a conventional value utilized in anticipation of a medium effect size (Murphy, Myors, & 
Wolach, 2014). Additionally, I specified a desired D = 0.05 and power (1-E) = 0.8. 
 In line with prior research concerned with understanding activist behavior (e.g. Corning 
& Myers, 2002; Gousse-Lessard et al., 2013), the population of participants for the study are 
either individuals actively engaged in the environmental movement through their involvement in 
environmental organizations, university employees and students in the field of geosciences, or 
other individuals that can be considered “sympathetic” toward the environmental movement. To 
enhance the validity of the findings, all participants, regardless of their background, were 
screened for inclusion in the final sample used for analysis. The extent to which participants 
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were considered either active in, or sympathetic toward, the environmental movement is 
determined with the use of two screening questions:  
x “In the past, I have supported and/or participated in one or more special interest groups 
that promote sustainable development and/or the effective management of environmental 
problems.” [Yes /No] 
x “I would strongly support and/or actively participate in special interest groups that 
promote sustainable development and/or the effective management of environmental 
problems.”[Very unlikely, Unlikely, Somewhat unlikely, Undecided, Somewhat likely, 
Likely, Very likely] 
 
Participants were considered actively engaged in the environmental movement if they answered 
affirmatively to the first question, and if they answer “somewhat likely”, “likely”, or “very 
likely” to the second question. Participants are considered sympathetic to the environment 
movement if they answered “no” to the first question and “likely”, or “very likely” to the second 
question. These screening questions were administered at the conclusion of the formal 
experimental portion of the procedure, so as to alleviate concerns over reactivity bias (Lavrakas, 
2008; Orne, 1962). As such there is no way that the screening questions themselves are 
suggestive that respondents answer the hypothetical scenarios in a certain way. 
 The inclusion of sympathizers was only utilized to augment the final sample to conform 
to the power analysis. Nevertheless, it is important to note that including sympathetic individuals 
in the sample is not expected to influence the validity of the results in any substantive way, given 
the high degree of similarity in opinions and attitudes that “activists” and “sympathizers” express 
toward a range of environmental topics (Crabtree, 2002). Furthermore, including sympathizers in 
the final sample is consistent with prior work that demonstrates that secondary stakeholders 
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routinely succeed in “drawing in” sympathetic third parties in such a manner that these third 
parties themselves become more active participants in advancing secondary stakeholders’ issues 
(Downey & Rohlinger, 2008; Lipsky, 1968; Tilly, 1978). Including sympathizers in the sample is 
expected to provide a strong test of the research hypotheses. 
 While there is some criticism that students constitute a “narrow data base” (Sears, 1986), 
more recent investigations demonstrate that student subjects do not intrinsically pose a problem 
for a study’s external validity (Druckman & Kam, 2009). Additionally, students constitute a 
demographic segment of the general population that is heavily represented among activists 
(Walgrave, Rucht, & van Aelst, 2010; Wong, 2015). Further, student-run chapters of such 
organizations as Greenpeace and Sierra Club have a diffuse presence throughout social media, 
further suggesting the high propensity for students to get involved with such entities (Wong, 
2015). In other words, being a student is not an occupation that precludes one’s ability to actively 
participate in any type of cause promoted by secondary stakeholders or to make similar decisions 
to those of non-student activists. Using students as participants in the present study is not 
dissimilar from recent research having argued that MBA students have the sophistication 
necessary to be utilized as adequate proxies for company shareholders (Bigelow, Lundmark, 
Parks, & Wuebker, 2014; Krause et al., 2014).  
 After eliminating observations due to missing data, the final sample used for analysis is 
comprised of 148 individuals, of which 95 (64%) are considered active participants in the 
environmental movement and 49 (36%) are considered sympathizers toward the environmental 
movement. 
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4.3.2. Procedure 
 I employed a two-by-two between-subjects research design, which yielded four 
experimental conditions. Each participant was randomly assigned to one of the four conditions. 
Each subject was told that he/she is “an active and important participant in a fictitious interest 
group—The Ecology Alliance—that is particularly concerned with the extent to which 
organizations promote sustainable development and/or the effective management of 
environmental problems”. All participants received experimental scenarios that were identical 
except for the manipulated factors, which represent the only differences between experimental 
cells. Figure 4 displays the four experimental conditions and the number of participants that were 
randomly assigned to each condition. Because of the simple randomization patterns in the 
software utilized to administer the experiment online (Qualtrics), and because the screening 
questions were asked after the completion of the experiment, the number of participants in each 
cell were slightly unbalanced; this is not unexpected or inherently problematic (Schulz & 
Grimes, 2002). A one-way ANOVA demonstrated no significant differences in the composition 
of active participants and sympathizers between experimental conditions (F = 0.38, p = 0.53). 
Additionally, two-sample tests of proportions (prtest in STATA 13.1) further confirmed that the 
proportion of active participants and sympathizers were not significantly different across 
conditions. 
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FIGURE 6 
Responses and Experimental Manipulations 
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4.3.3. Dependant Variable(s) 
 Intentions to engage in threatening actions. Participants were asked to respond to an 
adapted and abbreviated version of the previously validated Activism Orientation Scale (AOS) 
(Corning & Myers, 2002). Specifically, 17 of the original 35 items on the AOS were retained for 
the purposes of this study because many of the items were not applicable to the context of this 
study’s experimental scenario and/or did not reflect a tangible behavior that could be undertaken 
toward the firm (see: Appendix B). For example, items such as “vote in a non-presidential 
federal, state, or local election”, “keep track of the views of members of Congress regarding an 
issue important to you”, and “campaign by phone for a political candidate” were all removed. 
For each of the 17 items, participants rated their likelihood of undertaking each stated behavior 
Chapter 4 – Exploring Managerial Rhetoric to Secondary Stakeholders: Response Posture and the use of Impression Management 
 145 
using a scale with points of 0 (Extremely unlikely), 1 (Unlikely), 2 (Likely), or 3 (Extremely 
likely). Responses to all items were then summed, yielding an overall score of intent to engage in 
threatening actions between 0 and 51, with higher scores reflecting a greater intention to engage 
in threatening actions toward the firm (D = 0.86). 
 Evaluation of the firm’s corporate opportunity structure. Participants were asked to 
evaluate the firm’s corporate opportunity structure. Since there is no readily validated or 
established instrument to measure individuals’ beliefs pertaining to the firm’s corporate 
opportunity structure, I opted for a direct approach of asking respondents to evaluate whether 
“the organization and its executives are sufficiently receptive to social issues to be effectively 
targeted by interest groups”. Participants answered on a nine-point scale anchored at  – 4 = “no, 
certainly not” and 4 = “yes, certainly”. I chose to measure participants’ evaluations of the firm’s 
corporate opportunity structure with a single item because it meets three conditions stipulated by 
Wanous and Hudy (2001): the construct of interest can be regarded as (1) one-dimensional (see: 
Briscoe et al., 2014; King, 2008; McDonnell et al., 2015), should (2) be clear to respondents, and 
(3) sufficiently narrow. Furthermore, like organizational behavior scholars have argued for 
single-item measures of job satisfaction (e.g. Wanous, Reichers, & Hudy, 2001), this single-item 
measure of participants’ evaluations of the firm’s corporate opportunity structure also alleviates 
the need for redundant items, and adequately captures the construct I am testing. 
4.3.4. Independent Variables: Manager Response and Impression Management Strategies 
 I designed my experiment based on scenarios that manipulate managerial responses as 
being either accommodative or defiant and impression management tactics as being either 
flattering or intimidating. In other words, the independent measures in this study consist of the 
two possible experimental treatments. As mentioned above, to strengthen the internal validity of 
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the manipulations and to limit confounding information, the initial preface of information that 
each participant received pertaining to the firm and their role within the scenario was identical. 
Appendix C contains the experimental scenario and two experimental conditions that participants 
were subjected place in; the other two experimental conditions are simply permutations of the 
listed examples, as Figure 6 illustrated. 
 Manipulation of impression management tactics. To manipulate IM tactics, participants 
were presented with a scenario in which the firm’s CEO either utilizes flattering or intimidating 
IM tactics, as illustrated in Appendix C. Accordingly, flattery was coded as a value of 0 for the 
groups of participants that receive a response in which flattery tactics was used; intimidation 
therefore received a value of 1for the groups of participants that receive response in which 
intimidation was used. Manipulation checks confirmed the validity of the experimental 
manipulation of top managers’ IM tactics. Specifically, participants were asked: “without 
referring back to the first set of comments issued by JRE’s CEO, how would you rate these 
comments?”. Participants answered on a nine-point scale anchored at – 4 = “not confrontational 
at all” and 4 = “very confrontational”. Participants that received a flattering IM tactic viewed this 
set of comments as significantly less confrontational than those participants that received an 
intimidating IM tactic (0.55 vs. 1.27; t = 0.01). 
 Manipulation of response posture. To manipulate response posture, participants were 
presented a scenario in which the firm’s CEO either issued an accommodative or defiant 
response to secondary stakeholder demands, as illustrated in Appendix C. Consequently, 
accommodative response was coded as a value of 1 for the groups of participants that received a 
response that accommodated their demands; defiant response received a value of 0 for the groups 
of participants that received a response that did not accommodate their demands. Manipulation 
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checks also confirmed the validity of the experimental manipulation of managers’ response 
posture. Specifically, participants were asked: “without referring back to the (second) follow-up 
set of comments issued by JRE’s CEO, how would you rate these comments?”. Participants 
answered on a nine-point scale anchored at – 4 = “not cooperative at all” and 4 = “very 
cooperative”. Participants that received an accommodative response posture viewed it as 
significantly more cooperative than those participants that received a defiant response posture 
(1.03 vs. -0.37; t = 0.00). 
4.3.5. Analytical Approach 
 To test hypotheses 1 and 2, I compared the means of the group in condition 1 and 
condition 3, against the mean of the group in condition 2 and 4, using a t-test. To test hypothesis 
3, I compared the mean of the group in condition 1 against the mean of the group in condition 3, 
using a t-test. Finally, to test hypothesis 4, I compared the mean of the group in condition 2 
against the mean of the group in condition 4, using a t-test (Lattin, Carroll, & Green, 2003; 
Shadish et al., 2002). 
4.4. RESULTS 
 Table 7 shows the descriptive statistics for secondary stakeholders’ intentions to engage 
in threatening actions and evaluations of the firm’s corporate opportunity structure for each 
experimental cell. 
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TABLE 7 
Descriptive Statistics by Experimental Condition 
 
Variable Statistic Flattery u 
Defiant 
(Cond. 1) 
Flattery u 
Accommodative 
(Cond. 2) 
Intimidation u 
Defiant 
(Cond. 3) 
Intimidation u 
Accommodative 
(Cond. 4) 
Total 
Threatening 
actions 
Mean 21.24 20.27 21.48 21.79 21.19 
 s.d. 6.89 7.75 10.19 6.85 7.92 
Opportunity 
beliefs 
Mean 0.29 0.71 -0.55 0.88 0.28 
 s.d. 1.87 1.81 2.23 1.90 2.02 
 
 Table 8 shows the results of the t-tests that were used to test hypotheses 1 and 2. 
Hypothesis 1 stated that secondary stakeholders would execute a higher amount of threatening 
actions toward the firm as managerial response became more defiant. However, the results of the 
t-test fail to provide support for hypothesis 1; there is no significant difference in the threatening 
behavior of secondary stakeholders regardless of the posture of the response that the firm’s CEO 
issues. Hypothesis 2 stated that secondary stakeholder evaluations of the firm’s corporate 
opportunity structure would be more favorable as a response became more accommodative. The 
results of the t-test provide support for hypothesis 2; secondary stakeholder evaluations of the 
firm’s corporate opportunity structure are more favorable when the CEO issues an 
accommodative response. More specifically, it is possible to conclude with 99% confidence that 
and accommodative response is positively associated with secondary stakeholder evaluations of 
the firm’s corporate opportunity structure.  
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TABLE 8 
Means Comparison Defensive vs. Accommodative Response 
 
Variable Statistic Defiant 
(Cond. 1 & 
Cond. 3) 
Accommodative 
(Cond. 2 & 
Cond. 4) 
p 
Threatening actions Mean 21.36 20.78 0.33 
 s.d. 8.81 7.45  
 n 76 72  
Opportunity beliefs Mean -0.17 0.76 0.00 
 s.d. 0.24 0.22  
 n 76 72  
 
 Tables 9a and 9b show the results of the t-tests that were used to test hypotheses 3 and 4, 
respectively. Hypothesis 3 predicted that the positive relationship between a defiant response and 
secondary stakeholders’ threatening actions would be moderated by the usage of flattery, such 
that the relationship would be weaker with the usage of flattery. However, the results of the t-test 
fail to provide support for hypothesis 3; there is no significant difference in the threatening 
behavior of activist regardless of the impression management tactics that the firm’s CEO utilizes 
to frame a defiant response. Hypothesis 4 predicted that the positive relationship between an 
accommodative response and secondary stakeholder favorable evaluations of the firm’s 
corporate opportunity structure would be moderated by the usage of intimidation, such that the 
relationship would be weaker with the usage of intimidation. However, the results of the t-test 
fail to provide support for hypothesis 4; there is no significant difference in the opportunity 
beliefs of activist regardless of the impression management tactics that the firm’s CEO utilizes to 
frame an accommodative response.  
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TABLE 9A 
Means Comparison Flattery vs. Intimidation IM Tactic on Defiant Response 
Variable Statistic Flattering IM  Intimidating IM  p 
Threatening actions Mean 21.24 21.48 0.47 
 s.d. 6.89 10.19  
 n 34 42  
 
TABLE 9B 
Means Comparison Flattery vs. Intimidation IM Tactic on Accommodative Response 
Variable Statistic Flattering IM  Intimidating IM  p 
Opportunity beliefs Mean 0.71 0.88 0.64 
 s.d. 0.26 0.38  
 n 48 24  
 
4.5. DISCUSSION 
 This essay informs our understanding of the consequences of managerial responses as 
they relate to the subsequent behavior and actions of secondary stakeholders by examining how 
differences in responses issued by a targeted firm’s CEO influences secondary stakeholder 
evaluations of such responses and subsequent secondary stakeholder group actions and behavior. 
While the firm’s top managers are generally viewed as key figures in managing the firm’s 
secondary stakeholders and other external stakeholders (e.g. Fanelli et al., 2009; Finkelstein et 
al., 2009; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Thompson, 1967; Westley & Mintzberg, 1989), there is 
limited theoretical or empirical attention that has focused on understanding how managers’ 
rhetoric influence secondary stakeholder behavior and evaluations of the firm. As such, I drew 
on motivated cognition theory (Higgins & Molden, 2003; Kunda, 1990), and related work on 
cognitive appraisal theories of emotion (Roseman et al., 1990; Smith & Lazarus, 1993), to 
examine secondary stakeholder reactions to top manager responses in terms of how they 
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influence these entities threatening behaviors and evaluations of the firm. Accordingly, the study 
provides important insights pertaining to the consequences—or lack thereof—of the strategic use 
of language by the firm’s top managers toward secondary stakeholders. 
 First, the results suggest that the posture of managerial response—whether it is defiant or 
accommodative—has no significant influence over the behavior of secondary stakeholders; these 
entities do not exhibit a lesser or greater intent to engage in threatening behavior as a result of 
managers’ response posture. While somewhat surprising, these results appear to suggest that, 
given secondary stakeholders’ motivated cognitions, these entities are highly focused on seeing 
substantive actions and changes from the firms that they target and are relatively indifferent in 
regards to symbolic action in the form of response from management when it comes to 
modifying their behavior. Put differently, secondary stakeholders do not exhibit any intentions to 
modify their behavior, possibly until such a time as they see substantive changes implemented 
(or not). As such, it appears that behavior of secondary stakeholders may not be as susceptible to 
managers’ symbolic actions as the behavior of other external stakeholders, such as securities 
analysts (Fanelli & Grasselli, 2006; Fanelli et al., 2009). A central consequence of these results is 
that the firm’s top management may not be able to alter the behavior of secondary stakeholders 
that have issued demands of their firms through simply by using strategically worded responses. 
While responding in a defiant manner does not seem to arouse secondary stakeholders to behave 
in a more threatening manner toward the firm, responding in an accommodative manner does not 
seem any more effective in making these entities curb their threatening behaviors, by 
comparison. As such, it does not seem that a firm’s top managers can simply make secondary 
stakeholders go away by strategically telling them what they want to here. It appears that, at the 
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very least, managerial responses may have to be accompanied by some substantive action—even 
if a token one—in order to have any impact on the behavior of secondary stakeholders. 
 However, the results suggest that the posture of managerial response does have an 
influence over secondary stakeholders’ evaluations of the firm; these entities do have more 
favorable evaluations of the firm’s corporate opportunity structure as a result of an 
accommodative response. Generally, these findings support the argument that managerial 
responses do appear to constitute a hitherto neglected, albeit important, aspect of the firm’s 
corporate opportunity structure, as evaluated by secondary stakeholders. Substantively, these 
results suggest that top managers issuing an accommodative response, thought to be effective in 
calming secondary stakeholders down, may be doing so at the risk of sending signals—perhaps 
inadvertently—about the firm’s receptivity to working on issues advanced by secondary 
stakeholders. Taken together, the results of the analyses pertaining to hypothesis 1 and 
hypothesis 2 more importantly suggest that issuing an accommodative response may not present 
any strategic upside for management, especially if the goal is to utilize such a response as a 
symbolic gesture to appease secondary stakeholders without necessarily making any substantive 
commitments to working on their issues. Interestingly, issuing an accommodative response does 
not influence behavior but does send a message that the firm’s corporate opportunity structure is 
more attractive target, perhaps making the firm susceptible to additional demands from the focal 
group or other secondary stakeholders. As such, it might appear that when faced with secondary 
stakeholder demands, the best course of action—if management’s intention is to accommodate 
the demand with little interest for receiving other demands—is to do so quietly and away from 
the public eye.   
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 Finally, the findings suggest that impression management (IM) does not meaningfully 
alter the behavior of secondary stakeholders or their evaluations of the firm in any substantive 
way. In some way, these findings may suggest that secondary stakeholders tend to view IM in a 
more skeptical way than other stakeholders, especially stakeholders that are beholden to the firm 
in some fashion. For instance, prior work shows that IM may be effective in changing the 
behavior of customers that owe the firm money (Elsbach et al., 1998). As such, it is possible that 
other stakeholders that depend more strongly on the firm are more susceptible to taking IM at 
face value; for instance, it may suit these types of stakeholders’ self-serving biases to fall for 
ingratiation such as flattery (Vonk, 2002). From a managerial standpoint, the findings therefore 
suggest that IM may be an ineffective way of strategically framing responses toward secondary 
stakeholders. 
4.5.1. Contributions to Theory 
 This essay contributes to strategic management and organizational theory in multiple 
ways. First, from a strategic management perspective, I extended research on how top managers 
may utilize symbolic actions to manage the firm’s external stakeholders (Barnard, 1938; Fanelli 
et al., 2009; Finkelstein et al., 2009; Westley & Mintzberg, 1989) by examining managerial 
response to secondary stakeholders; entities whose actions and demands present important 
strategic consequences for firms. By demonstrating that the posture of top managers’ responses 
to secondary stakeholders influence evaluations of the firm’s corporate opportunity structure, I 
offer further insights as to specific forms of managerial rhetoric that top managers might be able 
to rely on in order to more effectively engage or dissuade external stakeholders from future 
action (see: Fanelli & Misangyi, 2006). Accordingly, it appears that different managerial 
responses may help the firm avoid the potentially costly resource commitments and policy 
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changes that are involved with implementing secondary stakeholder demands by sending signals 
pertaining to the firm’s corporate opportunity structure.  
 This study also helps to establish some of the boundary conditions pertaining to the 
effectiveness of symbolic action—specifically managerial rhetoric—targeted toward external 
stakeholders. Overall, it appears that managerial rhetoric might be generally ineffective in 
influencing the behavior of secondary stakeholders in ways that management may intend. As 
such, it is possible that a boundary condition around the use of symbolic action in the form of 
managerial rhetoric lies in the motivations and emotionality of the entities the firm’s managers 
are communicating to. Specifically, those entities that appear highly motivated to affect change 
within the firm, such as secondary stakeholders, may not be as susceptible to rhetoric as other 
stakeholders.  
 This study contributes to stakeholder theory by shedding important theoretical light on 
some the cognitive processes of secondary stakeholders. Specifically, I theorized about the 
nature of their motivated cognitive processes and emotion in their judgment of firms and firm 
responses to their demands. Building on motivated cognition theory, I argued that secondary 
stakeholders’ motivations to affect changes within firms would lead them to view defiant 
responses as inconsistent with their cognitive frames and lead them to engage in a greater degree 
of threatening behavior toward the firm. Additionally, I argued that these same motivations 
would lead them to interpret accommodative responses as consistent with their cognitive frames 
and lead them to form more favorable evaluations of the firm’s corporate opportunity structure. 
The findings offer initial support for the role of motivated cognition and how it influences 
secondary stakeholder evaluations of the firm as a result of managerial response rhetoric. 
Specifically, consistent with their motivations, secondary stakeholders evaluate the firm’s 
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corporate opportunity structure more favorably as a result of management issuing an 
accommodative response to their demands, in comparison to a defiant response. This study also 
draws needed attention to some of the important consequences of managerial response to 
secondary stakeholders. In general, stakeholder theory remains silent about the consequences of 
responses to secondary stakeholders; it largely assumes that defiant responses necessarily imply 
negative consequences and that accommodative responses imply positive consequences for the 
firm and top management. For example, work in the stakeholder theory literature cautions that  
“firms ignore the needs of the multitude of stakeholders they face at their own peril” (Eesley & 
Lenox, 2006: 765). Moreover, Edward Freeman originally stated: 
Some groups may have as an objective simply to interfere with the smooth 
operations of our business. For instance, some corporations must count "terrorist 
groups" as stakeholders. As unsavory as it is to admit that such "illegitimate" 
groups have a stake in our business, from the standpoint of strategic management, 
it must be done (1984: 53; emphasis added) 
However, contrary to these ideas, the present study’s findings indicate that top managers that 
accommodate secondary stakeholder demands may be doing so at the firm’s peril, by signaling 
that the firm may have an attractive corporate opportunity structure. Moreover, prior work has 
tended to view responses to various stakeholder groups (i.e. accommodate or not) as the final 
outcome of the interaction between a firm’s management and a given secondary stakeholder 
(Eesley & Lenox, 2006; King, 2008). In contrast, this study suggest that responding to secondary 
stakeholders, especially if done so in an accommodative manner, may only represent the 
beginning of the firm’s dealings with a given secondary stakeholder group and others in the field. 
 Finally, this essay further develops the construct of the corporate opportunity structure by 
articulating and testing how top managers’ responses to secondary stakeholders may constitute 
an important aspect of the firm’s corporate opportunity structure. In comparison to prior work 
that exclusively considers relatively static and observable features of the firm (e.g. firm 
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performance, firm reputation, CEO political ideology), I draw attention to how the behaviors and 
actions of top managers may also be an element of the corporate opportunity structure. This is an 
important extension of prior research, as it demonstrates that managers do have some level of 
discretion over the attractiveness of their firm’s corporate opportunity structure; one such 
mechanism is through their rhetoric. Furthermore, while prior work has also largely made 
assumptions related to how secondary stakeholders might evaluate the firm’s corporate 
opportunity structure, the present study is one of the first of its kind to attempt to actually capture 
secondary stakeholders’ evaluations of the firm’s corporate opportunity structure. 
4.5.2. Limitations and Future Research 
 It is important to note that great care was taken in designing the experimental scenario, 
following recommendations to elaborate it based on a real life case (Aguinis & Bradley, 2014); 
specifically, this scenario was based on the documented event in which Greenpeace and other 
environmental movements targeted Shell Oil Corp to abandon its drilling operations in the 
Arctic. Further, the participants that were utilized to construct the sample for analysis in this 
study were also selected carefully, using screening questions that allowed these individuals to be 
considered as active participants in the environmental movement, or highly sympathetic to it. 
Despite the care taken designing the experimental scenario and selecting representative 
participants, the main analysis revealed some non-significant findings, which motivate further 
reflection on possible limitations in this study ex post, but also lead to interesting future research 
suggestions. 
 First, it is possible that an experimental scenario makes it more difficult than originally 
anticipated to replicate many of the real world factors that may influence secondary stakeholder 
behaviors in light of a given managerial response to their demands. More specifically, it is 
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possible that eliciting the type of emotion and animosity that is often present in real instances of 
interactions between secondary stakeholders and firms (Markman et al., 2016; Rowley & 
Moldoveanu, 2003; Soule, 2009), in which certain types of responses might enflame or calm 
tensions in a more dramatic fashion, is more difficult to replicate in experimental scenarios than 
originally expected. Further, experimental scenarios may present too sterile a setting to examine 
the relationships of interest because many of these types of scenarios unfold over an extended 
period of time (Dutton & Dukerich, 1991), and include a theatrical dimension in which feedback 
from the general public and media outlets plays a more important role than was originally 
anticipated at the outset of this study (McDonnell & King, 2013; Tilly, 1978). Based on these 
considerations, one possible avenue for future research would be to examine the relationships of 
interest in a field setting or with detailed case studies with first-hand accounts to further build 
theory from an inductive perspective (Siggelkow, 2007). Another possible approach would be to 
design an experiment in which certain performance-feedback information was presented to 
secondary stakeholders; for instance, informing participants about how certain prominent media 
outlets were reporting on managers’ response and the legitimacy and success of the secondary 
stakeholder group in which they participate. Given the prominent role of the media as 
information intermediaries during these instances (King, 2008; McDonnell & King, 2013), it is 
possible that the inclusion of performance feedback information of this nature could refine an 
experimental scenario in a fashion that would further elicit the types of behavioral and cognitive 
outcomes from secondary stakeholders that were theorized about in this study. 
 Another possible limitation, although this study was consistent with previous experiments 
that outline there experimental conditions based on “ideal types” (Doty & Glick, 1994; Shadish 
et al., 2002), is that the distinction between the four experimental conditions was not as clear-cut 
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as what prior theory and examples that formed a basis for this scenario would suggest. However, 
developing even more extreme experimental conditions likely would have been ill-advised 
(Aguinis & Bradley, 2014). As such, future investigations may instead leverage within-subjects 
designs to enhance the potential for participants to pick up on the subtleties in the different types 
of responses. 
 This study drew theoretical attention to the importance of secondary stakeholders’ 
cognitive processes and the emotional frames through which they evaluate firms.  The results 
suggest interesting research avenues for further study of the cognitive processes of secondary 
stakeholders. Examining the cognitive and processes of secondary stakeholders in vivo may yield 
additionally insights about how secondary stakeholders’ cognitive processes support behavior. In 
doing so, researchers would be better able to observe the thought processes of individuals that 
participate in secondary stakeholder organizations in real-time as these individuals determine 
how they might act and evaluate the firm in light of managers’ responses. One approach to doing 
so would be to employ a verbal protocol approach (Ericsson & Simon, 1993).  
 Additionally, because secondary stakeholders may be opposed to the policies or programs 
that a firm has adopted in accordance with the priorities of its primary stakeholder groups 
(Clarkson, 1995), the responses that a targeted firm’s top managers offer may also influence the 
ongoing relationship that the firm maintains with its primary stakeholders. Accordingly, future 
work might benefit from expanding the scope of inquiry to consider the consequences of 
response on primary and secondary stakeholders in a more integrative fashion. 
4.5.3. Conclusion  
 In this study, I sought to understand how different types of top manager responses 
influence the cognitions and behaviors of secondary stakeholders. Overall, the findings 
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demonstrate that managerial response rhetoric does not appear to influence the behavior of 
secondary stakeholder in any meaningful way. However, the findings do demonstrate that 
managerial responses influence secondary stakeholders’ evaluations of the firm’s corporate 
opportunity structure. Altogether, the study informs thinking on the role of managerial rhetoric in 
managing the firm’s external stakeholders while also offering promising recommendations for 
future research. 
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Chapter 5 
GENERAL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
“If we knew what it was we were doing, it would not be called research, would 
it?” —Albert Einstein 
 
“You don’t learn to walk by following rules. You learn by doing, and by falling 
over… —Sir Richard Branson, Founder of Virgin Group  
 
5.1. What managerial attributes influence firm responsiveness to secondary stakeholders? 
 A firm’s response to a secondary stakeholder’s demands is important to its strategy 
because it often entails substantial resource commitments and/or policy changes that affect the 
way the company does business (McDonnell et al., 2015; Pacheco & Dean, 2015; Waldron et al., 
2013). However, despite facing similar—if not identical—secondary stakeholder demands, firms 
vary, often significantly, in the manner in which they respond to such entities. For example, in 
2008 Greenpeace challenged the sustainability of several grocery chains’ seafood sourcing 
practices; some firms modified their practices almost immediately (e.g. Trader Joe’s), while 
others lagged or did not respond at all (e.g. Costco, Publix) (Ram, 2012; Trenor & Mitchell, 
2013; Waldron et al., 2013). 
 These examples help to illustrate how current theoretical perspectives that are utilized to 
explain firm responsiveness to secondary stakeholders provide an incomplete picture of the 
factors that are involved in determining the firm’s responsiveness. Stakeholder-sided research is 
limited by the presumption that top managers, and by extension their firms, differ in their 
responses only to the extent that the attributes and behaviors of secondary stakeholders they 
encounter differ. Firm-sided research focuses on top managers’ perceptions of firm-level 
cognitive structures and filters but provides little understanding of the relationship between the 
attributes of top managers themselves and the how these translate toward response to secondary 
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stakeholder demands in particular. The firm-sided perspective provides only a limited 
understanding of the role of managerial decision-making in determining firm response because it 
omits any consideration of top managers’ own attributes and the cognitive processes by which 
those attributes influence their interpretations of, and responses to, those demands. However, 
secondary stakeholder demands constitute values-laden, emotionally charged, high discretion 
scenarios in which firm actions and behavior are likely to be influenced by top managers’ 
cognitive frames, and especially, personal values. Accordingly, my dissertation first finds 
motivation in the notion that responsiveness to secondary stakeholders is significantly influenced 
by factors related to the firm’s top managers themselves. 
 In Chapter 2, A Top Manager-Driven Process Model of Firm Response to Secondary 
Stakeholders: The Role Personal of Values and Passion, carefully drawing from work in social 
psychology that links personal values and passion to decision making and action, I developed a 
top manager-driven perspective of firm responsiveness to secondary stakeholder demands, 
defined as the degree to which the firm’s top managers are willing to accommodate (or deny) a 
secondary stakeholder demand and commit themselves (and the firm) to enacting their chosen 
posture toward the demand (Bundy et al., 2013; IRRC, 1993; Waldron et al., 2013). My dual 
process model positioned top managers’ personal values and passion as central, yet hitherto 
unconsidered, drivers of firm response to secondary stakeholder demands. In developing my 
theoretical perspective, I also built on prior research that demonstrates that secondary 
stakeholders coalesce around values-laden, emotionally charged social issues, and adopt 
positions and tactics that are often initially considered radical or illegitimate (Davis et al., 2005; 
den Hond & de Bakker, 2007; Markman et al., 2016; McDonnell & King, 2013; Rowley & 
Moldoveanu, 2003; Soule, 2009). Furthermore, I elaborated on the values-driven cognitive 
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process through which top managers’ personal norms pertaining to secondary stakeholder 
demands become activated (Harland et al., 2007; Schwartz, 1973, 1974; Stern, 2000) and 
influence the posture of the firm’s response (positive or negative), and then expanded on the role 
of passion toward the issues that form the basis of secondary stakeholder demands in 
determining top managers’ level of commitment to their response (Cardon et al., 2009; Vallerand 
et al., 2003).  
 In doing so Chapter 2 addresses the dissertation’s first guiding research question—what 
managerial attributes influence firm responsiveness to secondary stakeholders?—and also makes 
important contributions to strategic management and organization research. First, my theoretical 
framework contributes to stakeholder theory by specifying the means by which personal values 
influence perceptions of stakeholder salience. Although stakeholder theorists have suggested that 
perceptions of stakeholder attributes might be shaped by the values of the top executives (Agle et 
al., 1999; Mitchell et al., 1997), this work stops short of specifying the socio-cognitive 
mechanisms and pathways that connect a top manager’s personal values to his or her attributions 
of stakeholder salience. Second, this chapter also importantly recognizes secondary stakeholders 
as increasingly important actors that affect firm strategies and competitive behavior in highly 
visible ways, but that are not being accounted for in more established frameworks. The third 
contribution is to the strategic leadership and upper-echelons literature by expanding upon the 
socio-cognitive process through which top managers’ values influence action (see: Finkelstein et 
al., 2009). Additionally, by articulating these arguments within the scenario of a secondary 
stakeholder demand, I heeded a call for more configurational approaches to studying the firms’ 
top managers; for instance, by accounting for how individual attributes of top managers interact 
with features of their environment (Busenbark et al., 2016; Finkelstein et al., 2009). 
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 In Chapter 3, Firm Receptivity to Secondary Stakeholders: The Role of Managerial 
Political Ideology, I build on a part of the theoretical developments presented in Chapter 2 to 
empirically examine the influence of an under-examined but potentially important individual 
attribute—political ideology—on firm responsiveness to secondary stakeholders. Political 
ideologies are central, and relatively stable, features of individuals’ personal values and broader 
cognitive makeup (Jost, 2006) and thus, offer an accurate measure that reflects the theoretical 
argument made in Chapter 2 that top manager’s values determine response. Substantively, I 
hypothesized that the degree of liberalism in TMTs political ideologies is positively related to the 
firm’s receptivity to secondary stakeholder demands. However, recognizing that firm receptivity 
to secondary stakeholders likely implicates important debates within the executive suite, I also 
argued that the degree of political ideology separation within a focal TMT may negatively or 
positively moderate the relationship between TMT liberalism and firm receptivity. Finally, I 
considered the influential role of the firm’s CEO; hypothesizing that the CEO’s degree of 
liberalism is positively associated with firm receptivity to secondary stakeholders. However, I 
hypothesize that the positive relationship between CEO liberalism and firm receptivity to 
secondary stakeholder demands would be stronger as separation between the CEO’s ideology 
and that of the TMT decreases. 
 The analyses of a unique dataset, which included extensive information on top managers’ 
personal political contributions, offered general support for my research hypotheses. 
Substantively, the results provide empirical support for a values-based theory of managers’ 
receptivity to secondary stakeholders. The results from Chapter 3 also made some noteworthy 
contributions to strategic management and organization research, as well as toward practice. 
First, I contributed to research on upper echelons and strategic leadership by emphasizing the 
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role of mangers’ personal values in shaping their firm’s receptivity to secondary stakeholder 
demands. This study also contributes to stakeholder theory by outlining new theoretical and 
empirical insights concerning the role of top managers’ personal values and articulating how 
these characteristics act as important firm-sided drivers of firm receptivity to secondary 
stakeholders (Eesley & Lenox, 2006). In addition, prior work has tended to focus almost 
exclusively on the likelihood of firm concession. By examining and measuring receptivity per se, 
a continuous outcome, I provided important insights pertaining to how firms generally engage 
with secondary stakeholders as an element of their broader strategic agenda.  
 In addition to theoretical contributions, important practical advice seems to arise from 
Chapter 3. Most importantly, it can make executives aware of their own natural tendencies to 
inject their personal values into decision-making and evaluations of secondary stakeholder 
demands; perhaps they would respond to secondary stakeholders in a fashion that is inconsistent 
with the strategic objectives of the organization or with the priorities of the organization’s 
primary stakeholders. 
5.2. What are the consequences of managers’ response rhetoric? 
 Chapter 4, Exploring Managerial Rhetoric to Secondary Stakeholders: Response Posture 
and the Use of Impression Management Offsetting, extends theorization about the role of top 
managers during firm interactions with secondary stakeholders to understanding the impact of 
managers’ response rhetoric on secondary stakeholder behavior and evaluations of the firm. I 
drew on motivated cognition theory (Higgins & Molden, 2003; Kunda, 1990) to investigate 
secondary stakeholder reactions to top manager response rhetoric. Specifically, I argued that 
secondary stakeholders’ motivations to affect changes within firms would lead them to view 
defiant responses as inconsistent with their cognitive frames and lead them to engage in a greater 
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degree of threatening behavior toward the firm. Additionally, I argued that these same 
motivations would lead them to interpret accommodative responses as consistent with their 
cognitive frames and lead them to form more favorable evaluations of the firm’s corporate 
opportunity structure. Additionally, I considered whether and how top managers may also 
capitalize on the emotional mechanism of secondary stakeholders’ motivated cognitions (Hinsz 
et al., 1997; Weston et al., 2006) and strategically use impression management (IM) tactics to 
‘offset’ the potential severity of the consequences associated with each of these response 
postures.  
 The results of the study offered support for the role of motivated cognition and how it 
influences secondary stakeholder evaluations of the firm as a result of managerial response 
rhetoric. Specifically, consistent with their motivations, secondary stakeholders evaluate the 
firm’s corporate opportunity structure more favorably as a result of management issuing an 
accommodative response to their demands, in comparison to a defiant response. However, the 
results also suggest that the firm’s top management might not be able to alter the behavior of 
secondary stakeholders that have issued demands of their firms through simply by using 
strategically worded responses.  
 This essay contributed to strategic management and organizational theory in multiple 
ways. First, by demonstrating that top managers’ responses to secondary stakeholders influence 
evaluations of the firm’s corporate opportunity structure, the essay offers further insights 
suggesting that different managerial responses may help the firm avoid the potentially costly 
resource commitments and policy changes that are involved with implementing secondary 
stakeholder demands by sending signals pertaining to the firm’s corporate opportunity structure. 
The study also helps to establish some of the boundary conditions pertaining to the effectiveness 
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of symbolic action—specifically managerial rhetoric—targeted toward external stakeholders; 
managerial rhetoric might be generally ineffective in influencing the behavior of secondary 
stakeholders in ways that management may intend. Finally, contrary to stakeholder theorists’ 
main assumptions about the consequences of certain types of response postures, this study 
demonstrated that top managers that accommodate secondary stakeholder demands may be doing 
so at the firm’s peril, by signaling that the firm may have an attractive corporate opportunity 
structure.  
5.3. Beyond the Scope of the Dissertation: Overarching Contributions and Future Research 
 Ultimately, the impact and overall contributions of this dissertation are not only a 
reflection of whether or not I was able to answer some of its guiding research questions, but also 
will be determined by the future research questions and scholarly conversations that my 
dissertation might open up. Overall, the general thrust of the dissertation—examining the role 
and influence of top managers during firm interactions with secondary stakeholders—is 
positioned within an extremely novel phenomenon and novel stream of the strategic management 
literature.  
 In general, our knowledge on how firms and secondary stakeholders interact, and the 
influence that top managers have over this situations remains in its infancy. However, secondary 
stakeholders have been recognized as increasing important entities that may influence firms in 
noteworthy strategic and performance-related ways. For example,  
In the summer of 2011, Greenpeace launched a campaign against large sportswear 
companies including Nike and Adidas with the aim of reducing global water 
pollution. The decisions these companies faced were central to their strategies, 
entailed substantial commitment of resources, and required that these companies 
go beyond their own practices to work with suppliers to achieve environmental 
goals (Pacheco & Dean, 2015: 1093). 
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While not essential for the firm’s survival, secondary stakeholders can impose costs, disrupt 
routines, and force policy and practical changes that may make it increasingly difficult for a firm 
to acquire and maintain a competitive advantage; especially if the firm’s competitors are not 
subjected to these same types of nonmarket pressures (cf. Waldron et al., 2013). Additionally, 
the type of damage that secondary stakeholders may level toward some of the firm’s intangible 
resources, such as its reputation (Eesley et al., in press; McDonnell & King, 2013), may have a 
detriment effect on the firm’s ability to retain customers, or to retain and recruit skilled 
employees. Moreover, the manner in which firms respond to secondary stakeholder demands can 
have lasting consequences for the way they are perceived by financial markets and the general 
public (Lamin & Zaheer, 2012). My dissertation has asked some essential questions, and 
provided some empirical evidence on this topic, which contributes to strategic management and 
organizational science in noteworthy ways, and that stand to initiate future inquiries in this area. 
 First, my dissertation demonstrates both theoretically and empirically, that top managers 
are key determinants of firm responsiveness to secondary stakeholders, and that their decisions 
and actions in these scenarios are heavily influenced by their personal values. From a strategic 
management standpoint, the theory and empirical evidence contained within my dissertation 
offers a micro-foundational account of how secondary stakeholder demands may impact firms’ 
strategic and competitive behavior. Though they do not compete directly with firms for 
resources, secondary stakeholders have become a distinct and common source of external 
pressure and strategic opportunity for firms. Yet their tactics, which are affective in nature and 
focus on broad, socio-political issues, differ significantly from the transactional or regulatory 
nature of primary stakeholder claims and present unique challenges to top managers. By 
theoretically highlighting the role of top managers’ values in influencing firm responsiveness to 
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these types of demands and laying out the processes by which these attributes affect the 
cognitive antecedents that influence firm responsiveness, I offered unique and valuable insights 
into the cause of variation in response to secondary stakeholder demands. 
Furthermore, this dissertation advances upper echelons theory in a number of ways. First, 
I expanded theory regarding the distinctive cognitive process through which values influence 
managerial choice. Given the recent increase of work focused on top managers’ personal values 
(Chin et al., 2013; Christensen et al., 2015; Hemingway & Maclagan, 2004), this is a needed 
theoretical refinement as upper echelons theory sees top managers’ cognitive bases and values as 
operating through similar processes (Hambrick & Mason, 1984), which is problematic from a 
social-psychological standpoint. Second, this dissertation enriches our understanding of how top 
managers may mold the firm to reflect their own personal values and ideologies through the 
firm’s responsiveness to secondary stakeholder demands; an action emblematic of the firm’s 
stakeholder engagement orientation and broader social strategy.  
 Finally, this dissertation also provided valuable insights pertaining to whether, how, and 
why top mangers’ response rhetoric influences secondary stakeholder behavior in any 
substantive way. Overall, it appears that managerial rhetoric might be generally ineffective in 
influencing the behavior of secondary stakeholders in ways that management may intend. 
Moreover, top managers that accommodate secondary stakeholder demands may be doing so at 
the firm’s peril, by signaling that the firm may have an attractive corporate opportunity structure. 
As such, this dissertation also demonstrates that how mangers respond to secondary stakeholders, 
especially if done so in an accommodative manner, may only represent the beginning of the 
firm’s dealings with a given secondary stakeholder group and others in the field. 
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 Building on these contributions and the dissertation’s guiding research questions, it is 
also possible to envision several potentially fruitful areas of future inquiry. First, I believe that 
the theoretical arguments presented in the dissertation lend themselves to studying the nature of 
firm response to other ambiguous and emotionally charged strategic situations that may resemble 
the decision-making scenario secondary stakeholder demands present for a firm’s top managers; 
for instance, certain types of crises or other natural disasters and traumatic events. Additionally, 
this dissertation opens the possibility of considering the extent to which top managers personal 
values may form a hitherto unconsidered basis for the development and refinement of firms’ 
dynamic political management capabilities (Oliver & Holzinger, 2008), which allow firms to 
acquire and sustain competitive advantages through nonmarket channels. 
 Additionally, one logical follow-up question to the dissertation’s first guiding research 
question that warrants being pursued is: To what extent do managers influence firm 
responsiveness to secondary stakeholders? In light of my findings, and of the existing body of 
work that highlights the influence of stakeholder-sided, and firm-level factors on firm 
responsiveness to secondary stakeholders, it would be important to understand the extent to 
which stakeholder-sided, firm-level, and managerial-level factors each contribute to firm 
responsiveness when they are considered in an integrative fashion. Concretely, one possible 
approach to examining this question would be to leverage the variance partitioning approach, 
which has been recently utilized to help explain varying levels of managerial discretion across 
national contexts (Crossland & Hambrick, 2007, 2011) and the influence of CEOs over firm 
performance across time (Quigley & Hambrick, 2015). Such an approach would allow scholars 
to better understand the proportion of variance in firm responsiveness that could be attributable 
to stakeholder-sided, firm-level, and managerial-level factors. Another potential approach to 
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examining this question would be to leverage fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
(fsQCA) (Ragin, 2000, 2008). This approach would allow scholars to identify the configuration 
of stakeholder-sided, firm-level, and managerial-level attributes that yield more positive and 
more negative responses to secondary stakeholders. 
 Second, another important follow-up question that would warrant being pursued is: What 
other managerial attributes might influence firm responsiveness to secondary stakeholders? The 
obvious area of inquiry that emerges from this dissertation is to further examine the role of top 
managers’ passion toward the issues forming a basis for secondary stakeholder demands; which 
was not empirically examined in this dissertation. Recent work in the strategic leadership and 
upper echelons tradition also highlights the potential of examining the influence of top 
managers’ regulatory focus. Regulatory focus theory is a theory from psychology that suggests 
that people are motivated to pursue goals through two coexisting internal mechanism: a 
promotion focus and a prevention focus (Higgins, 1998; Higgins, Shah, & Friedman, 1997; 
Lanaj, Chang, & Johnson, 2012). Both promotion focus and prevention focus direct people 
towards goal pursuit but do so through different motivational and behavioral processes (Lanaj et 
al., 2012). Examining the role of regulatory focus might be important because it captures top 
managers’ motivational orientation; the influence of top managers’ cognitive frames and values 
are mediated though motivational processes including how a manager is oriented to approach a 
strategic decision, as determined by his or her regulatory focus (Gamache et al., 2015; Lanaj et 
al., 2012). Thus, by focusing on top managers’ regulatory focus, future research could better 
understand one of the direct mechanisms that may lead to top managers to more proactively 
engage with their secondary stakeholders. Additionally, recent work on CEO temporal focus 
(Nadkarni & Chen, 2014) also reveals some potential, as it could be conjecture that more future-
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oriented top mangers are potentially more inclined to respond favorably to secondary 
stakeholders, compared to more past-oriented top managers. Furthermore, secondary stakeholder 
demands may represent important scenarios for certain top managers to engage in narcissistic 
displays of power or self-indulgence; examining how top manager, especially CEO, narcissism 
influences these individuals’ responses to secondary stakeholders may represent an additionally 
interesting line of inquiry. Moreover, important theoretical and empirical insights may be gained 
by studying the influence of board structure and composition—specifically, female and minority 
representation—on response to secondary stakeholders. All of the above are but a handful of the 
numerous important theoretical and empirical questions that emerge from this dissertation. 
 Finally, it is possible that secondary stakeholders have an indirect influence over CEO 
compensation arrangements. Extending the theory of executive job demands (Chen, 2015; 
Hambrick, Finkelstein, & Mooney, 2005), one possible argument that could be made is that 
CEOs who are hired in firms that face higher secondary stakeholder pressure will face higher job 
demands, since the array of firm stakeholders is possibly more broad, and managing them 
requires some considerable degrees of managerial time and attention. Given the possibility of 
higher job demands that accompany being hired into a firm that faces a greater amount of 
secondary stakeholder demands, CEOs hired into those firms may have greater bargaining power 
for setting their initial compensation, and be compensated more handsomely that their peers 
hired into firms that face less secondary stakeholder pressure. 
5.4. Conclusion 
 In the three essays (Chapter 2, Chapter, 3, and Chapter 4), I have examined the role and 
influence of top managers during firm interactions with secondary stakeholders. The theory and 
empirical evidence presented throughout this dissertation present exciting evidence that top 
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mangers matter a great deal in determining how the firm will respond to secondary stakeholders, 
and that top managers’ personal values are particularly important predictors of responsiveness. 
Further, the results indicate that studying the role and influence of top managers during firm 
interactions with secondary stakeholders is indeed a fruitful avenue for future research. Top 
managers may also find important insights and advice from these essays. 
 I hope that the dissertation advance our understanding of not just the increasingly 
important strategic influence of secondary stakeholders over firm behavior and performance, but 
also about the important and proximal managerial factors within the corporate upper-echelon that 
influences the firm during such interactions. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Supplementary Analyses: Managerial Ideology and Receptivity 
TABLE A1 
Influence of Top Management Liberalism on Receptivity 
 Receptivity = E0 + E1 Political Ideology + 6Ek Controls + H 
 Model 7  Model 8 
Variables E p LCI95% UCI95%  E p LCI95% UCI95% 
TMT liberalism 
(weighted) 
0.265 
(0.131) 
0.02 0.008 0.522      
TMT liberal pres.      0.176 
(0.084) 
0.02 0.012 0.341 
Controls          
TMT age 0.033 
(0.013) 
0.01 0.007 0.059  0.033 
(0.013) 
0.01 0.007 0.059 
Female rep. -0.679 
(0.364) 
0.06 -1.392 0.033  -0.665 
(0.372) 
0.07 -1.394 0.064 
TMT politics -0.001 
(0.001) 
0.33 -0.003 0.001  -0.001 
(0.001) 
0.29 -0.003 0.001 
Employees -0.075 
(0.363) 
0.04 -0.147 -0.004  -0.081 
(0.036) 
0.03 -0.152 -0.010 
ROA 0.068 
(0.080) 
0.39 -0.089 0.225  0.075 
(0.084) 
0.37 -0.089 0.238 
Intercept -1.155 
(0.220) 
0.11 -2.558 0.249  -1.248 
(0.723) 
0.08 -2.665 0.168 
Industry effects Yes     Yes    
Cluster by firm Yes     Yes    
N 270     270    
F2 207.92     208.76    
Notes: Coefficient estimates are reported with robust standard errors in parentheses. One-tailed tests for 
hypothesized variables, two-tailed tests for control variables. 
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TABLE A2 
Curvilinear Effect of Ideology Separation on Receptivity 
 Receptivity = E0 + E1 Political Ideology + 6Ek Controls + H 
 Model 9  Model 10 
Variables E p LCI95% UCI95%  E p LCI95% UCI95% 
TMT separation 0.721 
(0.323) 
0.01 0.088 1.353  0.700 
(0.938) 
0.23 -1.139 2.539 
Separation (squared)      0.039 
(0.281) 
0.49 -3.182 3.262 
Controls          
CEO liberalism 0.173 
(0.173) 
0.32 -0.166 0.512  0.174 
(0.183) 
0.34 -0.185 0.533 
TMT size -0.056 
(0.026) 
0.03 -0.107 -0.005  -0.056 
(0.026) 
0.03 -0.108 -0.004 
TMT age 0.047 
(0.016) 
0.00 0.016 0.077  0.047 
(0.015) 
0.00 0.017 0.076 
Female rep. -0.564 
(0.424) 
0.18 -1.394 0.266  -0.563 
(0.428) 
0.19 -1.402 0.275 
TMT politics -0.001 
(0.001) 
0.37 -0.003 0.001  -0.001 
(0.001) 
0.37 -0.002 0.001 
Employees -0.104 
(0.033) 
0.00 -0.169 -0.039  -0.104 
(0.033) 
0.00 -0.168 -0.038 
ROA 0.120 
(0.078) 
0.12 -0.032 0.272  0.120 
(0.078) 
0.13 -0.033 0.274 
Intercept -1.609 
(0.970) 
0.10 -3.510 0.291  -1.609 
(0.970) 
0.10 -3.513 0.293 
Industry effects Yes     Yes    
Cluster by firm Yes     Yes    
N 200     200    
F2 246.92     249.59    
Notes: Coefficient estimates are reported with robust standard errors in parentheses. One-tailed tests for hypothesized variables, 
two-tailed tests for control variables. 
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TABLE A3 
GLS Estimations of Top Management Liberalism on Receptivity 
 Receptivity = E0 + E1 Political Ideology + 6Ek Controls + H 
 Model 11  Model 12 
Variables E p LCI95% UCI95%  E p LCI95% UCI95% 
TMT liberalism 0.260 
(0.079) 
0.00 0.105 0.416      
TMT liberal 
rep. 
     0.306 
(0.089) 
0.00 0.131 0.480 
Controls          
TMT age 0.035 
(0.005) 
0.00 0.024 0.045  0.032 
(0.006) 
0.00 0.019 0.045 
Female rep. 0.084 
(0.149) 
0.57 -0.208 0.376  0.107 
(0.145) 
0.46 -1.776 0.392 
TMT politics -0.001 
(0.001) 
0.44 -0.001 0.001  -0.001 
(0.001) 
0.37 -0.001 0.001 
Employees -0.045 
(0.205) 
0.03 -0.085 -0.005  -0.053 
(0.021) 
0.01 -0.094 -0.013 
ROA 0.194 
(0.049) 
0.00 0.098 0.291  0.167 
(0.049) 
0.00 -0.070 0.263 
Intercept -1.669 
(0.257) 
0.00 -2.174 -1.167  -1.478 
(0.330) 
0.00 -2.124 -0.830 
Industry effects Yes     Yes    
Year effects Yes     Yes    
Cluster by firm Yes     Yes    
N 222     222    
F2 97.81     96.50    
Notes: Coefficient estimates are reported with robust standard errors in parentheses. One-tailed tests for 
hypothesized variables, two-tailed tests for control variables. 
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TABLE A4 
GLS Estimations of Top Management Ideology Separation on Receptivity 
 Receptivity = E0 + E1 Political Ideology + 6Ek Controls + H 
 Model 13  Model 14 
Variables E p LCI95% UCI95%  E p LCI95% UCI95% 
TMT separation 0.718 
(0.231) 
0.00 0.266 1.172  0.609 
(0.280) 
0.01 0.121 1.169 
TMT liberalism      -0.044 
(0.212) 
0.43 -0.448 0.384 
TMT lib. u TMT 
sep. 
     0.635 
(1.071) 
0.27 -1.464 2.734 
Controls          
CEO liberalism -0.141 
(0.130) 
0.28 -0.396 0.115  -0.036 
(0.199) 
0.59 -0.427 0.355 
TMT size -0.004 
(0.023) 
0.86 -0.041 -0.049  0.017 
(0.025) 
0.67 -0.032 0.066 
TMT age 0.052 
(0.011) 
0.00 0.030 0.074  0.051 
(0.013) 
0.00 0.023 0.077 
Female rep. -0.033 
(0.250) 
0.90 -0.523 0.457  -0.061 
(0.289) 
0.83 -0.626 0.505 
TMT politics -0.000 
(0.000) 
0.90 -0.001 0.001  -0.000 
(0.000) 
0.46 -0.002 0.001 
Employees -0.145 
(0.031) 
0.01 -0.169 -0.039  -0.154 
(0.036) 
0.00 -0.225 -0.083 
ROA 0.169 
(0.062) 
0.01 -0.032 0.272  0.181 
(0.076) 
0.02 0.032 0.330 
Intercept -2.431 
(0.690) 
0.00 -3.784 -1.078  -2.350 
(0.843) 
0.00 -4.004 -0.697 
Industry effects Yes     Yes    
Year effects Yes     Yes    
Cluster by firm Yes     Yes    
N 157     157    
F2 78.15     79.34    
Notes: Coefficient estimates are reported with robust standard errors in parentheses. One-tailed tests for hypothesized 
variables, two-tailed tests for control variables. 
 
Appendices 
 201 
TABLE A5 
GLS Estimations of CEO Ideology and Separation on Receptivity on Receptivity 
 Receptivity = E0 + E1 Political Ideology + 6Ek Controls + H 
 Model 15  Model 16 
Variables E p LCI95% UCI95%  E p LCI95% UCI95% 
CEO liberalism -0.093 
(0.113) 
0.20 -0.314 0.129  -0.129 
(0.128) 
0.16 -0.380 0.121 
CEO-TMT separation      0.526 
(0.199) 
0.01 0.134 0.917 
CEO lib. u TMT sep.      0.465 
(0.554) 
0.20 -0.621 1.624 
Controls          
CEO age -0.026 
(0.007) 
0.00 -0.039 -0.013  -0.030 
(0.007) 
0.00 -0.045 0.016 
CEO gender -0.142 
(0.196) 
0.47 -0.526 0.241  -0.096 
(0.195) 
0.62 -0.478 0.286 
TMT size -0.027 
(0.023) 
0.23 -0.017 0.072  0.029 
(0.026) 
0.26 -0.022 0.080 
TMT age 0.060 
(0.012) 
0.00 0.037 0.083  0.064 
(0.013) 
0.00 0.038 0.089 
Female rep. -0.237 
(0.225) 
0.29 -0.678 0.205  -0.266 
(0.266) 
0.32 -0.788 0.256 
TMT politics -0.001 
(0.001) 
0.49 -0.001 0.001  -0.000 
(0.001) 
0.97 -0.002 0.002 
Employees -0.078 
(0.025) 
0.00 -0.126 -0.029  -0.134 
(0.032) 
0.00 -0.197 -0.072 
ROA 0.102 
(0.060) 
0.09 -0.014 0.219  0.156 
(0.078) 
0.02 -0.027 0.285 
Intercept -1.640 
(0.717) 
0.02 -3.045 -0.235  -1.441 
(0.828) 
0.08 -3.063 0.182 
Industry effects Yes     Yes    
Year effects Yes     Yes    
Cluster by firm Yes     Yes    
N 157     157    
F2 85.26     107.32    
Notes: Coefficient estimates are reported with robust standard errors in parentheses; coefficients in interaction are mean-centered. 
One-tailed tests for hypothesized variables, two-tailed tests for control variables. 
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APPENDIX B 
Modified Activism Orientation Scale 
Items Scale 
INSTRUCTIONS:  
Thinking about the CEO's remarks concerning your special 
interest group's actions, please respond to the following items 
by indicating how likely it is that you might engage in each of 
the following activities. 
 
Very unlikely Unlikely Likely Very likely 
Display a poster or bumper sticker with an anti-JRE message 0 1 2 3 
Engage in an activity against JRE in which you knew you 
would be arrested 
0 1 2 3 
Organize an awareness event (e.g. talk, support group, march) 0 1 2 3 
Campaign door-to-door to mount support for your special 
interest group 
0 1 2 3 
Engage in a physical confrontation with a JRE representative 0 1 2 3 
Send a letter or e-mail expressing your group's opinion to the 
editor of a periodical or television show 
0 1 2 3 
Engage in an illegal act as part of anti-JRE protests 0 1 2 3 
Boycott JRE and its CEO 0 1 2 3 
Distribute information about your group's cause 0 1 2 3 
Engage in an anti-JRE activity in which you suspect there 
would be a confrontation with the police or possible arrest 
0 1 2 3 
Send a letter of email expressing your group's opinion to a 
public official 
0 1 2 3 
Attend and disrupt JRE's shareholder meeting 0 1 2 3 
Start a petition against JRE 0 1 2 3 
Block access to JRE buildings with your body 0 1 2 3 
Wear a t-shirt or button with an anti-JRE message 0 1 2 3 
Campaign by phone to mount support for your special interest 
group 
0 1 2 3 
Engage in an anti-JRE activity in which you fear for you 
personal safety 
0 1 2 3 
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APPENDIX C 
Example of Experimental Manipulations 
Description of the initial scenario (Identical for all participants) 
You are an active and important participant in a special interest group—The Ecology Alliance—that is 
particularly concerned with the extent to which organizations promote sustainable development and/or the 
effective management of environmental problems. 
 
The JRE Corporation, a large oil and gas company, recently had its plan to drill for oil in the Chukchi Sea 
in the Alaskan Arctic approved by the United States Congress. Since that approval, both of JRE’s rigs--the 
Northern Light and the Polaris Star--have failed routine inspections. However, JRE plans to use the 
Northern Light to drill for oil in the Alaskan Arctic in less than two weeks from now. In addition, an 
environmental analysis revealed a 75 percent chance of a major oil spill if all of the Chukchi Sea's oil is 
produced. 
 
In a recent statement, Robyn Fontaine, the Executive Director of Resisting Environmental Destruction on 
Indigenous Lands stated: “JRE’s Arctic venture is seriously reckless. This company has no capability to 
address an oil spill in unpredictable ice conditions and has proven in previous attempts that they are not 
equipped for the harsh and volatile conditions of the Chukchi Sea.” 
 
As a result of these developments, your special interest group has decided to publicly denounce JRE on its 
website. As an active and important participant in your interest group, consider the following information: 
 
x Through publicly denouncing JRE, your interest group expects that JRE will—at a minimum—
ensure that the rigs it is using to drill for oil in the Arctic are adequately maintained and compliant 
with routine inspection standards; 
x Any response from JRE executives that does not comply with your interest group’s demands will 
be considered a failure for your group and by the environmental activist community at large. 
 
 
Intimidating IM Tactic Flattering IM Tactic 
 
The Ecology Alliance has undertaken a very ill 
advised course-of-action regarding policies and 
practices that are of primary concern to the JRE 
Corporation and its shareholders. Continued actions 
executed against JRE will not be taken lightly, as 
JRE is committed to leveraging all necessary 
resources in order to defend its reputation, and does 
not take kindly to the Ecology Alliance’s current 
actions. 
 
Defiant Response 
 
At the present time, I have determined that it is in 
the best interest of the JRE Corporation to maintain 
our current stance on drilling for oil in the Arctic, 
including our intentions to use both the Northern 
Light and Polaris Star rigs as-is. JRE has no 
intention of altering our objectives or of revisiting 
the manner in which our rigs are inspected for 
compliance with safety and environmental 
standards. 
 
The Ecology Alliance has undertaken a very 
commendable course-of-action regarding policies 
and practices of primary concern to the JRE 
Corporation and its shareholders. Continued actions 
executed against JRE will be considered carefully, 
as JRE is committed to leveraging all necessary 
resources in order to enhance its reputation, and 
remains receptive to the Ecology Alliance’s current 
actions. 
 
Accommodative Response 
 
At the present time, I have determined that it is in 
the best interest of the JRE Corporation to revise 
our current stance on drilling for oil in the Arctic, 
including our intentions to use both the Northern 
Light and Polaris Star. JRE has every intention of 
modifying our objectives and of revisiting the 
manner in which our rigs are inspected to ensure 
their compliance with safety and environmental 
standards. 
 
